Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-93-194
Friday
8 October 1993

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FBIS-EEU-93-194 *8 October 1993*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Owen, Stoltenberg Consider 'New Global Approach' *[TANJUG]* 1
'New Plan' for Bosnia, RSK Reported *[TANJUG]* 1
Izetbegovic Condemns UN Inaction in Bosnia *[Sarajevo Radio]* 2

BULGARIA

Videnov Speech at Socialist Party Plenum *[VECHERNI NOVINI 27-28 Sep]* 3
Article Calls For Socialist Party Congress *[DUMA 29 Sep]* 8
Commentary Views Power Held by BSP *[KONTINENT 5 Oct]* 9
Daily Publishes SDS Conference Statements *[DEMOKRATSIYA 4 Oct]* 10
Dimitrov Views Statements *[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK 4 Oct]* 12
Commentary Analyses Conference *[STANDART NEWS 4 Oct]* 13
DPS Leader Dogan on Ties With Other Parties *[PRAVA I SVOBODI 1 Oct]* 13
Commentary on Politicians' Attitudes to Moscow Events *[KONTINENT 5 Oct]* 15
Kozloduy Nuclear Plant To Receive European Loan *[BTA]* 15
Ex-King Simeon Comments on Political Intentions *[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK 30 Sep]* 16

CZECH REPUBLIC

German Defense Minister Arrives for Visit *[CTK]* 17
Comments on NATO *[CTK]* 17
Meets With Havel *[CTK]* 17
Klaus Explains Government Salary Increase *[TELEGRAF 2 Oct]* 18
Urges U.S. To Avoid Protectionism *[CTK]* 18
Zieleniec Says International Situation May Worsen *[CTK]* 18
Assesses Visit to New York *[CTK]* 19
Government Approves 1994 Draft State Budget *[CTK]* 19
Dyba on Trip to South Asia, Australia *[CTK]* 20
Dlouhy Pleased With Visit to Iran *[CTK]* 20

SLOVAKIA

Meciar Views Economy, Privatization Process *[REPUBLIKA 2 Oct]* 21
Concerned About 'Greater Hungary' *[REPUBLIKA 4 Oct]* 23
Expects HZDS Majority in Elections *[REPUBLIKA 4 Oct]* 23
Kovac Discusses Domestic Political Issues *[NARODNA OBRODA 4 Oct]* 24
Foreign Minister Denies Intention To Resign *[CTK]* 26
Cernak Denies Responsibility for Sugar Scandal *[CTK]* 26
Andrejcak on Ethnic Composition of Army Officers *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 30 Sep]* 27
SDL Reaffirms Call for Early Elections *[CTK]* 27
Article Analyzes Price Increases in August *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 30 Sep]* 27
New Party of Democratic Center Formed *[CTK]* 28

HUNGARY

Doctors 'Satisfied' With Results of Tests on Antall *[MTI]* 29
Prime Minister's Health, Substitution Viewed *[NEPSZAVA 6 Oct]* 29
Horn Views Future Prospects of MSZP *[NEPSZABADSAG 6 Oct]* 29
MSZDP, MSZP Officials View Leftism *[UJ MAGYARORSZAG 7 Oct]* 31

Editorial Views Yeltsin Letter on NATO *[NEPSZABADSAG 2 Oct]* 32
Germany Pledges Funds To Support Agriculture *[MTI]* 32
Police Chief Views New Police Bill, Efficiency *[PESTI HIRLAP 6 Oct]* 32

POLAND

'Secret Talks' To Determine Fate of Attaches *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 7 Oct]* 34
Coalition Experts Establish Joint Economic Platform *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 7 Oct]* 34
Coalition Talks Continue *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 7 Oct]* 35
'Dangers' Facing New Government Viewed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 5 Oct]* 36
Article Views Possible Splits in Leftist Alliance *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 30 Sep]* 36
Polish Peasants Party Leader Profiled *[London THE EUROPEAN 7-10 Oct]* 37
Ministry To Liquidate 1,304 State Farms *[GAZETA POZNANSKA 2-3 Oct]* 39

ROMANIA

Iliescu Statement Before Leaving for Vienna Summit *[ROMPRES]* 40
Admittance to Council of Europe Viewed 40
UDMR Leader Interviewed *[ROMANIA LIBERA 2 Oct]* 40
Melescanu Comments *[Bucharest Radio]* 40
Political Leaders Comment *[ROMANIA LIBERA 5 Oct]* 41
PDSR Welcomes Admittance *[ROMPRES]* 42
Military Accord With Russia Seen as 'Normal' *[TINERETUL LIBER 4 Oct]* 42
Editorial Examines Aftermath of Yeltsin's Success *[ADEVARUL 5 Oct]* 43

BALKAN CRISIS ROUNDUP

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 8 October 44

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Delic Threatens Military Action in Western Bosnia *[TANJUG]* 45
Delic Visits Bihac *[Sarajevo Radio]* 45
Commander Reportedly Replaced *[Belgrade TV]* 45
* Army Takes Over Bihac Pocket *[London AL-HAYAH 30 Sep]* 45
Croats Reportedly Expel 530 Muslims From Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* 46
Mass Grave With 500 Civilians Discovered *[Sarajevo Radio]* 47
UN Troops Exchange Fire With Serbian Sniper *[Sarajevo Radio]* 47
Serbs Reportedly Shell Civilians in Maglaj *[Sarajevo Radio]* 47
Serbs Tie Peace Plan to Lifting of Sanctions *[Belgrade Radio]* 48
All Prisoners Expected To Be Exchanged *[Sarajevo Radio]* 48

CROATIA

RSK Says Resolution Aimed Against All Serbs *[TANJUG]* 49
Russian Envoy: Resolution Not Anti-Serb *[TANJUG]* 49
UNPROFOR Reports Army Massacre of Serbs *[TANJUG]* 49
Tudjman Receives Representatives of Muslim Parties *[Zagreb Radio]* 50

YUGOSLAVIA

Serbia

Assembly Discusses No-Confidence Motion *[Belgrade TV]* 51
Assembly Debate Continues *[Belgrade Radio]* 53
Journalists Predict Survival *[Belgrade Radio]* 53
Seselj Predicts Ouster *[Belgrade Radio]* 53
Draskovic Seeks Talks With Milosevic *[TANJUG]* 53
Article Views SPS Attack on Seselj, Radicals *[BORBA 30 Sep]* 54
No Heating in Belgrade Hospitals *[TANJUG]* 55

Macedonia

Assembly Supports Frckovski by 'Tight Majority' *[MIC]* 55
Defense Minister Views Role of UN Peacekeepers *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 2 Oct]* 55

Montenegro

Republic Government Not Expected To Fall *[Belgrade Radio]* 57

Kosovo

Rugova Endorses UN Resolution on Yugoslavia *[Tirana Radio]* 57

Owen, Stoltenberg Consider 'New Global Approach'

LD0710185993 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1658 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Geneva, Oct 7 (TANJUG)—The co-chairmen of the peace conference on former Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, are considering a new global approach to the resolution of the crisis on former Yugoslavia which would include the settlement of the war in Bosnia.

After the Bosnian Moslems rejected the Geneva peace plan on Bosnia, the co-chairmen are now trying to find a way out by applying a new strategy, TANJUG learned from a senior conference official who asked not to be named.

"Since the Geneva plan is clearly experiencing the destiny of the Vance-Owen plan, the package will now also include the issue of the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and Kosovo (Serbia's southern province)," the official said.

Of crucial importance is also the remaining open question of whether the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, are willing to accept the new approach to the crisis in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

The official warned, however, that the "climate for a dialogue is very unfavourable, especially after the adoption of Resolution 871," because "Croatian President Tudjman is not motivated for a dialogue as this resolution has given him the green light to finally resolve the RSK issue."

Referring to the civil war in Bosnia, the official expressed doubts in the readiness of Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic to give up his territorial demands and accept the Geneva peace package.

He rejected the idea on a new London or other conference on former Yugoslavia and underscored that the problem of the crisis in former Yugoslavia is complex and will be resolved in the long run.

Over the next few weeks Lord Owen and Stoltenberg will seek the support for their new strategy in the European Community and the United Nations. Stoltenberg leaves for New York on Friday for consultations with U.N. General Secretary Butrus Butrus-Ghali and may address the General Assembly on Saturday.

'New Plan' for Bosnia, RSK Reported

LD0710192693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1857 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Rome, Oct 7 (TANJUG)—Italian news agency ANSA claims on Thursday [7 October] that a new option has been put into circulation for the solution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that this also opens up the possibility for resolving the conflict between the republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia.

ANSA cites observers as saying that the "key to the solution" lies in the newly-formed Moslem autonomous province of western Bosnia which, under the plan, should be a part of Croatia and have a confederal status.

In return, Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic would be given Bosnian Croat territories in central Bosnia, the agency says.

The Bosnian Moslem parliament on September 29 rejected the Geneva peace plan demanding bigger territorial concessions from those already agreed by the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

The Bosnian Serbs and Croats offered the Moslems, who now control a mere 10 percent of Bosnia, that the future Moslem republic within the Bosnian union (made up of three ethnic states) be given 31 percent of this former Yugoslav republic.

ANSA said there are chances that Izetbegovic will accept the new solution. It added that the autonomous province of western Bosnia cannot geographically be linked with the future Moslem republic within the union and that by "proclaiming autonomy" this Moslem enclave in northwest Bosnia has already wrenched itself free from Izetbegovic's regime.

On September 28, bloody fighting broke out in the newly-formed province between the local population, which claimed autonomy, and forces loyal to Alija Izetbegovic, who accused his people of secession and ordered the army to impose order. So far, the clashes have killed over 50 people.

According to ANSA, the other part of the "new plan" refers to a solution for the already three-year-old conflict between Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) which will also be offered a confederal status within Croatia with wide autonomy and with its rights and borders guaranteed by the United Nations.

RSK was proclaimed by the local Serbs in parts of Croatia where they are in the majority and in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslav Federation. Zagreb refuses to recognize this state and is trying to impose its authority by force. In March 1992, RSK was proclaimed a U.N. Protected Area (UNPA).

ANSA believes that the biggest obstacle to the realization of this plan is the "irreconcilable stand" of the Krajina Serbs who insist on their own independent state. However, the agency said that this obstacle is not unsurmountable "if Belgrade exerts pressure."

Izetbegovic Condemns UN Inaction in Bosnia

AU0710195693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Report by Erol Abdovic from New York on address of Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic to UN General Assembly, in New York on 7 October—recorded]

[Text] President Izetbegovic put several significant issues before this ultimatum-like committee. He said that at least a billion people are waiting to see what will be done and what this political body will do, while watching the destruction of Bosnia and the disappearance of its people. He added that this quarter of mankind would never forget, nor would they ever forgive it for this. The president asked why UN Security Council Resolutions 752, 787, 824, 836, 838 were never implemented. Every single one of these resolutions was adopted in name only.

What happened to the request demanding the withdrawal of Serbian artillery from the known peaks [of Igman and Bjelasnica]? What happened to the monitoring of the Serbian-Bosnian border to provide the crucial definition of who the aggressor in Bosnia-Herzegovina really is? In connection with this, the president also said: We can no longer discuss the possibility of military intervention. The involvement of the international community in Bosnia began when the arms embargo was imposed; this is the only resolution that has been thoroughly implemented; to our disadvantage, of course.

Izetbegovic then once again called on the United Nations to lift the arms embargo if the multilateral peacekeepers do not adequately participate in the implementation of the possible peace agreement. The world does not have the right to take both possibilities away from the Bosnians, added the Bosnian president. The Bosnia-Herzegovina president then quoted U.S. President Clinton, who, let me remind you, said in the United Nations that the world organization could not get involved in every single conflict in the world without having a definite and crystal-clear political or military-strategic goal, and this also applied to the United States.

The Bosnian president commented on this by saying that the (?real) presence of the UN Protection Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina was precisely the most tragic antithesis of their purpose there. They have demonstrated just how disoriented they are, without a clear understanding [of the facts], and, at time, extremely [word indistinct] biased. After acquainting the General Assembly with the four conditions under which the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliament accepted the peace agreement, but had conditioned it with the minimum of demands below which the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government could not go, despite the fact that the press here had in practice interpreted the Sarajevo assembly's decision as a rejection of the Geneva package. [sentence as heard] This was the first time that Izetbegovic demanded from such a high place—I quote—respect for the rights of our Bosnian minority in Serbia—the Sandzak Muslims. He warned that their basic human rights were constantly being threatened, and asked why the Serbs in Croatia should have and be demanding more rights for themselves than the Muslim minority in Sandzak? The president also requested that NATO be introduced as a new side among the mediators in future negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina. After addressing the General Assembly and after receiving several minutes of applause, President Izetbegovic was escorted from the floor by Secretary General Butrus-Ghali himself. The president's news conference is scheduled for this afternoon. This has been Erol Abdovic reporting for Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina from the United Nations in New York.

Videnov Speech at Socialist Party Plenum

AU0610125093 Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI in Bulgarian 27-28 Sep 93 pp 1-3

["Report of Zhan Videnov, Chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council, at 26 September Joint Meeting of Supreme Party Council and Parliamentary Alliance for Social Democracy"]

[Text] The situation in the country changed substantially after the last June meeting of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council. The attempt of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] to push society into a new confrontation crisis and radically destabilize the institutions failed. The dangerous plans to evoke total confusion among the people and impose on the country through elections the dangerous confrontation political model, also failed. The aspirations of a few militant anticommunists to dictate the public pace in the country for the first time did not receive the anticipated support from outside. This was not accidental. A new mood exists in world public opinion, which presupposes a more critical attitude toward the ideological remnants of the Cold War. The grave influence of the Yugoconflict on the Balkans and the entire continent sobered many contemporary "crusaders" both in Bulgaria and abroad. The crisis in the Russian governmental institutions, which was extremely exacerbated by the recent actions of President Yeltsin, demonstrated that the danger of the authoritarian distortion of the transition is a real one. However, the understanding exists that the main problems of the change are in the socioeconomic sphere, and they cannot be resolved through the mechanical application of foreign schemes or political experiments and violence as a goal in itself. The results of the recent elections in Poland show clearly that the people believe in the leftist alternative of the transition, and are prepared to support a tolerable cost of the changes, the smooth implementation of the reforms, and national consensus on the crucial social issues.

A sobering, as a result of the crisis difficulties and the challenge of the transition, can also be observed in Bulgaria today. Simultaneously, the danger of the progressing erosion of the state institutions, the total defenselessness of the individual personality, and a lasting negative social attitude toward every political reform, grows. Public opinion is sharply critical of the inability of the state and political institutions to provide a convincing answer to the question about the cost, road, and goal of the transition. It is greatly alarmed by the imminent gravest crisis year, in which we will have to encounter the most serious problems of the transition. In the next few months the fate of the agrarian reform and Bulgarian agriculture will be determined. The vital restructuring of industry, which cannot be postponed, is doomed to fail if it does not base itself on the criteria of economic efficiency, and if does not provide a chance for every citizen to construct his personal and social well-being. The tax reforms, which are vitally important for the country stability, cannot obliterate the unresolved social problems. In its present politicized form, the judiciary cannot cope with the unprecedented crime, corruption, and the overt and politically prompted subversion of the "blue [SDS] bureaucracy" in the central departments, and especially in the municipal administration. The commercialization, vulgar politicization, and instigation in our intellectual life lead to grave and irreversible consequences.

All those, and many other issues confront us with the basic political problem of the country today: How to overcome the gravest period of the crisis under the extremely unfavorable internal and international conditions, and simultaneously, how to give an impetus to the vital reforms without paying an insufferable social price and without losing the main constitutional landmarks of the democratic, social, and rule-of-law state? The answer to this question is related to two basic political facts—the 1991 elections, and the forming of the current government in 1992.

A) The burden of the 1991 elections continues to trouble the country, despite the fact that those elections are no longer a decisive political factor in developing public life. The radical negative mood of the people, which was predominant at that time, prevented an election result that could give a clear mandate for the constructive, pragmatic, and responsible management of the country. This allowed the SDS to impose its destructive, adventurist, and extremely ideologized formula of ruling.

Without relinquishing its strategic line of national consensus even for a moment, the BSP decisively opposed the restoration and confrontation, which serve the interests of a small part of society. The SDS policy painfully affected the interests of millions of people, evoked their internal resistance, and shamefully failed.

B) The fall of Filip Dimitrov's cabinet and the formation of Lyuben Berov's cabinet marked the beginning of the end of this lethal-for-the-country model. Its final and total rejection is possible only through new elections. However, the very formation of the new cabinet and its activity have strongly diminished the probability of reviving the restoration philosophy of the change and improved the chances of obtaining a categorical social support of the transition toward a democratic, social, and rule-of-law state. Without being the government of national consensus, so much needed by the country, Professor Berov's cabinet prepared the ground for its future establishment. Through its very existence and activity the cabinet proved that the doctrinarian, confrontation, and single-alternative understanding of the transition, imposed by the SDS already in 1990, is vicious in principle, will not withstand the test of time, and has no future.

C) The other major part of the problem stems from the fact that, at the end of last year, society related the new cabinet to its hope of smoothly overcoming the gravest stage of the crisis, achieving political stability, and effecting lasting changes for the better, through radical

reforms in all spheres. Those anticipations of the public have a decreasing intensity, but a growing degree of negativism, nihilism, alienation, and confusion. They face the government with ever growing problems. In December 1992, the current cabinet obviously underestimated the scope of the destruction inherited from the SDS, and decided to refrain from officially publishing it. However, the basic part of its program intentions at that time were and remain plausible. Therefore, for the BSP, the essence of this cabinet remains in maximally utilizing the chance of implementing the commitments incorporated in its program declaration, related to overcoming the crisis and accelerating the transition.

The fact that the majority of those promises have not been fulfilled so far imposes a grave responsibility on this cabinet and the political forces that supported its good intentions. The BSP also faces the issue of the further prospects of the present formula of governing, the ever growing expenses of sustaining it, and the risks related to its further preservation or change.

Already last year, the BSP leadership noted many inherent shortcomings in the existing parliament and the cabinets formed by it. Lyuben Berov's cabinet was an attempt to overcome a part of them. It is not committed to any party and carries out a specific program of governing, aimed at conducting a constant dialogue with the basic state, political, and social institutions and groups on the basic problems of the crisis and the main challenges of the transition. The goal of this dialogue is to materialize the possibility of national consensus, at least on the basic current issues of our society. The government hopes to be able to act with a relative calm within the framework of its pragmatic, logical, and broadly popular program, without being subjected to politically motivated attacks. The nonparty character of the cabinet is also a means of protecting it from the clashes between the political forces for domination in the power institutions. Therefore, the BSP decisively opposed and will oppose the attempts to give a party character to the cabinet. The practice shows that even the formula of the "nonparty cabinet" is fully subjected to the subjective caprices of the political situation, based on this situation's objective limitations in the struggle against the problems of the crisis and transition.

A) From its first day until today, Prof. Berov's cabinet was forced to struggle on all fronts against the administrative subversion implemented under the orders of Rakovski Street 134 [the SDS headquarters], and the "blue nomenklatura" in all state institutions, without any exceptions. A large number of officials in the central departments, and even in Bulgarian representations abroad, belong to this nomenklatura. At the expense of the tax payers, hundreds of local SDS functionaries, "incorporated" into the municipal and oblast administrations, the leaderships of the state and municipal companies, the liquidation councils, and the land commissions, work against the government. The politicized judiciary, obedient to the SDS, openly struggles against the executive power. The trade unions often turn the tripartite cooperation into a political mechanism of applying pressure on the government, not in the interests of the working people, but in the interests of obscure financial groups. The presidential advisers interfere in issues that are within the exclusive competence of the government, serving as agents of foreign interests. The national radio and television continues to be utilized for a trite blue propaganda and counterdisinformation. All this is ostensibly done in the name of the struggle against the "recommunization," while, in practice, it helps the SDS to cynically cash in on both the populist dividends of the opposition and the administrative benefit of being in power. In the final analysis, all this erodes the Bulgarian state institutions in a manner that is especially dangerous for the country.

B) The crisis of the Bulgarian state institutions is ever more skillfully and purposefully intensified by circles that want to prepare, motivate, and justify an authoritarian model of the transition. Today, the new oligarchies, which combine financial, trade union, administrative interests, and interests alien to our country, unite against the politicians. They sense the danger of the emergence of a new plutocracy, which stems from the civil society structures, which consolidate, despite the difficulties. By attacking the "inept parliament," they suggest the so-called "Latin American variants." Discrediting the real carriers of change today, they force the country to face the great danger of losing confidence in the any consistent policy of reforms.

C) It is a fact that, in its attempts to struggle against the crisis and set in motion the changes in implementation of its program, the Council of Ministers cannot always rely on the necessary parliamentary support. This support is not guaranteed through a coalition alliance, a political agreement, or the ideological proximity of the forces that support various actions of the government. The government's program cannot be implemented only through a good will and a constructive initiative to consult on every specific issue. This mechanism is deliberately being subverted by the SDS, is seldom supported the New Alliance for Democracy [NSD], and often foiled by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]. Under those circumstances the BSP and its coalition partners must not turn their desire for following a constructive approach toward the government into an uncritical servile attitude to various parliamentary caprices of the NSD and the DPS. The distance between us and them, and between us and the government is necessary in order to prevent a situation in which the society will become the victim of the exceptionally dangerous generalization "they all are the same rascals!" The only means against this is following a clear, consistent, and principled position on all important issues.

Today, our society is threatened not so much by the authoritarian distortion of the transition, as by the lack of clarity about its real alternatives, and subsequently, the lack of minimum national consensus on the goal, road, and cost of the transition. Without such a consensus, no Bulgarian government will be able to fully

implement its functions, while the intensifying nationalistic nihilism will place not only the character of the transition, but the transition itself under a question mark. This becomes especially clear under the conditions of the sharp political struggle for the principle character of the changes in Bulgaria.

A) The BSP supports the social model of the transition, despite the fact that it notes, supports, and recognizes certain advantages of the modern European liberalism, defended today by the responsible Bulgarian entrepreneurs. This political line gives a centrist character to the Bulgarian leftist party. On many of the reform's crucial issues there are no unsurmountable differences between the Bulgarian leftist forces and the leftist-centrist forces. This is a good ideological foundation for conducting a political dialogue and cooperation.

B) The situation in the Bulgarian rightist parties is completely different. This camp is dominated by radical tendencies, promoting restoration, authoritarian, and even anarchist views about the character of the transition, under the disguise of ultraliberal slogans. Against the background of its various components, the SDS simultaneously serves the restitution, speculation, and comprador capital. The objective contradictions in the interests of those three most parasitic superstructures of the budding Bulgarian plutocracy are the real reason of the contradictions within the SDS. This, to a large extent, predetermines its inevitable collapse as a uniform formation. The SDS leadership hides its total confusion at the impossible task of balancing the already irreconcilable economic interests of its numerous masters under the muddy idea of "restoring the authentic vote of the voters." In its attempt to survive as a monopoly agent of the changes, the SDS tries to mobilize a radical minority through a decisive and populist opposition and a phraseology that has a leftist character. It relies on the militant anticommunist mood of the past, the lumpen reaction to the present difficulties, and the lasting strengthening of social confrontation, so that the SDS could use, also in the future, its tactic of dictate and blackmail.

C) The present efforts of President Zhelev to restore the "old parliamentary majority" have a different character. They are not related to the subject, but rather the essence of the changes, to preserving at all costs the hitherto restoration character of the transition, and to foiling the leftist alternative, which consistently gains ground. Thus for example, the recent interference of Zhelev in the work of the government on the issues of agriculture and the agrarian reform, was in fact a call for an arbitrary administrative attitude toward the owners in the name of the fragmented Bulgarian agriculture model, rejected 50 years ago. The president bases his hope on the restoration as the only real obstacle to the social alternative.

D) Despite its obvious unfeasibility, the restoration model of the transition is extremely dangerous, not only because of its violent antisocial direction, but also because of the obstacles to the normal development of the liberal alternative it creates. Despite the expectations, the restoration model will not prevail, neither through the support of the SDS circles, nor under the protection of the president. The hitherto practice of the so-called "Cooperation Council" shows this. The DPS has difficulties in coping with its responsibility to its voters, commitments to unpredictable foreign factors, and inability to break out of the primitive schemes of continuing the balancing act under conditions of an artificial confrontation. The two basic trade unions—the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] and the Podkrepa Labor Confederation—are at a dead end, predetermined by the personal superambitions of their present leaders. Those are clearly political and financial ambitions, rather than trade union ones. Only the newly created Liberal-Conservative Union is the only extraparliamentary force that poses itself a relatively realistic goal, namely, to personify and assert the liberal alternative of the transition. The other extraparliamentary formations mostly continue to go through the motions of creating an ideologically amorphous "center."

They still try to rely on the theory according to which the present bipolar model is the main reason for the stagnation in our development, and the leaderships of the SDS and the BSP are equally responsible for this stagnation and the poor efficiency of the legislative and executive powers. Actually, the efforts to "reconstruct the political space in a new fashion" practically prevent overcoming the consequences, negative for the rightist forces, of the failure of the SDS' confrontation and restoration policy, as well as the consequences of the SDS' failure to exclude the BSP from the country's political life through repressive measures. The goal of this political line is clear: To achieve the political isolation of the BSP simultaneously with the political decline of the SDS, and degrade the BSP to the role of a decorative party without a real social influence and a visible role in the country's management.

It must be completely clear that the BSP will not assume the responsibility of others for the damage caused by the confrontation model. This first of all means the responsibility of those who, in 1990, pushed the country toward a futile "communism-democracy" confrontation. If we must pay our toll as a party for overcoming the damage of the confrontation, this will not be in the form of a voluntary decline together with the disappearing SDS, but in the form of preserving and expanding our political influence as a part of the really new spectrum of the country, characterized by correct and constructive relations among the political forces. Thus, we will also contribute to achieving a consensus on the transition model, outlining the possible alternatives, and giving legitimation to the political configurations that are committed to those alternatives. The lack of a clarity on those fundamental issues mostly prevents society from becoming a real agent of its own change, and threatens society with accidental and manipulative influences. However, as long as the basic state and political institutions continue to conduct a responsible dialogue aimed

at overcoming the crisis and continuing the reform, one should not ignore the chance of achieving a consensus. This dialogue gives, and will continue to give, a serious impetus to the activity of the parliament and the government. When the degree of national responsibility will prove to be insufficient for continuing the dialogue, it will be necessary to ask the voters to cast their votes in support of one of the real alternatives of the transition. This is the simple formula, which for almost one year determines our attitude toward the present configurations in the power institutions, and toward their eventual change. This is the only possible responsible attitude we can follow. It poses the question of the progress of the reform as the foundation of every decision related to effecting a change in the institutions.

A certain form of a governmental crisis is possible anytime. This could happen because of the huge scope of the problems, the limited resources of the government, its inability to implement its program commitments, and some of the recent political actions against the government. Because of the confrontational character of every governmental crisis it is hardly probable to imagine that the present parliamentary majority will survive, let alone that a new majority will be created. In such a situation, it is impossible to note any realistic variants related to finding a new formula of the government or the parliamentary majority that supports it. If Prof. Berov's cabinet is subverted in its efforts to implement its program, the resources of the political dialogue will be exhausted, and only the vote of the people will be able to create new resources.

Consequently, early parliamentary elections remain the most probable prospect of effecting a change in the power institutions in the next year. This also corresponds to the deteriorating situation of the basic state institutions, the mood of the basic political forces, and the desire for a change on the part of most voters. However, if we want early, rather than premature, elections, those elections must be conducted on the basis of a hope, rather than despair. This puts the stress today not on the elections themselves or the post-election situation, but on the problems of the period until the elections. It could be shorter or longer, but in any event, sufficient for implementing the urgent changes in the most crucial public spheres—the judiciary, the social realm, the field of finances, and in the new economic policy of the country. It also is necessary to construct reliable institutional, legal, and constitutional obstacles to distorting the transition. The negative attitude against the parliament and parliamentarism in general, must be eliminated through tangible positive results in the legislature. Naturally, this cannot be effected through the efforts of a single parliamentary force. Certain guarantees are needed against reanimating the confrontation bipolarity of political life, which is harmful to the country. Naturally, this cannot take place through political charity, but only through committing the basic extraparliamentary forces to dialogue and partnership on the basis of real and socially significant interests, actions, and responsibilities.

Our basic task as a party in the new political season must take into consideration the predominating anticipations society has toward the BSP. As noted already at the All-Party conference in March, those anticipations are related to the ever more direct commitment of the BSP to resolving the most difficult management problems of the transition and the crisis, and its active presence in the sphere of the government, under various conditions. This is a great test for the party, because it contains risks that cannot be forecast, and does not offer any guarantees of success. It is well known that a part of those anticipations are dictated by the lethal illusion that it is possible to return to the "good old time," while another part—by the malicious hope that Bulgaria's leftist forces will fail under the combined attack of the crisis, the internal subversion, and the foreign isolation. Despite all this, the BSP, as an initiator and guarantor of the changes and as an important agent of one of the real alternatives of the transition, has no other way than to become a crucial and constructive factor of the reform. Our society must undergo a radical change and a real and comprehensive modernization if we are to cope as a nation with the challenges of the 21st century. The people have the right to demand a bearable social cost of this difficult transition. In order to guarantee such a cost, they must have a strong and modern leftist party, which firmly upholds the best traditions of the Bulgarian leftist forces, continues the values of freedom, solidarity, and justice, and shows an ability for partnership and joint national responsible actions for implementing the social transition in the interest of the millions of people. Thus, in its commitment to the changes, the BSP combines today and in the near future the national, social, and party interests.

A) In order to achieve such substantial tasks, the BSP must rid itself of its past complexes and practically implement a new attitude toward governing the country that fully corresponds to the public expectations of a social transition, related to the active participation of a strong leftist party, and its being a part of the sphere of the government. Tiredness, other burdens, fear, or behind-the-scene machinations could by no means characterize the attitude of the BSP toward the power any longer. Society expects from us precisely the opposite—active, decisive, and responsible actions and positions on all topical issues of the government, and preparation for fully using the power for implementing the clear mandate for effecting a social transition, that we will receive through the elections. We will still have to overcome many obstacles of lack of confidence, fear, and even hatred, that many people in the country and abroad have for us. The attempts to place us in a state of domestic and foreign isolation will continue. They must be intercepted through purposeful actions aimed at forming the leftist camp, through supporting the nationally oriented goals, ideas, and actions, and through curbing the social disintegration of relations within the basic groups of our voters.

B) We have the right to demand a new credit of confidence. The "Prospects for Bulgaria" Program is our

reason of demanding this credit. The understanding of the social transition, vested in this program, must be specified. Within a brief period of time, we must further elaborate the national security doctrine, the BSP's position on the struggle against crime and corruption, the BSP's position on the agrarian reform and on saving, reviving, and restructuring industrial production, the BSP's policy toward the revenues, and so forth. Those elaborations must be subjected to an expert, social, and political debate, which should become the foundation of a greater future partnership between the nationally responsible leftist and centrist forces.

C) Through its activity in the parliament, contacts with the political forces, and cooperation with the government the BSP must work for stabilizing the democratic process, guaranteeing the social orientation of the economic reform, strengthening the national security, and conducting a social attack against the crime, corruption, and administrative subversion. The BSP must clearly declare to the other parliamentary factions, the government, and all society that it is determined to defend the values of the social transition, its voters' interests, the dignity of the leftist forces, and the indisputable national priorities. Society expects such an identification on the part of the BSP, and does not interpret it as an excessive firmness on our part. It needs a greater clarity in anything related to the factors that are a direct result of the government's program declaration, a deviation from which will cause a radical reassessment of the present political situation on the part of the BSP. Those factors include:

1. Waging a determined struggle against the crime, corruption, and administrative subversion, and increasing the prestige of the Bulgarian state institutions in all spheres and in all regions of the country and abroad.

2. Eliminating all remnants of the so-called "decommunization through laws," and immediately stopping the judicial arbitrariness, property discrimination, and cadre purges, implemented even now toward the BSP by the government.

3. Accelerating the agrarian reform, removing all administrative obstacles to the activity of the agrarians, and providing state aid to them and their associations at all phases of forming such associations.

4. Reviving production, effecting a moderate protectionism, curbing the unemployment, and adopting a clear governmental policy and a mechanism of its implementation in the economic sphere.

5. Activating the industrial reconstruction in accordance with the criteria of economic efficiency and values of social justice.

6. Protecting the income of the pensioners, disabled, students who receive stipends, and the state employees, and beginning a reform in the social field.

7. Asserting the local self-government and adopting a clear regional state policy and a mechanism on applying it.

D) Without coercing the government, in the future we intend to subject it to a constant public pressure to implement its own promises, especially in the spheres where serious contradictions in the approaches have already emerged. However, those demands cannot be implemented only through parliamentary activity. Activating their participation in the municipal organs of power is an important task of the Socialists at present. Regardless of the great diversity of the situations in those municipalities, we must fully utilize the possibilities of municipal politics in defending our voters' interests. This requires rendering the appropriate organizational, information, methodical, and cadre assistance at the municipal and oblast levels on the part of the Supreme Party Council and the Parliamentary Alliance for Social Democracy. Those efforts will not be vain because the strength of the leftist forces in the municipal government is our main guarantee of overcoming the administrative subversion of the SDS, activating the participation of the BSP in the sphere of the government, and analyzing and implementing our ideas of overcoming the crisis and accelerating the transition.

E) All organizational efforts of the BSP must be directed toward the participation of the Socialists and their organizations in the most active areas of social life. This applies first of all to the trade union, cooperation, and youth movements. It is clear that, outside those movements, the BSP will not be able to implement its basic political task and defend the social model of the transition in the interest of the great majority of the Bulgarian people. The necessity must be especially stressed of most precisely formulating and putting into effect without any deviations the attitude of the Socialists toward the modern Bulgarian businessmen and managers. The BSP has clear program postulates in support of the national responsible Bulgarian enterprise, however, often in the person of its individual members and activists the party shows a strong bias. Such a practice not only returns us to the remote past in anything related to our theory, but also renders us helpless witnesses of the dissipation of speculative, comprador, and restitution capital, something that deeply insults many most capable economic figures—the pride of every economic and political elite—repels them, and disposes them against us. It is a high time to stop the groundless accusations, excessive suspicion, and constant doubts in their intentions. It is necessary to provide updated information and let the party to assess alone in front of entire society whether the moral, charter, and laws have been violated.

F) It must be pointed out that, today, the party encounters difficulties in working out and implementing the most adequate political behavior. Those difficulties are a result of the simultaneous activity of two negative tendencies within the party—one leading toward a radicalization of the moods within the party, the other toward depriving the party activity of motivation and drive. The

radicalization is a result of the great and comprehensive crisis. Many of the BSP members and supporters suffer grave and painful blows. The failure of the SDS government inspired a part of them with the illusion that we will return to the "good old days." This mirage, which disappeared in front of their own eyes, evoked pain and despair, while the entire party was blamed for all this. The successes of leftist parties, which are close to us, sometimes created the deceiving notion that, with a bit more attacking approach and by copying successful foreign models from Europe and Asia, the BSP could achieve a guaranteed success. Some comrades interpreted the failure of the SDS as the failure of any reform policy. Other saw the BSP course toward a clear identification as a call for returning to the past—toward the political hegemony. It is not difficult to refute all those groundless notions in a categorical and well-founded manner. Furthermore, those notions are not characteristic of the entire party. However, they objectively create superexpectations of immediate radical changes for the better. Since those superexpectations remain futile tension rises.

The lack of motivation and drive in the party are a more complex phenomenon. After the drastic reduction of the party's professional and public personnel in 1990-91 and the total confiscation of its property in 1992-93, the BSP failed to preserve many of its intermediate units in their normally functioning form. Relations between the all-party organs and the Socialists were disrupted. This brought the party to the brink of a financial catastrophe. The worst was that this placed our members and supporters in an information vacuum, without any reference points and mechanisms that could facilitate their political activity. The democratic spirit of the current BSP Charter does not presuppose direct links in relations between the party organs. Unfortunately, the party press is not utilized to bring the leadership's positions to the local units and the Socialists. The national and private media deliberately distort those positions. Under conditions of an information vacuum, the entire party life focuses on a single prolific information source—the parliament. All expectations and radical claims are related to the parliament and its activity, and afterward there are great disappointments, unjust accusations are voiced, and a state of apathy emerges. The deception exists that the local and small individual policy has no importance or meaning. This extremely negative tendency must be eliminated. The Executive Bureau of the Supreme Party Council adopted many measures in this context. This was clearly expressed in the plan on the activity of the Supreme Party Council, that is prepared. I ask the Supreme Party Council to enrich those measures and support them with meaningful actions.

G) Finally, but first in its importance, we must stress the necessity of activating the ideological discussions on the really great problems of the party, the leftist forces, and the country. By the end of the year, on the basis of program drafts that have been worked out, the Supreme Party Council must adopt a decision on the next reports and elections in the party. They must be carefully prepared and reflect all organizational, political, ideological, and cadre changes in the last two years. It would be good if the reports and elections in the party end before the beginning of the eventual preelection period next year, so that we could conduct our 41st congress immediately after the eventual parliamentary elections. The election results could be the best testimonial to our comprehensive work as a party. However, let us settle this issue in 2-3 months, when we again will assess our political line in the new political season.

Article Calls For Socialist Party Congress

AU0610195393 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 29 Sep 93 p 8

[Article by Stefan Prodev: "A Congress Is Urgently Required Before The Elections"]

[Text] We have already heard the opinion that a regular congress of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] should be convened after the elections, whether they are held in the near or the more distant future. Numerous observers are convinced that the question has been predetermined rather than decided on the basis of discussions. Unfortunately, the last session of the BSP Supreme Council hardly paid any attention to this. It means that one of the most important decisions of the National Party Conference has been obliterated.

The majority of Socialists consider the postponement of the 41st BSP Congress to an uncertain future date as inexplicable and even disturbing. It shows a certain organizational weakness, or a secret political maneuver. The congress is awaited, not only as an opportunity to assess past achievements, but as an important step along the path of renewal. In this respect the date of the congress is not only a detail of the calender schedule, but a tactical move in the party's development. Hence, its postponement is an incomprehensible maneuver and requires an explanation on the part of the BSP leadership.

Not only a hard winter is awaiting us, but also a difficult political season, which requires total clarity on all important, topical issues. The clarity should apply to all tactical and strategic aspects of party activities and should elucidate all the details of our social development. There is no doubt that such a clarity can be achieved only on the basis of an extensive and comprehensive discussion, which can only take place at a congress. Moreover, it should not be a formal, but a creative congress, devoted to intellectual disputes and creative quests. This simple truth is doubtless. Hence, the postponement of the fundamental party forum to the post-election period is puzzling. It is unnecessary to try to convince ourselves that the party's organizational leadership is not in a position to guarantee the real political prevalence of the BSP in a complicated and even unpredictable pre-election situation. This requires

a most serious reevaluation of all possible and impossible tactical moves, which cannot be accomplished in the course of ordinary party meetings and conferences. It demands a comprehensive congress debate on all topical issues, regardless of the rapidly changing reality. Unfortunately, the importance of such a debate is being underrated, at least for the time being.

It is hardly possible for anyone to imagine that the election will be easy and uncomplicated for us. This is a delusion. Although damaged, the blue "Titanic" of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] continues to strive for the safety of the shore. Its pumps and lifeboats are still functioning. It means that the BSP will be facing a desperate force trying to keep afloat at all costs. Let us not forget that this force is surrounded by other antisocialist barges, which are likely to rally in their longing for victorious revenge. Under such circumstances, the BSP has no right to face the storm without a sound and precise compass and without a reliable helm. The compass and the helm, however, are unthinkable without a general reassessment of the entire policy, something which can be accomplished only at a party congress. In this case, all palliative measures and tactical exercises are doomed to failure. The present state of the party and of the party structures as a whole does not justify too much hope. Our ship also needs overhauling, even quite substantially, if we are willing to be victorious in crossing the political ocean. This requires the convening of the 41st BSP Congress not as a simple obligation required by the statute, but as an urgent requirement. Only such a congress is capable of rescuing the party and preparing it for a long and dangerous election campaign. In the opposite case, we risk remaining stagnating, or to be carried away by invisible, but incorrect currents.

It is erroneous to assume that the convening of a congress within the first two or three months of the next winter would be an expression of weakness or of secret intentions. The opposite is true. A congress held precisely at that time is likely to prove our strong will to live and that we are prepared for all eventualities. At the next elections, whenever they should take place, the BSP must appear not only with new slogans and new posters, but with new names and with a new image. The Polish left-wing forces showed us how to do it. Hence, the congress, which is not being idly called for, is not a simple event of noisy political propaganda, but a most urgently required necessity. We need this congress, so that we may rally around its resolutions. This applies not only to the BSP, but to the large group of the fragmented leftist camp, to all those who see the future of Bulgarian democracy to the left of center.

All these circumstances assign a great importance to the congress and guarantee its historical role. For all these reasons, the postponement of the congress might be disastrous. If the congress should be convened after the elections, regardless of their results, the congress is likely to become a most ordinary "post factum," rather than the locomotive of the social struggle.

It is unncessary to point out that a belated congress is totally useless for the BSP. Even the best party records cannot change the situation. Hence, the congress that we await should take place today, or tomorrow at the latest, but certainly not the day after. A congress that succeeded the elections rather than preceded them is likely to appear like a late train, arriving behind schedule.

Naturally, regardless of its basic importance, the BSP congress could hardly play its great role unless it discusses the most crucial problems related to the party and to society as a whole. The questions of legitimacy, the question of our renewal, of our social involvement, of the sacrifices required by the transitional period, of intellectual and cultural values, and of the people's prosperity, must be discussed at the congress. Only the congress can provide an umistakable and intelligent answer to such questions, if the BSP wishes to win public support for the election cause of the Socialists. This is the great responsibility facing the socialists, a responsibility that some of them may be afraid of. Nevertheless, the fear, as great as it may be, should not prevent us from holding the congress. It must take place within a realistic schedule in the political context, if we are willing to test our own capacities through ourselves, and if we wish society to understand us and to follow us. In the opposite case, we would join the stormy election campaign with our bad old habits and with unclarified positions, with the fatigue of yesterday that depresses us. Hence the problem of convening the 41st BSP Congress is not only a question of political strategy, but has a psychological context. The congress should shake us up, stimulate our progress, equip our ranks with new ideas and a new self-confidence. The people are awaiting visible changes that only the congress is capable of providing for them. Well-known, routine methods increasingly bore people and have hardly any chances of being successful. Even if the old methods remind us of past successes and past glories, time has no regrets and has its own requirements. Such is the truth that we should not forget if we want to be successful. Hence the congress that is bound to take place should not be postponed. It is our only opportunity to find the correct path and embark upon it as soon as possible—a path that is likely to lead us ahead of the sinking "Titanic" and the small barges accompanying it. This is how we will leave far behind us all those militant revanchists and those pirates who, in spite of their sinking ship, still believe in their last chance.

Commentary Views Power Held by BSP

AU0810100893 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Oct 93 p 6

[Commentary by Georgi Asyov; "On White Horse Toward Power"]

[Text] Regarding the course toward seizing power, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] announced, KONTINENT urgently sent reporters to Positano Street No. 20 [the headquarters of the BSP]. No revolutionary situation was found there. The building was completely

peaceful, facing in one direction the Palace of Justice and in the other—the former BSP headquarters, which burned down and will never be restored in their previous glory.

Actually, the BSP has no reason to seize power, because it already has it.

The prerogatives of the president have been so much curbed that the only thing that could be seized from him is his freedom of speech (to the nation). The BSP is in power in most municipalities and mayorships. Its cadres still hold crucial posts in various ministries, committees, enterprises, and labor cooperative agrarian farms. The BSP holds in its hands not only the majority in the National Assembly, but also its leadership, because without its support National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov would have been toppled a long time ago. The miracle called Berov's cabinet also relies on the BSP, for which it is very convenient to see how the Augean stables of its decades of rule are being cleaned.

Indeed, the BSP will begin its real course toward seizing all power (something that would not be a problem for the BSP even now) only when the others clean the stables, so that the BSP could enter them on a white horse.

Daily Publishes SDS Conference Statements

AU0710214893 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 4 Oct 93 pp 1, 4

[Report by a team of DEMOKRATSIYA editors on statements made by delegates at the Union of Democratic Forces First Theoretical Conference held in Sofia on 2-3 October: "Unity and Pragmatism"]

[Excerpts] The chief trends and key topics of the First Theoretical Conference held by the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] on Saturday and Sunday [2-3 October] can be pointed out as follows:

The SDS must and shall preserve its dual nature: As a coalition of parties, organizations, and movements, based on the national cause of democratization and aimed at removing the socio-communists and their related satellite parties from the zone of power. The arrest of the reforms in all spheres performed through and by the present government, which serves as a cover for the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], demands a resolute turn to pragmatism in the behavior of the SDS, both for the purpose of expanding its own sphere of influence, as well as attracting new political allies. [passage omitted]

The SDS coalition is the decisive political factor in present-day Bulgaria regarding the establishment of market economy and Bulgaria's integration with Western values and democracy. The SDS is the chief factor of the democratic transition based on a new political structure and a new system. Such theses of crucial importance were developed by speakers Ivan Kostov and Nikolay Khristov, but they were also mentioned in numerous other statements. Edvin Sugarev analyzed in detail the dual nature of the SDS as a coalition of parties and a national movement. He also examined the rational application of this formula in connection with overcoming the contradictions within the coalition (for the sake of the common ideal and the effectiveness of its actions). [passage omitted] Yordan Vasilev summed up the facts related to the established form of the coalition stating that the development of the member-parties is a necessity, but can only proceed in an evolutionary manner. These views of principle were assessed by Stefan Savov in pointing out that all modern democratic states have confirmed the truth about political parties being guarantors of democracy and being responsible for the actions of their representatives in parliament and in other spheres of power. Democracy cannot exist without political parties, Aleksandur Yordanov categorically stated in his report. [passage omitted] Ventseslav Dimitrov warned that the SDS, deprived of its variety of ideas and their multifarious wealth is likely to become a static religion and lose its vitality. [passage omitted] Filip Dimitrov summed up the meaning of the debates held on the first day of the conference and dwelled on the SDS's future development. [passage omitted]

All members of the SDS coalition agree that the 36th National Assembly has exhausted its possibilities and can no longer be an active and leading factor in dismantling the totalitarian system and in implementing the reforms that are required by the SDS program. This was the tenor of Stefan Savov's report. As a result of this, the question about the stand of the SDS Parliamentary Group on this particular issue was justifiably raised. The conviction that parliament is no longer capable of working for the democratization of society prompted some of the coalition's member-organizations and some of the SDS supporters to call for the SDS deputies walking out of parliament. It became immediately clear, however, that because of the proportional system, according to which they were elected, they would be replaced by people nominated by the Alternative Social-Liberal Party [ASP] or by the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, who are hardly likely to defend the SDS ideas. Hence, the thesis of leaving parliament was rejected and replaced by the proposal of a parliamentary boycott. It actually started under the circumstances of escalating tension during Edvin Sugarev's hunger strike. However, after the end of the hunger strike, it was the SDS deputies' obligation to attend the plenary sessions.

According to Mr. Stefan Savov, the meaning of the SDS deputies' participation in parliamentary work was to halt, block, or at least delay the recommunization bills that the present parliament, subject to the communists' majority, was trying to promote. As an opposition force, the SDS must apply all means of parliamentary struggle against recommunization—such are the main parliamentary strategy and tactics of the coalition. [passage omitted]

In his report, Edvin Sugarev analyzed the mistakes committed by the SDS since the last elections. According to his thesis, in addition to the real mistakes of the "blue" coalition, there is also a deliberately concocted propaganda myth that is aimed at the self-destruction of the SDS and its transformation from an inconvenient political opponent into a convenient partner, into a pliable puppet force likely to join secret deals and be ready for collaboration. Part of this myth are the infinitely reiterated theories about the SDS "having given up the power" and about this being the "blunder" of the century. The ambition of staging an internal coup aimed at splitting and destabilizing the SDS is evident in this respect, Edvin Sugarev declared.

This does not mean that the coalition has not committed its own real mistake. According to Sugarev, the major and almost irreparable mistake of the SDS is genetically inherent in the very organizational formula of the coalition. The parties within the coalition are still embryonic political structures because they have no ideologically and socially defined strata of the population to rely upon, which should be ready to identify themselves with those parties. Hence, people are accepting the coalition as an entity and the SDS electorate is common. It is at least a dozen times more numerous than the rank and file members of the respective parties, and they rely on abstract goals related to the image of the SDS as a national cause.

In Sugarev's view, this contradiction could be overcome by changing the organizational formula of the SDS. The National Coordinating Council is lagging behind events instead of playing the role of a promoting factor, and it is too preoccupied with its own internal coalition problems. According to Mr. Sugarev and Mr. Yordan Vasilev, who also shares his view, the only solution is to elect an operational leadership (namely, an executive organ) on a majority basis, entitled to adopt decisions and obliged to account for its activities to the National Coordinating Council, while the latter should be in charge of the global tactics and strategy of the coalition.

In his report, Ventseslav Dimitrov mentioned the danger of the SDS turning to the left in the economic and political sectors. This would prevent the coalition from accomplishing its main task, namely that of changing the system, because a right-wing-center program is the only possible economic solution for the transition period. One of the reasons for the SDS turning to the left is the member-parties' lack of self-identification, especially in the economic sphere, which particularly applies to those parties likely to cover the left-wing spectrum of the SDS. The government's actions should not be attacked with populist arguments, as some of the coalition's leaders are inclined to do. The cabinet should be mainly criticized for its inactivity and for halting the reforms, Mr. Ventseslav Dimitrov declared. [passage omitted]

In his report, Aleksandur Yanchulev [Sofia mayor] declared that the Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act adopted in 1991 with the votes of the socialist majority is full of traps and potential conflicts, aimed at undermining the power of SDS-dominated municipalities. The parliamentary majority is once more trying to amend the act in order to affect the SDS local government prior to the elections. The communists are aware that an early replacement of SDS mayors by their own people is likely to provide a new opportunity of forging election results in their favor.

The resolute behavior manifested by the overwhelming majority of SDS mayors, local council chairmen, and municipal councillors is successful in foiling the government's attempts of assuming total control over the local government in SDS municipalities. Conflicts between local organs and the Berov cabinet, which is trying to restrict the mayors' prerogatives, to deprive them of their financial resources, and to subject the local administrations to individual ministries and departments on the basis of government decrees are inevitable. The SDS municipalities amount to 81 and are practically the only institutions that are implementing the SDS program. The confrontation between them and the government is escalating, but the SDS municipal leaderships are rallying and organizing joint actions within the framework of the Association of Democratic Municipalities, Yanchulev declared. [passage omitted]

Ivan Kostov [former finance minister in the Filip Dimitrov cabinet] described the economic framework that encompasses all SDS coalition partners. He pointed out the following national economic interests: overcoming the foreign economic isolation with the assistance of international financial institutions and signing an agreement on the foreign debt. Bulgaria should be integrated in the European economic sphere, but without losing its markets in the Commonwealth of Independent States and by developing potential markets in the Black Sea zone. The country must play an important role in the Balkans, taking advantage of its industrial, intellectual, and infrastructural superiority over the neighbors. The country's financial balance and the maintainance of a stable foreign exchange rate are also of great national economic interest. The lev could become a convertible currency. The SDS does not agree with the BSP doctrine that we can live without the international financial institutions. The firm defense of Bulgarian interests in the foreign policy sphere, on the subject of the embargo against Yugoslavia, and in the arms trade are also national priorities, Ivan Kostov pointed out.

He explained that the BSP has no foreign economic strategy and tries to make up for this lack by nostalgia for the USSR and fear of closer relations with the West. It is no coincidence that the government, supported by the BSP, has not managed to ratify the association treaty with the European Community, which the SDS cabinet signed almost a year ago. [passage omitted]

Filip Dimitrov analyzed the model of behavior during the forthcoming election campaign by pointing out that the BSP leaders are relying on the democratic forces losing the elections rather than on their own victory.

This is so because the communists perfectly realize that the number of their voters is dwindling. The BSP is suffering from the negative results of the Berov administration, which is entirely sponsored by the Socialists. Hence, the former Communist Party is already talking about elections, before it has lost the major part of its electorate. Nevertheless, the BSP will go to the elections only after it has tried to destroy the SDS unity, relying on the example of the "Polish syndrome."

Nikolay Khristov's report also contained a precise definition of the political opponent. According to him, the BSP is not a political party in the classical sense of the word. It is a dual formation: On the one hand, appearing as an exponent of the communist-type state institutions and, on the other hand—as a mechanism of transforming political power into an economic force.

Dimitrov Views Statements

AU0710123293 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 4 Oct 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council, by Nevena Kopandanova; place and date not given: "Pragmatism, Not Based on Specific Principle, Sooner or Later Ends in Treason"]

[Text] [Kopandanova] Was the focus of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] first theoretical conference directed more at the past or at the future?

[Dimitrov] I think that it was directed at the future, which was a positive factor.

[Kopandanova] Was there a conflict between the thesis of pragmatism and the thesis that adheres to principles?

[Dimitrov] I think that it is impossible to talk about two different theses. Adherence to principles, which does not include any pragmatism, is futile, and pragmatism, which is not based on principles, will sooner or later end in treason or marauding. As far as the pragmatic approach is concerned, I think that it exists. I think that what we really need more is the operational factor, i.e., viewing the pragmatic approach as a series of clearly defined actions, which have a beginning and an end, and have time and space dimensions.

[Kopandanova] Can we expect the SDS to look in a new way at the political sphere after its conference?

[Dimitrov] Well, not completely.... I think that the political sphere has clearly defined parameters. The fact that the SDS has many problems with this area is a matter of our political reality. Those problems are real, and if we adopt a new outlook, this would mean that until now we looked but did not see. This does not correspond to the truth, and that we are yet to open our eyes to certain realities. This is something we must not allow.

[Kopandanova] Could we expect a change in the SDS political image?

[Dimitrov] I do not think so. The SDS image is a topic that is being much discussed recently. It suffices to look at the SDS historical development until now. In the past they used to deal with questions such as is there an SDS or not, should it exist, and so forth. Now they deal with the SDS image. The SDS is a public fact of great importance. It asserted itself in a manner that evokes no doubt. There always will be attacks against us, and we also will have problems. This does not mean that within the SDS there could be no different opinions. The actions will show this. It could be taken into consideration that certain opinions will damage the SDS, and they must be overcome. However, when those opinions are presented in good faith, this would not be too difficult. This could be seen best in the case when certain theses, launched by honest and respected SDS members, do not receive a total support. Then such people usually find the formula according to which they could make their contribution without turning their case into "casus belli." If one seeks a war he can always find it. Then one must fight.

[Kopandanova] What was the most interesting thesis that was voiced during the conference?

[Dimitrov] I do not think that it is appropriate to answer this question, because there were many theses, and everyone assesses them in his own way. This is not the issue. There were original theses. Some of them were interesting, especially in the sphere of economy. In this context the economic report of Mr. Kostov and Mr. Luchnikov's report on the SDS election campaign were very interesting. Some of the political theses, as well as the reaction to the thesis on the space model of the Bulgarian political scene, also were interesting. Many original views were expressed in those cases. They remind of the beginning of the changes in Bulgaria, for example, the view on how it is possible to separate between the democratic and nondemocratic political spheres. Those are valuable things. However, you understand well that if for example in France the opinion is voiced that the parties of Mr. Le Pen and Mr. Marchais do not belong to the French political sphere, this would certainly evoke many commentaries. However, on the other hand it also is true that the specific characteristics of a communist party, which used to govern until recently, are especially difficult and burdensome. Thus, there certainly will be many more commentaries and discussions in this context.

[Kopandanova] What was the most frequently used word?

[Dimitrov] Frankly, I did not conduct any statistical study.

[Kopandanova] I expected to hear the word elections, for example, or unity....

[Dimitrov] I do not think that those were not the words that were used mostly. However, I do not think that there was any refrain that dominated the statement, and this is good, because after all, this was a theoretical conference. In a purely political conference it is allowed to repeat insistently certain inspiring phrases, but this hardly is the best attitude at a theoretical conference.

[Kopandanova] Should we expect soon a political conference?

[Dimitrov] I have no information about this.

Commentary Analyses Conference

AU0710101593 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 4 Oct 93 p 5

[Commentary by Nevena Andonova: "Metaphors and Realism"]

[Text] The two-day conference of the Union of Democratic forces [SDS] "gave ammunition" to the lovers of political metaphors.

The gamut of the figurative thinking within the SDS coalition proved exceptionally wide. It includes the ventilator of Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov, which could blow away the Communists masked as Socialists, and those who demonstrate extremist political behavior. The gamut also includes the restoration thesis of Mr. Yordan Vasilev about the SDS being a coalition in its character and a movement in accordance to its support. It also includes the final edition of the "Sliver Plan," presented by the members of the New Social Democratic Party, according to which all participants in the coalition are travelers in an infernal machine that has been constructed and launched by certain centers, which programmed its flight and target.

Fatalistic moods prevail among the coalition's vanguard, after the SDS found itself in opposition. Much was done in the name of the suggestion that everything in the country heads toward perdition.

However, in the last two days the same vanguard selected a healthier behavior. Obviously, many things had to be said. The metaphoric images provided more than "ammunition" for the journalist reports.

In other words, the statements made at the SDS First Theoretical Conference proved that the coalition character prevails vis-a-vis the attitude to close and unify the SDS, which was thought to be a predominant attitude before the conference. The specialized reports, read mostly by the members of Mr. Yordan Vasilev's Academic Club for Democracy, tried to fill the vacuum created by the lack of reaction on the part of the SDS to the painful topical issues—culture, health protection, trade unions, environment, the territorial division, and the intellectual crisis.

The coalition character surpassed even the boldest expectations and the aspiration of Mr. Ventseslav Dimitrov for an SDS that covers the entire democratic political spectrum. The voters, recently influenced by a leftist mood, could find their political representation in the "revolutionary mood and leftist organizations in the SDS," such as Ecoglasnost, the New Social Democratic Party, and the Social Democratic Party, which are strongly advised to create a "popular bloc," and attract the voters of the masked Communists. It appears that with this thesis the deputy tried to resolve at one scoop the fundamental dispute, which was expected to undermine the calm tone of the "innocent" conference.

Naturally, no solution was reached. Indeed, the great expectations of a political solution were not satisfied at the conference. An SDS deputy, who has recently gained prominence, admitted that two months ago he had great hopes for the forum. Precisely he was most disappointed. However, there was a surprise: The SDS coalition demonstrated its diverse character.

Mr. Luchnikov tried to purchase an insurance policy at the last briefing, and repeatedly said that "every thesis presented here represents only its authors. The coalition itself has no commitment to any of them." Furthermore, he stressed that this was not a conference of the SDS, but only a conference organized by the SDS.

Nevertheless, there is a great difference between a specification and a political stigma.

DPS Leader Dogan on Ties With Other Parties

AU0810100493 Sofia PRAVA I SVOBODI in Bulgarian 1 Oct 93 pp 1, 3

[First part of interview with Ahmed Dogan, chairman of Movement for Rights and Freedoms, by Dushko Popov for Radio Free Europe; place and date not given: "Responsible for Country's Fate"]

[Text] [Popov] Mr. Dogan, as a deputy of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] you had your vacation during the month of August. Did you rest?

[Dogan] It seems that I rested, but the impression is relative. I had the opportunity to rest, but did not make full use of it, because I had to deal with state and parliamentary problems. In any event, state affairs were dominant.

[Popov] Yes, such a vacation could be described as an "active rest," and that is useful from many points of view. It appears, however, that not only your colleagues, politicians, and journalists disrupted your vacation, but you yourself were active, and whenever it was necessary you initiated action at the state and government level in accordance with your interests. I will quote a newspaper headline: "Ahmed Dogan Sends Message for Meeting to 134 Rakovski Street [headquarters of the Union of Democratic Forces]."

[Dogan] Thank you for your question. I was indeed shocked because I never sent such a message.

[Popov] Another headline read: "Dogan Intends To Split Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], Punish DPS."

[Dogan] In principle, we never intended to split the SDS, because as a coalition the SDS has the historical mission of being the carrier of the change. This does not mean, of course, that it is the only carrier. Consequently, any attempt to split the SDS brings self-inflicted damage. This does not mean, of course, that this specific carrier of the change, which as I said is not the only one, should believe that it must carry out the change alone and, in a coalition, assume sole responsibility for all processes related to the stage of transition. The transition itself is a very complex concept, which requires the cooperation of several coalitions, representatives of all groups and strata of the population, and all people, rather than the individual participation of parties. From this point of view we are interested in preserving the SDS as a strong coalition with a clear program and leaders that really represent the program and goals to the entire society.

[Popov] In his interview on the "Panorama" television program, President Zhelev first outlined the possibility of a new parliamentary majority, consisting of the SDS, the DPS, and the New Alliance for Democracy. What do you and the SDS think about this political prospect?

[Dogan] Such possibilities of changing the configuration and restructuring the political, and more specifically, the parliamentary space, always exist in our parliament. I say this against the background of the forces that are currently represented in parliament. This applies especially to the SDS, the DPS, and the fourth parliamentary force. If they really find the mode of a new coalition, I am sure they could do everything possible to create the appropriate conditions and preconditions for forming such a coalition. This does not mean, however, that it would happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. It is a process that presupposes coordination and a common system of values. Indeed, so far this is only an expectation.

[Popov] How do you assess President Zhelev's position on returning the land and the liquidation councils?

[Dogan] Everything related to the Land Law is a very complex matter, even a whole package of issues and problems. In any event, every opinion will be abstractly interpreted by any given political institution or party. The basic factor in this case is that the government has undertaken to return the ownership of about 55-60 percent of the land by the end of the year. If this happens, I think that the basic element in the program of Professor Berov's cabinet—stressing privatization above all—will become a reality.

[Popov] When you were allies with the SDS you often stressed that the noncommunist coalition was your natural partner. Now because of the differences of opinion and the rupture in relations, the DPS actively cooperates with the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the New Alliance for Democracy [NSD]. Could you explain more precisely what political force is your natural partner and political ally?

[Dogan] The SDS has always been our natural partner, and the same applies to the fourth parliamentary force—the NSD. Against the background of the most recent parliamentary tendencies, this is natural. I also keep the Civil Alliance for the Republic [GOR] in mind. We are at the stage of specifying the conditions of cooperation with GOR. This will become a reality in the coming weeks.

I would explicitly like to stress that we have never had and probably never will have an active position of cooperating with the BSP and its parliamentary faction. I have stressed this many times, and I emphasize it again now: A priori the BSP and the DPS can have no common program. This is vitally important. It is another issue that the process and the situation, (I specifically mean the transition and most of all the inadequate behavior of the SDS, something of which we also are guilty—we were too hasty and did not adequately assess the situation) reshuffled the cards of political life in such a way that at a certain point we found ourselves in a no-win situation, a dead end.

[Popov] You mean the inadequate behavior of the SDS or its National Coordinating Council?

[Dogan] Naturally, I do not want to identify the SDS and the Coordinating Council. In this case I think that specific leaders represented in the Coordinating Council are responsible. Naturally, if they do not check their watches and set them with the pace of our time, with the responsibilities, and most of all, with the common responsibility of those organizations committed to being the carriers of the transition, I think it will be very difficult to talk about anything related to our political space, and above all, our relations with the SDS.

[Popov] Mr. Dogan, what political formations in Bulgaria does the DPS consider its political enemies?

[Dogan] This is an exceptionally important question. I want to be clearly understood: We oppose every attempt to restore communism and socialism. Every party, coalition, political force, and organization that dreams of restoring communism, with its inherent structures, are our natural enemies. It makes no difference what they call themselves—the BSP or some other organization that, for example, tries to create a new social image as a political force. Every party that calls, for instance, for the restoration of conditions that are close to communism or socialism, or has a program in which this demand is specified in principle, is our natural enemy.

[Popov] The SDS sees in your person one of the main obstacles to restoring last year's coalition alliance and is calling for your resignation, as indeed some of your closest aides are also doing. For your part, you are calling for a change of the SDS hardline leaders, and above all,

Filip Dimitrov, as a precondition for reconciliation and restoring the partnership with the SDS. If those two personal obstacles are removed, will it be possible to restructure the parliamentary majority according to last year's formula, or according to the configuration outlined by President Zhelev?

[Dogan] If we specifically analyze the context of your question—the incompatibility of personalities, or the lack of personal relationship between the leaders—I would not agree that for example, my resignation or Filip Dimitrov's resignation would automatically create conditions for new harmony and a new family idyll in our relations. Every politician creates a personal style of work. The removal of the person does not mean that his style of work is also eliminated. This is an issue of the existence of a team, strategy, tactic, position, and attitude. If they really are convinced that my resignation would facilitate the process, I am prepared to resign, but let the other side do the same, so that we can be even.

[Popov] Let us assume an eventual political reconciliation with your old ally—the SDS, something, I can see, you do not exclude. What are your conditions in the new political situation, and what concessions could the DPS make to its old natural anticommunist ally?

[Dogan] We have always been ready—whenever our friends from the SDS settle their internal problems, I mean the problems of the leadership, mutual relations among the parties in the coalition, the present and future strategy of this coalition that should propose a clear alternative for the transition—to negotiate and begin a new process with established responsibilities and roles. We could not do this at the beginning, when we won the last elections. As chairman of the DPS I am prepared to negotiate under all circumstances, or at least to conduct a dialogue, to specify our positions. This already goes a long way in our political situation. It shows that the party has a sense of responsibility for the fate of the country.

Commentary on Politicians' Attitudes to Moscow Events

AU0810100993 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Oct 93 p 6

[Unattributed commentary: "Matter of Principle"]

[Text] If they adhered to principles, the Bulgarian politicians should have supported not the person, Yeltsin, but the democratically elected institutions in Russia. This means both the parliament and President Yeltsin, because a man comes and goes, while the institutions remain, and they are either democratic or not.

This is the essence of democracy—it does not depend on a single person. Otherwise Lenin would have been right with his thesis on the role of personality in history.

There also is another thing that draws attention: Both the president and the prime ministers expressed support for Yeltsin only on Monday [4 October], when the things in Moscow became more or less clear. The national television, for its part, simply had difficulties in deciding how to report on the events. Why were they not categorical on Sunday [3 October] when the things were not clear and it was not known who will have the upper hand? Perhaps they waited for Clinton to make a statement in order to synchronize their watches with him? Besides, did they notice that Clinton said that he will support Yeltsin as long as he guarantees the "democratic processes" in Russia?

Bulgaria must finally have a clear list of its national interests. It must include our attitude to every state, regardless of who rules it. Then there will be no need to use ideological qualifications for a certain regime or a form of government. Otherwise the United States would also have refrained from embracing various "democrats," such as all Middle East rulers, or Pinochet. The United States simply knows where its interests lie.

The verbal support of a future political corpse such as Yeltsin (this is the fate of all dictators, and it does not mean that Rutskoy's fate would have been different) does not allow us to assume that the Bulgarian leaders will have good relations with his heir, especially if he would define himself as a Communist.

Who will benefit from all this? And where are the principles?

Kozloduy Nuclear Plant To Receive European Loan

AU0710061893 Sofia BTA in English 1941 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Sofia, October 6 (BTA)—Today officials of the European Community's Commission familiarized the management of the Power Engineering Committee with the terms and conditions for the receipt of loans to be used for raising the efficiency and improving the safety of the installations at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, a press release of the Power Engineering Committee informs. The participants in the meeting were told that experts had estimated the total amount needed for improving the operation and safety of N- plants in Eastern Europe at ecu 10-15,000 million. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will grant ECU 1,000 million for the N-plants in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It was stressed that the Western financial institutions would concentrate on projects the expenses on which could be refunded by selling electricity in the internal or the international market.

According to the commission, Bulgaria stands a chance of being among the first to receive similar loans because the N-plant at Kozloduy is well known to the Western experts who have already presented their opinion as to its technical improvement.

Ex-King Simeon Comments on Political Intentions

AU0510122793 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 30 Sep 93 p 2

[Reprint of interview with Simeon Coburg-Gotha by unnamed Khorizont Radio Network correspondent on 28 September 1993; place not given: "Simeon II Has Not Made a Deal With Zhelev"]

[Excerpts] [Khorizont] Your Majesty, in spite of living far from Bulgaria, you are always present in this country as a secret political factor. Should you not assume a more categorical stand and express your views on the development of events on our political scene, under such circumstances?

[Simeon] I must tell you that I do not like categorical stands, as a matter of principle, and even less so in case I should really be a secret factor, as you say. With reference to a popular American saying that back seat driving is the easiest way, because someone else is responsible for the car, I would say that it is easy to criticize without assuming responsibility. I think that this rule should be observed. On the other hand, I would not like to become a commentator of events in our country, because this is not my trade. Hence, although observing all developments with great attention, I prefer to be more restrained.

[Khorizont] Have you not the feeling that a little over a year ago, after your meeting with President Zhelev, we could almost detect a subsiding interest in Bulgarian affairs on your part. Has there been, in fact, a gentleman's agreement that you should not provoke further confusion on our political scene by your statements, or can we talk about some sort of deal between you and the president?

[Simeon] I totally disagree with this question and with your insinuation. It is simply ridiculous to say that my interest in Bulgaria has subsided, and as far as a deal, according to which I should keep away from Bulgarian affairs, is concerned, this is not only far from being gentlemanlike, but it is simply preposterous. I would like to add that there has never been such a thing, and that, during my meetings with the president, there has never been a question of such a behavior, or policy. I would further express my firm conviction that none of my statements has ever contributed to confusion on the Bulgarian political scene. I would rather say that the opposite is true, which is confirmed by my restraint and moderation.

[Khorizont] I would like to ask you an extremely embarrassing question, which may even seem provocative to you. Do you not think that the monarchist idea has additionally contributed to the crisis and split in the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]? Is it not high time for this question to be resolved, and for the monarchist idea to emerge under the wing of an united anti-communist coalition?

[Simeon] This is an interesting question. I would immediately say that there are no embarrassing questions. I think that there are only embarrassing or indiscrete answers. As to the question, whether the monarchist idea has contributed to the SDS crisis that you are referring to, I cannot answer it. I think that this question should rather be posed to the members and leading figures of the coalition. On the other hand, in my view, which I have always reiterated, the question of monarchy or republic is somewhat absurd, to a certain extent, especially if we start dividing the political parties into pro-monarchist and pro-republican ones. In every Bulgarian political party there are both monarchists and republicans, and this is so all over the world. Why should one or the other individual be excluded from one or the other possibility? In my view, it is very important for a democracy that people should talk to each other, that they should respect each other, and let the majority decide in the long run. Frankly speaking, I would be very glad if the broad public should not automatically associate the idea of the monarchy with primordial and crude anticommunism, because this is neither conform with my own convictions, nor with a liberal and democratic view on a country's political life. [passage omitted]

[Khorizont] Your Majesty, let us assume that you are a head of state: I am asking you to renounce the prudence of political calculation and common sense for a moment, and to tell me what you would do away with on the Bulgarian political scene in the first place?

[Simeon] A so-called parliamentary king, a constitutional monarch, is not allowed to, and should not, do away with anything whatsoever. He is obliged to deal with other questions, he has many other possibilities of exerting influence, of helping people to understand each other and of contributing to their reconciliation. This is the role of a constitutional monarch, generally speaking. It is not the role of a dictator. You should believe me when I say that my actions are not guided by prudence and even less by political calculation, because I am not a politician. As a statesman, I have a broad world outlook, as a result of my education and thanks to the opportunities of extensive travelling that I had throughout my life and that permitted me to study various political systems. However, more than by any sort of calculation, my attitude is inspired by discretion and by the wish that things in our country should proceed in a peaceful, objective, and pragmatic way.

[Khorizont] Do you have any specific idea about what should be done in the future?

[Simeon] As long as I have not returned to Bulgaria, I can only observe things, and offer some advice here and there, or listen to various people. However, I am not the man with the magic wand, as some people like to think.

German Defense Minister Arrives for Visit

LD0710202593 Prague CTK in English 1639 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 7 (CTK)—German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe arrived today in the Czech Republic for a two-day official visit, which takes place at the invitation of his counterpart Antonin Baudys.

Ruehe started his visit with a meeting with Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus. Later in the day, he is to meet with Czech President Vaclav Havel.

Czech Defence Ministry officials told CTK that during his Czech visit, Ruehe was to become acquainted with the new Czech Army now being built, and to meet with Czech representatives to discuss strengthening and extension of contacts between the Czech and German Armies.

On Friday, Ruehe will leave for Cesky Krumlov, South Bohemia, to visit a base of the U.N. peacekeeping forces.

Later on Friday, he will deliver a lecture at Prague's Charles University on European uniting [as received] and transatlantic partnership - prospects of German foreign and security policies.

Ruehe is a member of Kohl's Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Earlier he held the post of CDU general secretary.

Comments on NATO

LD0710213993 Prague CTK in English 2033 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 7 (CTK)—I believe that NATO cannot be a closed society and that the democracies, which had no chance to be democracies within the last forty years, must be offered an opportunity to join this organisation, German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe told Czech television today.

Ruehe, currently visiting the Czech Republic, was referring to the Eastern and Central European countries, which have declared their interest in joining NATO.

At a press conference following his meeting with Ruehe, Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus said that the Czech Republic's joining NATO could be considered rather a long-term question.

Klaus said that he had discussed with Ruehe developments not only in the Czech republic and Germany, but also in Russia and Poland, and these developments' significance for the future European security arrangement. The two politicians also exchanged their views on the security situation in Central Europe.

Referring to a letter recently sent by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the governments of the NATO member countries, in which Yeltsin expressed his reservations about a possible extension of NATO, Klaus said that the letter, shortened in media, looked rather different from its real wording.

Klaus stated that Germany viewed Yeltsin's letter soberly. The letter will be answered in a way not to imply any limiting of cooperation, he stressed.

Asked if the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary should become NATO members even in view of Yeltsin's letter, Ruehe said that NATO was no closed society, and that the countries mentioned had set on the path leading to the European Community (EC). However, it is necessary to involve Russia in the European stabilisation process as well, Ruehe emphasised. A sort of strategic partnership between Russia and NATO should be established, he concluded.

Ruehe arrived today in the Czech Republic for a two-day official visit at the invitation of his counterpart Antonin Baudys.

Meets With Havel

LD0710215193 Prague CTK in English 2100 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 7 (CTK)—Czech President Vaclav Havel called NATO an organisation which protected democratic values, during his meeting with German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe, presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek told CTK today.

Ruehe arrived in Prague at his counterpart Antonin Baudys's invitation on a two-day visit today.

Not only do we espouse these values, but feel to be their co-creators, Spacek quoted Havel as having said.

Havel understands the fact that NATO has to accept new members gradually, Spacek said.

Havel stressed that if there were no stability and peace in Central Europe, no stability could exist in the whole of Europe, Spacek reported.

Ruehe explained that NATO would be a new alliance due to the new situation and pointed out to need to eliminate any border between stability and instability in Europe.

Ruehe assumes that the Czech Republic will become a member of the European Community (EC), said Spacek. The association agreement was signed on Monday.

It does not mean, however, that the EC membership means admission into NATO, Spacek quoted Ruehe as having said.

Klaus Explains Government Salary Increase

AU0710064693 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 2 Oct 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci, place and date not given: "I Am the Last One To Ask for a Higher Salary"]

[Text] In view of the fact that the government is to receive higher salaries next year, we asked Vaclav Klaus for an interview.

[Krejci] Sir, some people will certainly react to this pay rise by saying: "The government is going to get more money, but not us." Can you say something about it?

[Klaus] First, I would like say that I am the last person to ask for a higher salary. Therefore, I am not very happy to have to defend this matter right now.

Seriously, I have to say that salaries and wages are really increasing in our country. In the first eight months of this year, the average wage increased by 28.4 percent in the Czech Republic. This is a figure that causes me great anxiety. It seems that we should introduce stricter wage regulation. Certainly, not all the wages are climbing, but average wages and salaries are increasing. If the salaries of the deputy ministers and all the employees at the ministry are constantly increasing, then I do not see any reason why the government members should be excluded from this process.

Today, there are dozens of people at all ministries who have higher salaries than the ministers—if we include bonuses. This is a totally unnatural, abnormal, and illogical situation. We all know that ministers—not their deputies—are responsible for their sectors. For example, Minister Kocarnik is responsible for the Finance Ministry—not his deputies Purkyne, Rudlovcak, and Klak. There is no justification for the fact that they receive a higher salary than the minister. In this sense, I believe that it is reasonable and quite normal to raise the government's salary in proportion to the growth of the average salary.

[Krejci] People will say, however, that the higher the salary is, the faster it grows.

[Klaus] In my opinion, it is not true that only higher salaries are growing. We are aware of the fact that we are living in a country where there is the greatest income equality, as regards both wages and pensions. Wage differentiation is the only way out of this situation. However, it is a different thing to ask whether we have reached the optimum level of wage differentiation—or whether we are about to reach it, or whether we have gone past it. I am of the opinion that the increase in wages, as proposed by the government for individual grades in the budgetary sphere, only proves that we are still living in a world where wage equity prevails. If our wages differ by just 1,000 korunas, then this really means wage equity. I believe this is not the direction in which we should go. In any case, the government members are not among the 10 percent of the population who are the top earners.

Urges U.S. To Avoid Protectionism

AU0610174493 Prague CTK in English 1601 GMT 4 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 4 (CTK)—Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has called on American legislators to dismantle trade barriers in order to give East European producers greater access to American markets.

Klaus made his views known today in an interview with Associated Press to mark his forthcoming visit to the United States.

In the course of the interview, Klaus said the Czech Republic was the only successful postcommunist country and stressed the need for the West to help the countries of Eastern Europe by removing various trade restrictions.

Klaus said, we feel we have problems penetrating the markets of Western Europe and the United States.

As a result of the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading system, the communist world's version of the EC, disbanded in June 1991, the Czech Republic lost markets in the East which it urgently needs to replace, Klaus pointed out.

According to AP, he claimed protectionism to be one of the greatest dangers facing the embryonic democracies and market economies of Eastern Europe.

Klaus made it clear that the issue of gaining access to American markets would be at the top of his agenda during his visit to the United States which is to take place at the end of this month.

Zieleniec Says International Situation May Worsen

AU0610164493 Prague CTK in English 1229 GMT 4 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 4 (CTK)—The fact that military force has been wittingly used in Russia threatens to worsen the general international situation, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec said today before leaving for Brussels to sign the Czech Republic's association agreement with the European Community (EC).

It is a pity that the efforts of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and pro-reform forces which concentrated around him did not meet with the understanding of the other side, Zieleniec said. I firmly believe that the entire Russian problem should be settled by democratic elections, he added.

Zieleniec described the competing sides in Russia as those who were fighting under the national flag of Russia and those who stood under the hammer and sickle banner.

Asked whether security of the Czech Republic was threatened either directly or indirectly Zieleniec said: I believe this is not the question of these few hours. He said the situation in the Czech Republic was not immediately as dramatic as to require an extraordinary session of the government.

Assesses Visit to New York

LD0710123093 Prague CTK in English 0907 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] New York, Oct 7 (CTK)—I naturally hope that our country will be accepted to the Security Council and we are doing all we can for it, Czech Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec said today at the close of his stay here and before departure for Washington to meet United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

On the other hand, it will neither be a tragedy nor political defeat if we do not succeed on the present stage and field our candidacy, for example, in two years, Zieleniec added.

Zieleniec described his forthcoming talks with Christopher as important for the relations between the two countries. I have had no opportunity to have a detailed discussion with Mr. Christopher since the emergence of the Czech Republic, Zieleniec said. The United States is a power with which we are connected by friendly relations and it is a power of key significance leading the North Atlantic alliance. I think it is important that our positions be discussed and compared, he added.

On Tuesday Zieleniec met with Belarus Foreign Minister Pjotr Kravchenko to discuss the membership in the Security Council. Belarus is the Czech Republic's rival in its efforts at obtaining non-permanent membership in the Security Council.

In a meeting with United Nations Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and Chairman of the General Assembly Samuel Insanally, Zieleniec discussed the U.N. activity. Zieleniec's meeting with Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg from Brazil, this month's chairman of the Security Council, was aimed at clarifying the system of the council's work and of demands it sets towards each of its member states. Zieleniec also continued a series of bilateral talks with the foreign ministers of a number of states as well as with Madeleine Albright, the U.S. representative in the United Nations and a member of President Clinton's administration.

Referring to a meeting with Kravchenko, Zieleniec stressed that it was generally accepted in diplomatic practice that two countries which run for a non-permanent membership in the Security Council try with similar arguments to convince each other to give up their candidacy. Asked to comment on some reports from diplomatic circles that the Belarus minister was exerting pressure not only on the Czech delegation but on other delegations, Zieleniec said he considered it natural that if someone wants to succeed in something he uses different means. I think everything is being done according to accepted scheme and I must say there are many such competitions around the world just now, Zieleniec said. The question whether the Czech Republic or Belarus becomes a Security Council non-permanent member will be decided by vote on October 29.

The Belarus foreign minister refused to speak with CTK. According to Czech diplomats, his delegation is continuing an intensive campaign aimed at being elected to the Security Council.

Zieleniec expressed satisfaction that he had had an opportunity to both discuss bilateral relations and participate in multilateral diplomatic activities in New York. He stressed the importance of his being received by U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali on Tuesday, although just at that time talks on the U.N.'s further activity in Somalia were culminating, which is of key importance both for the secretary general personally and for the United States. Zieleniec refused, however, to express the Czech Republic's stand on the current crisis in Somalia. I usually avoid recommending to some other country whether or not it should send its troops into a war-torn region. It is a crucial decision, Zieleniec said, adding that the United States must take the decision bearing in mind the interests and opinions of its own citizens.

Government Approves 1994 Draft State Budget

AU0610181493 Prague CTK in English 2244 GMT 4 Oct 93

[Text] Prague Oct 4 (CTK)—The aggregate balance of the state budget for 1994 and the budgets of regional and town councils have been settled, according to data from both budgets in the wording approved by the government on September 24, 1993 which CTK received from the Czech Ministry of Finance today.

The surplus from the current account worth Kc [Czech Korunas] 14 billion (about $470 million) has been transferred to the budgets of regional and municipal councils for subsidies.

The aggregate budget of the state and regional and municipal councils anticipates that revenues will reach Kc431.8 billion (Kc401.5 billion last year), from which revenues to the state budget should reach Kc379.8 billion (Kc353.3 billion last year) and revenues to regional and municipal budgets Kc52 billion (compared to last year's Kc48.2 billion).

The expenditures of the state budget are expected to reach Kc365.8 billion (last year they reached Kc336.3 billion) and the expenditures of regional and municipal budgets should be Kc66 billion (Kc64 billion in 1993). The difference between the expenditures and revenues in

both budgets worth Kc14 billion (last year 17 billion Kcs) represents subsidies from the state budget to regional and municipal councils.

Revenues from physical persons' income tax have grown the most (to 158 percent of the last year's level), followed by other taxes (to 122.2 percent), while incomes from the road tax experienced the sharpest decline (to less than three-quarters). The biggest increase in expenditures is planned for housing (to 193.8 percent), while the biggest reduction is in price subsidies to enterprises (to 81.7 percent).

Almost 62 percent (last year 63.3 percent) of the state budget's revenues comes from taxes. For instance, the value added tax (VAT) will bring in 24.9 percent (last year 22.8 percent), the tax from incomes of physical persons 19.2 percent [item incomplete as received].

Dyba on Trip to South Asia, Australia

AU0710141093 Prague CTK in English 1549 GMT 5 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 5 (CTK)—A delegation of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry will visit the Czech Republic at the beginning of next year to discuss the founding of a non-governmental committee for economic cooperation between the Korean and Czech Chambers of Commerce, Karel Dyba said today.

Speaking with journalists on his return from visits to South Korea, Australia, and Singapore, Dyba, Czech economy minister, said that Asian economists had demonstrated very good knowledge about economic development in the Czech Republic.

They know that we are at the head of a group of countries reforming their economies, he pointed out, adding that the Czech Republic must keep attracting attention because competition for markets and investments was big.

Dyba stressed that responsibility in budgetary policy and finances were the basic pillars of the economic miracle in Korea, Singapore, and other countries. The approach taken by governments is equally important, he added. The government complemented the market with certain interventions but by no means did it set the market's direction or the rate of development.

Speaking about his visit to Australia, where he and Australian Trade Minister Peter Cook signed Agreement on Protection of Investment, Dyba said that abolishing visa requirements would help expand mutual relations.

During a short stopover in Singapore, Dyba met with the country's minister of foreign affairs, Wong Kan Seng.

Dlouhy Pleased With Visit to Iran

AU0810112393 Prague CTK in English 1732 GMT 5 Oct 93

[Text] Prague, Oct 5 (CTK)—The visit of a Czech delegation headed by Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Dlouhy to Iran fulfilled aims which included the signing of a trade agreement between both countries, Dlouhy told journalists after his return home today.

I returned with a feeling that Iranian economic leaders are trying to push through changes which will lead to a revival in our mutual relations, Dlouhy said.

Iranian leaders invited Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus for an official visit. Not once did I encounter any reservations about the recent visit of Salman Rushdie to the Czech Republic, Dlouhy said.

Rushdie visited the Czech Republic on September 2-5 to participate in a seminar on nationalism and racism held in Liblice, near Prague, by the Helsinki citizens' assembly. He also met privately with Czech President Vaclav Havel. A row erupted between Havel and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus who feared the visit might draw negative reaction from Muslim countries. Rushdie has been in hiding since 1988, when Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced a death sentence on him for blasphemy against Islam in his novel the Satanic Verses.

Iran represents an interesting territory for the Czech Republic. However, considerable payment problems of Iranian partners could not be ignored, Dlouhy said. He considered Iran to be one of the most difficult territories with respect to collecting claims.

Debts caused by withholding payments to Czech firms currently represent $19.5 million and the delays keep growing. Dlouhy added there was a danger Czech firms' supplies to an aluminum producing plant in Jajarm would aggravate the situation next year still farther. Their value was estimated to reach $200 million.

Difficulties connected with the construction of this plant have been overcome but participation in the building of a power plant in Iranshah have created bigger problems. Future orders would greatly depend on finding a way out of the troubling situation.

A contract concluded by both sides in 1988 contained many unfavorable conditions for the Czech Republic, Dlouhy explained. Moreover, Iranian partners have not kept some of their obligations. On the other hand, the Czech side was also not completely blameless as it had signed the less than perfect contract.

Therefore, Dlouhy concluded that it had been agreed a group of experts would deal with the issue. They would propose further procedures within three weeks.

Meciar Views Economy, Privatization Process

AU0810090693 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 2 Oct 93 p 5

[TA SR report: "Vladimir Meciar Holds News Conference on the Euro-Atlantic Orientation of the Slovak Republic"]

[Text] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, Slovak journalists, and foreign reporters accredited in Bratislava met in the building of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists in Modra-Harmonia yesterday. Prior to the signing of the EC Association Treaty in Luxembourg on 4 October, Meciar stressed that the Slovak Republic's orientation is Euro-Atlantic, that we are interested in EC membership, and are heading toward Maastricht. Despite the world economic recession, the Slovak economy has preserved its dynamism, Prime Minister Meciar said. He supported this by referring to statistical data showing an increase in productivity, a decline in prices, a growth of gross domestic product and trade turnover, a smaller number of loss-incurring enterprises, etc. In addition to the macroeconomic analysis, Vladimir Meciar also spoke about privatization.

We Are in Favor of Cooperation Within the Visegrad Four

Slovakia will continue searching for opportunities to intensify cooperation within the Visegrad Four, and will announce this intention to Europe. The Visegrad Four, he said, has acquired a certain political and moral lead, and it would be a pity if we lost it.

According to the Slovak prime minister, the misunderstandings during GATT meetings are the consequence of very significant changes in the factors influencing foreign trade. The Central European market is of utmost importance for the Slovak Republic. The government held discussions with all its partners in the Visegrad Four and made efforts to establish a free trade zone. The interests of the [Visegrad Four] countries differ, however. Meciar stressed that the Slovak Republic is in favor of taking immediate steps to remove the customs barriers within five years—an idea where Slovakia has the support of the Czech Republic. The attitudes of Poland and Hungary, however, are at present different. Slovakia proposes to institionalize economic cooperation within the Visegrad Four, but our partners are against it. "Talks conducted with Bulgaria and Romania do not imply that the Visegrad Four is to be expanded," the prime minister said.

The development of the economic situation in Slovakia is unusually dynamic and mostly positive, Meciar said at the beginning of his speech. This is true despite the world economic crisis, which has not failed to hit Slovakia. There were higher costs involved in the division of the federation. Gross domestic product has, so far, declined 6.2 percent, and the inflation rate is 12.1 percent. Real wages have declined 1.6 percent, while unemployment has increased.

Signs of a Turning Point in the Economy

The prime minister said that the results of the first quarter were greatly influenced by the usual problems of a newborn country, the transition to a new tax system, and new budgetary rules. However, we could see a certain turning point in the economy in the second quarter. Gross domestic product increased by 9.8 percent, output increased by 18 percent, labor productivity by 19.8 percent, and real wages by 6.7 percent. Inflation has been stabilized, and the increase in prices has not exceeded 1 percent. The number of loss-making enterprises declined. It is interesting, Meciar said, that at the very moment the government announced that the managers of loss-making companies would not be allowed to participate in the privatization of their companies, a total of 136 enterprises began showing a profit.

Slovakia's overall foreign trade turnover increased in April and May by a factor of 2.1 against the first quarter, while the foreign trade balance showed a surplus of 2.9 billion korunas [Sk]. The volume of domestic retail turnover increased by 16.2 percent, and investments increased by a third. Savings increased by 3.4 percent, and credits by Sk10.4 billion. The average budget monthly income was Sk13.1 billion in the second quarter, which is 50 percent more than in the first quarter. The deficit has been stabilized. In the first quarter it reached Sk11 billion, but by the end of September it did not exceed Sk3 or 4 billion. According to the prime minister, foreign currency reserves are equal to the value of Slovakia's three-month exports. Foreign capital invested in Slovakia in the first year [of independence] represented 40 percent of the entire volume of investments in Slovakia since November 1989. In the second quarter, the influx of foreign capital was higher than in the first quarter, despite the fact that the devaluation in June caused a temporary decline in production and made prices unstable. In August again, however, there was recovery. The daily production of goods increased by 9.7 percent against July. Labor productivity increased by 17 percent, which had a positive impact on exports. The average monthly wage declined by 4.1 percent. Productivity in enterprises with more than 25 employees declined by 2.3 percent, and wages by 5.6 percent, which is, according to the prime minister, a positive trend in view of the lack of wage regulation.

Federal Reform Tailored to Czech Needs

"Economic reform introduced by the federation had much more negative effects in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. For us, this resulted in a worse social and economic situation," Meciar said. Our unemployment rate is 13 percent, while unemployment in the Czech Republic is barely 3 percent. Gross national product also declined, and some sectors, such as the ore mining industry, failed completely. The same thing applies to agriculture, which was on the brink of bankruptcy when it was passed into the hands of independent

Slovakia, the prime minister said. This forced the government to analyze the causes and to change the strategy of reform.

The recovery on the market to which Slovakia has access was the first fundamental turning point. "More than 60 percent of our production is consumed outside the Slovak market and Slovak territory," Meciar said. "It is therefore important to stabilize [as published] Slovak products on the EC markets. The agreements in London—and later, Brussels—secured this stabilization and, as regards steel production, we were given what we had asked for," he added. "We argued that since arms production had been abolished in Slovakia, the damage caused by EC restrictions would exceed the value of Western assistance provided to the Slovak Republic," the prime minister said.

The Slovak Republic's markets should be secure next year, and we expect that our markets will expand in the years that follow. This should ensure, he said, that the EC Association Treaty will be signed in Luxembourg on 4 October. Apart from its great political significance, there is another aspect to this treaty: It secures the stability of market relations and Slovakia's orientation toward the West, and it also sets the conditions under which our trade will be conducted.

"In contrast to some of our partners in the Visegrad Four, we are satisfied with the pace of integration. There will be an unbalanced situation, whereby our products will be allowed to penetrate the West, but the West will have to respect our temporary protective measures," Meciar said. "The situation when our admission was being questioned in the Council of Europe will not be repeated. The treaty must be ratified by all countries. It contains clauses on the protection of civic and human rights, which are political conditions. If these conditions are not met, the European Community can abrogate the treaty. It is important that the ratification process should take as little time as possible."

"We all will be made responsible for the fact whether we become an EC member or not," the Slovak prime minister said regarding Slovakia's admission to the European Community. "We anticipate that the recession will stop next year, the economy will stabilize and recover, and the Slovak economy will grow in 1995. After 1996, the Slovak economy must grow at a high rate."

A Strategy Toward the East

Part and parcel of the Slovak Government's strategy is the revival on East European markets—in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. This is a complicated process. "I must reject the statement that our talks with Russia are aimed at turning Slovakia into a Russian satellite. At present, trading opportunities with Russia are minimal. When our trade is revived, however, we will have a chance of cashing our outstanding claims that amount to $2.5 billion," Meciar stressed. Slovakia made great efforts to obtain orders for securing the gas transit from Russia to Western Europe. According to the prime minister, Poland seems to be winning the competition, but the final decision has not been made yet. "It is not true that Russia has no money. It has enough foreign currency reserves, gas, oil, and nuclear material," the Slovak prime minister said. "This is why we expect that during our talks with the Russian delegation we will agree upon the trading system that could be fully implemented as of next year. Slovakia is producing 11 times as much as it could export to Russia," Meciar pointed out.

According to the prime minister, the Slovak Government is interested in establishing enterprises in Slovakia that would deal with the gas and oil transit all over Europe. Slovakia was the only country outside the Soviet Union to be given the opportunity to participate in mining and owning [as published] raw materials in the Russian Federation. Since 1 September, the Slovak Republic has been paying 15 percent less in taxes [as published] than other countries trading with Russia, and, in addition, Slovakia can also function as an intermediary for Western firms.

In his speech, the prime minister mentioned the interest of the Slovak Government in penetrating Asian markets, and he described the specific steps he is taking toward Japan, China, Korea, and the Arab countries. "It is possible that the Arab market will be opened up to the Slovak Republic, but this will not apply to weaponry," Meciar said.

Successful Privatization Requires Money

In another part of his speech he touched upon the problems involved in the privatization process in Slovakia. He said that the chemical companies received the greatest number of privatization offers. He also mentioned a number of measures that the government had adopted in order to revive the economy, which include tax reliefs and the establishment of the "Transformation Councils" that are expected to prepare the country's economy for tougher competition. These councils are expected to start working as early as October. Meciar said that the transformation process in Germany was an example of a process that is out of control—the Eastern part of Germany is consuming two thirds of the funds flowing into it from the Western part [sentence as published].

According to the prime minister, one of the tasks of the Transformation Council in charge of the mass media is to establish conditions that will allow dailies to become shareholders in the printing plants and the Newspaper Distribution Service. When these companies are privatized, domestic buyers will be given priority. He mentioned the Neografia Martin company as an exception. Within the framework of privatization, this company was sold to the Slovak Heritage Foundation for the symbolic price of Sk1.

According to the prime minister, a lack of funds is the main problem in the privatization process. Banks cannot become managers of privatized property. Next month,

the government will present a bill in parliament that will allow domestic buyers to repay the cost of the acquired enterprises in installments over several years. The bill's passage will eliminate the strong influence of the banks that decide who will get the credit—that is, who can participate in privatization.

Some of the enterprises that are being privatized lack capital, and many of them are insolvent. To stimulate growth, the National Property Fund could waive installments if the owner can raise the technological level, increase investments, and create more employment. The prime minister said that if there is strong demand and prospects of a high foreign currency profit, the Slovak Government will reserve the right to sell the enterprise to a foreign investor.

The Coupon Method Is Not a Panacea

Meciar said that enterprises privatized by the coupon method have a much slower pace of growth than enterprises privatized by foreign capital. He said that two thirds of all foreign investments were placed in Bratislava. He added that the government is concluding agreements with authorized agents abroad and provides information to foreign chambers of commerce and prospective buyers. He said that investors from the United States, Japan, and the Arab countries are increasingly interested in investing in Slovakia. The government intends to put banks operating with their own capital at an advantage, and to grant reliefs to non-profit organizations for up to five years. Foreign companies and foreign nationals will be allowed to own land in the Slovak Republic. We have to create advantageous conditions for foreign investments in the Slovak Republic, since all post-communist countries prefer this policy. Supply greatly exceeds demand, and the competition is tough. "Money will go wherever the most favorable conditions are," the prime minister stressed. "If we have a scandal at home, we are helping our competitors," he added.

The prime minister assessed the activity of privatization funds and the merits of individual privatization methods, their advantages and disadvantages. In this connection he admitted that the coupon method is "socially fair," and the entire process runs smoothly. He said, however, that this method is ineffective when it comes to creating a proper attitude on the part of the new owners toward their newly acquired property. "Coupon privatization is a good method to use in enterprises whose managers are not interested in acquiring them. In the second wave, coupon privatization will be used only as a supplementary method."

The prime minister mentioned that although the government prefers public competition when privatizing enterprises, more than half of the privatization projects were tailored to the needs of preselected prospective buyers. Based on this experience, Meciar suggested that an enterprise be sold to a selected buyer "only if there is a lack of competition, or if it is in the state interests." He added that the decisive steps regarding privatization will be taken next year. "The government is in favor of depolitizing and decriminalizing the entire process," Vladimir Meciar stressed at his meeting with journalists yesterday.

Concerned About 'Greater Hungary'

AU0710155793 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 Oct 93 p 1

[TA SR report: "From the Vicious Circle of Minorities"]

[Text] Bratislava— Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met yesterday at a working dinner with a group of European Parliament [EP] deputies headed by Ludivina Garcia Arias, chairwoman of the EP delegation for relations with the Slovak Republic. Augustin Marian Huska [deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic] and Ivan Laluha [chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee] were also present.

"We are concerned at present because, once again, there are efforts to renew Greater Hungary," Vladimir Meciar said in reply to several questions concerning the problem of ethnic minorities. "Their rights cannot be placed above the rights of other citizens and above territorial integrity. Owing to the excessive emphasis on minority rights, a situation has arisen wherein Slovaks are the ones asking for equal rights in the ethnically mixed areas."

The minority issue is a sensitive European problem. "We will accept a pan-European norm regarding the protection of human and civic rights as generally binding and pledge in advance to respect it," Vladimir Meciar proposed. He expressed readiness to come to an agreement on this issue on a Europe-wide scale.

Expects HZDS Majority in Elections

AU0710164593 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 Oct 93 p 2

[TA SR report: "The Art of Our Policy; Vladimir Meciar Met With Foreign Correspondents"]

[Text] Bratislava—The left won the elections in Poland and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] expects the same to happen in Hungary as well. "They [SDL representatives] say that the political strategy in Central Europe is changing and believe that they will win here, too. We assure them that, as long as there is the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], they will not win any elections here," Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said in Bratislava yesterday when meeting a group of foreign correspondents.

"My response to them is: You can win in Poland and Hungary but, as long as we are here, there will be a strong center in Slovakia," the prime minister added. He voiced the view that the next elections might possibly move the balance of power even more in favor of the HZDS. He

did not rule out that the next elections will be early elections. "However, they will take place when it suits us." Vladimir Meciar believes that the HZDS would again form the government itself and that it would have a majority in parliament. "There is one period that does not suit us, but we are going to improve that." [sentence as published]

He described a coalition of several political parties as possible, but added that this would be a coalition of unstable partners. According to the prime minister, the present government has the support of the majority of deputies. It will take approximately five years for the social structure in Slovakia to change. There will not exist any stable political party until then. "The art of our policy is in finding the common ground of several parties in parliament that are favorably inclined toward individual laws."

Kovac Discusses Domestic Political Issues

AU0710220093 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Oct 93 p 9

[Interview with President Michal Kovac "recorded by" Martin Hric in Bratislava; date not given: "How Do You Do, Mr. President?"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Hric] Unstable political conditions slow down economic transformation and the influx of foreign capital. And—vice versa—a shaky, faltering economy makes political consolidation impossible. Where can this vicious circle be broken? Surely, by consolidating the political scene?

[Kovac] Theoretically, I agree. However, the configuration of established political entities cannot be prescribed by law, nor is it a matter of goodwill. A model for European political structures simply cannot be decreed. The shaping of the parties and movements is a process that still awaits us. In particular, this involves entities that intend to remain on the political scene. In essence, the Christian Democratic Movement has a profile and has counterparts throughout the world. The same applies to the social democrats—but they are not in parliament. The Party of the Democratic Left and the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] are still looking for their political profile. However, this process could not be speeded up artificially in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Rumania, or anywhere else. That is, it is not a specific Slovak feature.

[Hric] Nevertheless, regarding the struggle for a share of the power in our country, is this not a specific feature?

[Kovac] This struggle takes place in every democratic country. However, in our country it should certainly be calmer and more civilized. It should not poison the atmosphere or inconvenience the citizens who are dragged into squabbles against their will. At the moment especially, in the tense economic conditions, they are more likely to need a kind word. I do not hold it against you correspondents. You reflect the real situation. This is the fault of the politicians.

[Hric] What should they do differently and better?

[Kovac] First of all, the problem is not in their programs or aims. Their programs have a lot in common. Moreover, they should be totally open and capable of reflecting the changing conditions. The differences lie in the methods for achieving these aims and in the means the political entities use. We definitely have to look for different ways and means of achieving our aims.

[Hric] Mr. President, do you think the issue really only involves power? Does it not involve property in the privatization process?

[Kovac] Let me be direct with you: Not everyone has a chance of coming into property. This applies to less than one-tenth of the population. It does not even attract many people. Property is a huge responsibility. Mostly, the citizen does not care if a factory belongs to Peter or Paul. He wants to have a job and a decent wage. It is true, there is also envy—and meticulous attention is paid to whether someone became rich by chance or by unfair means. What is fair about the whole privatization process is the fact that it is not the end of the matter. I can acquire property more or less properly... it does not change my ability. If I am incompetent, I will go bust in two years. I will be unemployed, and the business, the property, will end up being taken over by someone who is competent and knows how to manage and develop it.

[Hric] However, if the suspicions in the Indiagate affair are proven to be justifiable, will the property eventually end up in the hands of its rightful owner?

[Kovac] In essence, I only have the same information as you. I discussed the case with the prime minister last Monday [27 September]. He expressed his concern that it has a political background. The reports from the Interior Ministry and the Slovak Information Service do not enable me to assume this is an affair. However, at the moment, I do not even have enough information to be able to categorically discount the possibility. This is also your business, correspondents, carry out your own investigations.

Otherwise, there are things that arouse indignation but are within the framework of the law. I know of a hotel in the Tatras that has been privatized three times. The first time, it was done properly, by public tender, for 20 million if I remember correctly. The owner sold it later for a considerably higher sum, and this new owner sold it a third time for an even higher sum. Naturally, a citizen living from pay day to pay day takes an uncharitable view of profits amounting to millions. But what can the owner do with them? He can put them in a bank and live comfortably on the interest. But the bank invests the money! It will move it around to the benefit of the economy! Or, the owner can reinvest it himself. It would only be bad if he stuffed it into the mattress and the mice gnawed at it.

[Hric] Nevertheless, to turn from the Tatras to the foothills of the Himalayas....

[Kovac] I would differentiate between two things. The first one is the sugar purchase. If the company reexported the sugar contrary to the original agreement, then let India or the country of import raise hell. If the reexporter paid income tax, then everything is in order as far as we are concerned.

Unfreezing the outstanding claims is another matter. The Indian side would probably like to be clear about the addressee in its own interest. If the unfreezing was done by a company that is entitled to do so according to the company register and the remuneration is legal, taxed income—that would also be in order. In this case, the money should be placed in the state's account; only the commission should be placed in the account of the intermediary.

[Hric] This entire affair—as you have said—has certainly not helped Slovakia's reputation.

[Kovac] This is the thing. If I cared about Slovakia's good name, I would give 100-times more consideration as to whether to make the matter public before it had been substantiated and investigated. This does not only apply in the case of the current government. If government officials in Slovakia steal millions, they will do so no matter who the prime minister is. That is the way the country is! It may have repercussions for Slovakia's image abroad. [passage omitted]

[Hric] Mr. President, we are concerned that you have not quite convincingly enough dispelled the rumors of tension between the Castle and the government since you personally have not issued a statement, but have only done so through your spokesman.

[Kovac] (smiling) The question depends on your definition of tension. In my opinion, tension is created if serious disputes emerge, if there is an upsurge in mistrust and suspicion, and if the partners stop communicating with each other. I do not consider each difference of opinion to be a sign of tension. I consider tension to be the so-called arch enemy. There have been many differences of opinion, and I believe there will be others. However, if they are cleared up immediately, discussed openly, and both sides make the effort to find a starting point beneficial to the country, then I do not consider this to be tension. It is not my role to publicly criticize the government, parliament, or opposition. However, I do have the opportunity to express my views directly. If I invite a minister to discuss critical reservations about his department with me, there has to be trust here that this is not an anti-government conspiracy, but a conversation within the framework of my constitutional authority.

[Hric] What about the recall of Rudolf Filkus?

[Kovac] I also tried to find a civilized solution here and not pile one mistake on top of another.

[Hric] How did you endure the considerations or speculation about a change from a parliamentary to a presidential system?

[Kovac] I do not consider such views to be a sin or a blow below the belt of democracy. The presidential system has operated in the United States for 200 years without any kind of apprehension. However, it is necessary to weigh up the following: In which state and under which historical and present-day circumstances would such a change be beneficial, how would it be perceived, and in what direction would it be oriented? If you take all of this into consideration, then the situation in our country is not suitable for us to seek greater political stability by this means. This could be perceived as a sign of our departure from parliamentary democracy, interest in an authoritative regime, and so on. The various doubts would increase.

[Hric] The ruling movement and executive has more than once presented you with a fait accompli and it has viewed your attempts to find a constructive solution and your efforts to adopt an accommodating approach as indecision.

[Kovac] As far as I am aware, I have been presented with a fait accompli only once: In the case of Rudolf Filkus. As I have already said, it led to my attempt not to pile one mistake on top of another.

[Hric] What about Knazko? And the privatization minister? And the return of the law on first names and surnames?

[Kovac] We held long discussions about Milan Knazko. We clarified jurisdiction. If the parliament expresses no confidence in a minister, the president has to accept this. If no confidence is expressed in the prime minister, the president can accept the recommendation, but he does not have to. We also held long talks about the privatization minister.

Since I did not receive an official recommendation after them, I did not have to make an official response. As far as Rudolf Filkus is concerned, if the recommendation had been discussed with me in advance, I am convinced that we could have found an option that would also have been more acceptable to our friends in Austria. As opposed to the appointment and recall of state officials, where the president of the republic is not bound by the recommendation of the government or its prime minister, when a law is returned to the National Council, the president is obliged—in accordance with the Constitution—to respect the government's resolution. Therefore, part of the commentary published by NARODNA OBRODA on 30 September was incorrect. I recall that a few weeks ago we informed editorial offices through TA SR of the obligations imposed—in this case on the president of the republic—by the Constitution.

[Hric] Under the present circumstances, you have surely given some thought to your powers and possible reaction

in case the minority government should cease to function, parliament is unable to pass laws, the minority government is recalled, or the prime minister himself resigns.

[Kovac] Our young Constitution does not take all possibilities into consideration. The president only has the power to dissolve parliament six months after the elections if the government fails to win confidence three times. This certainly applies if the government submits its resignation and fails to form another one within six months that would win parliament's confidence. But this seems a little far fetched to me. In the event that the prime minister or the government resigns or in the event that parliament expresses no confidence in the government, the role of the president is to entrust the designated prime minister with forming a new government. This would be in harmony with the Constitution and the custom of entrusting the formation of a new government to a representative of the strongest political entity.

[Hric] Which representative? For example, if parliament were to express no confidence in the prime minister?

[Kovac] It would be more complicated in this case. The same would apply if the current prime minister were unable to form a government that could win the confidence of parliament. In any case—and I emphasize this in my talks with the political parties—it is also the duty of the other political parties and movements to put forward their alternatives for forming a broad coalition government. However, without new elections, I do not see any other possibility than the HZDS forming a coalition government.

[Hric] And in the event of early elections? We are aware of electoral preferences and we know from experience that they do not differ too much from the election results!

[Kovac] New elections are an option, but I agree that the outcome would not necessarily be too different from the current situation. Perhaps, with the exception that the coalition would not be made up of three, but of four, entities. Their will to cooperate, however, will be equally essential; just as it would be desirable today. If the prime minister were the cause of ill will, it would be necessary to seek another solution. [passage omitted]

[Hric] Do you feel that we are placing ourselves in political and diplomatic isolation?

[Kovac] Unfortunately, yes. I am afraid that our situation between April [when the government became a minority one] and September has not improved, but—in this regard—has worsened.

[Hric] Your economic forecasts for Slovakia for the half year are more pessimistic than the government's forecasts.

[Kovac] I am a banker, and the main reason for my more skeptical view is the fact that we invest little. We could also lose half a year by holding early elections. As you know, foreign partners and our enterprises or state officials will wait for the results: "We will see what comes out of the elections." In such a case, the decline could last until the end of 1994. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Denies Intention To Resign

LD0810082193 Prague CTK in English 2153 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Bratislava, 7 Oct (CTK)—Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS) denied today rumours about his intention to resign, saying, at the moment I'm not going to hand in my resignation.

Speaking after his return from a visit to Mexico, he said that the situation had been overdramatised. His alleged intention to resign has been publicly discussed and treated by the press for a few past days.

I think that, regardless of who is the foreign minister, it is most important that the foreign political orientation of Slovakia has been unequivocally set and whoever will be the minister will have to continue pursuing this line because it is based on our reality and our geopolitical situation, Moravcik said.

He also reacted to a statement made today by ex-foreign minister Milan Knazko dismissed by Premier Vladimir Meciar in mid-March that he had learnt from knowledgeable sources that Meciar and Moravcik were not on speaking terms. Knazko said so at a press conference of his Alliance of Slovak Demcorats (ADS).

Moravcik said he had no reason not to speak with the premier, adding that they conduct a very intensive conversation whenever they meet.

He wound up the discussion on his alleged intention to resign saying that nothing can be ruled out in the future.

The independent daily "NARODNA OBRODA" wrote on Wednesday that whispers have been heard for several days that Moravcik may resign. Moravcik's intention to resign is not concealed even by high-ranking representatives of Meciar's HZDS who describe it as another serious weakening of the movement and a symptom of a possible final rift, the paper wrote.

Moravcik held his press conference today at the Foreign Ministry even though it is a common practice to provide brief information after return from a foreign trip right at the airport.

Cernak Denies Responsibility for Sugar Scandal

AU0710173693 Prague CTK in English 2105 GMT 4 Oct 93

[Text] Bratislava, Oct 4 (CTK)— Though the Slovak-Indian trade agreement was being drafted when Economics Minister Ludovit Cernak still held the post, decisive steps were taken only after his resignation in mid-March, he told CTK today.

The interview focused on the scandal of an alleged embezzlement of 22 million USD, which was reported for the first time by the Slovak independent daily SME on September 28. Involved in it were allegedly Finance Minister Julius Toth, Economics Minister Jaroslav Kubecka, and Slovak National Bank Governor Vladimir Masar.

The paper wrote that the embezzlement occurred during the unblocking of Slovak claims in India in which India exported to Slovakia sugar, even though the commodity was not allegedly listed among commodities approved by the Slovak Government. The Slovak Government has lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General's Office demanding that the daily be sued for the publication of what it called false information.

Cernak (Slovak National Party), who resigned in mid-March after disputes with Premier Vladimir Meciar, said today sugar was not mentioned in the protocol on unblocking the claims in India at the time when he was still in office.

He said that in view of Meciar's statement on Friday [1 October], the SNS would demand investigation of the whole thing by a special parliamentary commission.

Meciar said on Slovak Radio that the whole matter happened when Cernak had been economics minister and that the SNS should settle it within the party and not entangle in it the whole government.

Andrejcak on Ethnic Composition of Army Officers

AU0710174693 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 30 Sep 93 p 4

[Unattributed report in the "From the Slovak Press" column: "Is the Slovak Army Commanded by Slovaks?"—reprinted from the 28 September issue of Bratislava ROLNICKE NOVINY in Slovak]

[Text] Reports have appeared in the press suggesting that one-third of members of the officers corps of the Army of the Slovak Republic are of Czech nationality. These reports have been refuted by Slovak Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak. He said that 83.9 percent of members of the officers corps are of Slovak nationality, 11.1 percent of Czech nationality, and 3.4 percent of Hungarian nationality, while 1.6 percent of officers are members of other nationalities. It is also interesting to note that 2.4 percent of employees at the Slovak Ministry of Defense are of Hungarian nationality and only 1.6 percent of Czech nationality. The minister went on to say that the language of command in the Army of the Slovak Republic is Slovak, in conformity with Slovak legislation. The same as in the Army of the Czech Republic, no order has been issued so far that would ban the use of other languages in dealings among soldiers.

SDL Reaffirms Call for Early Elections

AU0710125493 Prague CTK in English 1610 GMT 5 Oct 93

[Text] Bratislava, Oct 5 (CTK)—Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar is letting a genie out of bottle when he presents claims to the Czech Republic regarding the former Slovak State, Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Left Party (SDL) Pavol Kanis told journalists today.

He reacted to Meciar's statement of October 5 saying that the Czech Republic owed eight billion Swiss francs to Slovakia. The sum is allegedly an unsettled claim of the Slovak State (a quasi-independent Nazi-backed regime between 1939 and 1945) to Germany from World War II.

Kanis said that Meciar had obviously forgotten that the victorious allies never recognized the states which came into being during World War II.

Early parliamentary elections would sweep away the problems of the parliamentarians of the former Federal Assembly deputies elected in June 1992 to the last Czechoslovak Parliament and would upgrade the composition of the Slovak Parliament, SDL Deputy Chairman Milan Ftacnik said.

The elections would solve the Czech-Slovak syndrome as they would be held in the independent state current parliamentarians were also elected in June 1992 under the former Czechoslovakia, he stated [sentence as received].

Ftacnik announced that the SDL deputies would vote for a constitutional amendment on shortening the election term which is a precondition for the early elections.

We believe that the elections should be preferred to cabinet maneuvers. The current minority government has conducted several rounds of unsuccessful talks to form a coalition. Let the voters decide on the basic direction of Slovak policy, concluded Ftacnik.

Article Analyzes Price Increases in August

AU0610195993 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 30 Sep 93 p 9

[Article by Ivan Skutlety, director of the Price, Trade, and Services Department of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic: "The Development of Consumer Prices and Cost of Living in Slovakia in August 1993"]

[Text] Consumer prices increased by 2.4 percent in July. Prices for food products increased by 3 percent, nonfood products by 2.6 percent, public catering by 2.6 percent, and services by 1 percent.

Prices for food products increased because of higher prices for meat and meat products, which rose by 6.5 percent, and prices for eggs and egg products, which rose

by 13.7 percent. Prices for other groups of food products increased by between 1.7 and 3.5 percent.

Prices for all categories of non-food products increased by between 1.2 percent (cultural items) and 13.5 percent (tobacco products).

Prices for catering at the workplace increased by 3.4 percent, and prices in restaurants increased by 2.6 percent.

Prices for all types of services increased by between 0.1 and 2.2 percent (the last figure applies to personal services [osobne sluzby], education, culture, recreation, and sports).

Compared with December 1992, consumer prices increased by 13.3 percent in the first eight months of the year. The largest price increase was in public catering—24.8 percent. Within the same period, prices for services increased by 17.2 percent, prices for non-food products by 12.1 percent, and prices for food products by 9.2 percent.

From the longterm viewpoint, prices were 145.0 percent higher in August than in January 1989.

The price development also had an effect on the cost of living, which increased by 2.5 percent for all social groups in August.

Higher prices for food products were the main cause of the higher cost of living in the households of employees and pensioners. The cost of food increased by 3.1 percent in the households of employees, and 3.2 percent in the households of pensioners. In farmers' households, the cost of living increased, mainly because of higher prices for non-food products, by 3.0 percent.

New Party of Democratic Center Formed

LD0810080793 Prague CTK in English 1558 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Zilina, North Slovakia, Oct 7 (CTK)—A halt to the collapse of Slovak economy and wrongdoings done to ordinary people are the aims of the newly established Party of Democratic Centre of Slovakia (SDCS), chairman of the Organisational Committee Ivan Cavajda told CTK today.

Cavajda, a former policeman, said that the SDCS had gathered the 1,000 signatures necessary for registration.

The privatisation is just a swindle. It is no market system. people are only robbed and exploited, he stated.

Cavajda announced that his party was selling potatoes at acceptable prices.

As soon as our party expands, we will start up shops everywhere with the emblem of our party, and you will be able to buy goods everywhere at the same price, he added.

Doctors 'Satisfied' With Results of Tests on Antall

LD0710183993 Budapest MTI in English 1709 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Budapest, October 7 (MTI)—Doctors at the Cologne University clinic, where Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall is being treated with non-Hodgkin lymphoma, are satisfied with the results of preliminary tests on Antall.

The treatment is to continue with chemotherapy on October 8, the prime minister's press office reported on Thursday.

The doctors are to inform the public on the progress of the treatment next week.

Prime Minister's Health, Substitution Viewed

AU0610195693 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 6 Oct 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Doctors and Jurists on the Prime Minister's Illness—Even With an Operation, Antall Will Only Be Away for a Month"]

[Text] Starting on 6 October Prime Minister Jozsef Antall will be examined and treated in Cologne for about a month. If it is necessary, he will also have an operation, as we earlier reported.

According to certain medical views, the intervention means that the abdomenal lymphatic glands, perhaps the spleen have to be removed. If this operation is performed, the prime minister's condition may become much better and this could mean a long-term improvement. However, it is also possible that this will not be needed. Jozsef Antall's illness has been known for three years, and this operation is normally done at an earlier stage in the case of such malignant illnesses. If he has an operation now, he will need approximately four weeks to recover and regain his ability to work. If the operation is not needed then the treatment with drugs and radiation therapy will obviously be continued. It is also possible that the examinations will show that there is no point in an operation. Naturally, these are only guesses.

According to the opinion of doctors based, naturally, on statistical data, the survival period of these kinds of illnesses is usually five years. It is obvious that Antall is receiving the best treatment. Therefore, if the operation can be performed and the drug and radiation therapy is continued, then a relatively good condition could last for years. As a matter of fact, in Antall's case, it is unlikely that we have to consider a worst case scenario.

According to jurists, it is possible in theory for the interior minister to substitute Antall even up to the elections. We do not have any law or regulation to the contrary. All that the Constitution says is that, when announcing the time of the elections, the president of the Republic can also dissolve Parliament if the government's mandate is terminated and the person nominated by the president of the Republic to the post of prime minister is not elected within 40 days after the first nomination is made .

However, the government's mandate only expires when the newly elected Parliament is formed, the prime minister or the government resigns, the prime minister dies, or confidence is withdrawn from the government. The prime minister is substituted by the minister appointed by him for this duty. The 4/1992 prime ministerial decree states which actual minister—at the moment, the interior minister—can substitute the prime minister when he is unable to perform his duties. According to jurists, the instructions in the Constitution are somewhat contradictory because in the case of the president of the Republic, a disability lasting more than 90 days means the revocation of the appointment. There is no such stipulation in the case of the prime minister although, in practice, it is much more important. This issue would be resolved if the government at last submitted and Parliament enacted the law on the legal standing and responsibility of ministers because this is the only way to stop the rather serious legal hiatus that has existed for three years.

Horn Views Future Prospects of MSZP

AU0710064893 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Oct 93 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "Antall Should Really Not Be Afraid of Us"]

[Text] [Pogonyi] Prime Minister Jozsef Antall said in the "Het" television program on 3 October that he did not fear the advance of the left wing; at the same time, Jozsef Antall disapproved of the fact that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ], the Association of Left-Wing Youths [BIT], and others were now getting together. Jozsef Antall said that one should take a stand against this development in the setup of the constitutional state. What did you think when you heard this? Besides, Gabor Kuncze, head of the Parliamentary Group of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], also disapproved of the alliance between the MSZP and the MSZOSZ.

[Horn] Interestingly enough, an increasing number of recent government party statements have been trying to frighten the people and instill fear in them. All this leads to hatred in the end. These phenomenon are not welcome, but even more important, they are causing damage to Hungary.

In my opinion, if anyone, it was the MSZP who really did much for the peaceful change in the political and economic regime. In the course of its parliamentary activity of almost four years, the MSZP has been dealing

with genuine issues, and not with criticizing other parties. When we have criticized the government, we have done so specifically and objectively.

When government representatives talk about the danger of a swing to the left, they mainly see a threat to their own power position rather than to Hungary's interests. However, in the middle of the political rotation system, this is an irrelevant element for the country.

Besides, I also disagree with Mr. Kuncze's ideas regarding the relations between the MSZOSZ and the MSZP.

[Pogonyi] Jozsef Antall said he was not afraid of the advance of the left....

[Horn] He and his party should not be afraid of a possible victory for the left, because this would threaten neither him nor his camp, let alone Hungary. I also agree with him because the MSZP has done much more than any other party for the peaceful transition. As for our cooperation with the trade unions and left-wing youths, they are our natural allies. Besides, in order to carry out the social and economic changes, it would be correct to sign a pact with representatives of the employers and employees, as well as representatives of the parties, so as to achieve a smooth transition to the new system.

[Pogonyi] Some people say that the MSZP has become the client party of the MSZOSZ, and that the MSZP is controlled by the trade union bureaucracy.

[Horn] I was not even aware that there is a trade union bureaucracy. I do know, however, that, just like me, Sandor Nagy "operates" almost alone and only has a minimal apparatus. As for the client party, look at the local government elections held on 25 May. There and then, the program declared by the MSZOSZ and the other trade union confederations had an effect on the people, and not some kind of trade union bureaucratic edict. There are not so many left-wing people as the number of people who voted for the MSZOSZ.

[Pogonyi] Jozsef Antall also said in connection with the victory of the left in the Polish elections that it is too early for Gyula Horn and his party to start a political Indian dance of joy around the campfire, happy that the next election victory is here and some kind of left-wing trend will emerge.

[Horn] The left wing in Poland came up with two basic slogans. One of them was this: Things cannot go on like this any more. This slogan is probably also valid for Hungary. This refers to everyday political activity, and not to the change in the regime. The other slogan was that the reforms should serve the interests of the people. This slogan can also be well applied to Hungarian conditions. However, hardly anyone thinks that the Hungarian voters will vote on the basis of the achievements of the Suchocka cabinet. On the contrary: The Hungarian voters will start from concrete domestic experiences. In my opinion, our citizens will vote in favor of those who will show some way out of the current situation.

[Pogonyi] Some people say of you that the MSZP is promising everything to everyone.

[Horn] This is not true. We have taken it upon ourselves to represent the political interests of the majority of society, mainly those living on salaries and wages, and entrepreneurs. I ask you: What are these promises for? If the MSZP somehow gets into government and cannot win the confidence of the voters, the MSZP will be the first party to draw the necessary conclusion and step aside. We would not hang onto power to the very end....

[Pogonyi] This is the first time you have said this publicly....

[Horn] Then I will repeat it. We do not say that we stick to the full cycle of four years, and then a new cycle of four years.

[Pogonyi] What is your opinion about Lajos Fur's declaration, namely that Warsaw has fallen, and we should be careful not to have the same development in Budapest? Or Sandor Lezsak's views that the communists were thrown out of the door and now they are trying to come back through a broken window.

[Horn] I wish that representatives of the current authorities in Hungary would hand over their positions in the same civilized manner as we did in the spring of 1990. The representatives of the current authorities are trying to present the situation in a way that, if they fall, this will be a catastrophe for the country. Perhaps this is the way they feel about this, but society does not think so. Of course, what they say is understandable from a human point of view.

[Pogonyi] There are people who think that if government representatives accuse the MSZP, this will only contribute to your popularity. Moreover, if the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] actually praised the socialists, the MSZP would only lose out.

[Horn] There is some truth in this. The government parties are so unpopular today that it would only harm us if they started praising us. The election campaign has not even started and these parties have already swung to the right. The question is how the present government relates to the political rotation system. I think we are a mild opposition today, compared with the type of opposition that the current government parties would display if they lost power.

[Pogonyi] According to some analysts, Western European governments would not welcome the advance of the left in Eastern Europe. Do you have experience of anything of this kind from your numerous trips in the West?

[Horn] I have not come across any such concern. The World Bank, the IMF, and the EBRD in London have declared that they accept the results of the Polish elections and they have made cooperation dependent on the new government's economic policy. Interests are the things that count. Consulting with German Chancellor Kohl and other leading Western politicians, I came to the conclusion that perhaps Western European conservative parties would not rejoice at the victory of a left-wing party in an Eastern European country, but they would accept it and seek possibilities for cooperation. The declarations of our domestic opponents are nothing more than scaring the people.

[Pogonyi] Please give us your interpretation of the events in Moscow. Do these events have any effect on the position of the left in Hungary and in general in Eastern Europe?

[Horn] Because we are not the United States, it would be hardly appropriate to use Clinton's formulations. We must restrain ourselves. I agree with the various committees of the U.S. Congress in saying that they should provide Moscow with much more efficient economic support. I am very sorry that they [in Moscow] have introduced the state of emergency and that they provoked this, because people have fallen victims to the tragic developments. It is extremely important to hold proper parliamentary elections. It seems that the Russian Government failed to meet the challenges, and parliament hindered the reforms. The real political forces have not yet surfaced. The attitude of the West is a big question. In their declarations, Clinton and others support Yeltsin; the question is: What will they do financially? For our part, we need a modest attitude and we must stress that we want good relations and trade. Let them deal with the internal struggle; a small country cannot change the developments in the internal power politics of a big partner.

MSZDP, MSZP Officials View Leftism

AU0710185293 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 7 Oct 93 p 4

[Interview with Zoltan Kiraly, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary; and Gyorgy Janosi, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Janos Papp; place and date not given: "Parallel Interview About the Left Wing"]

[Text] [Papp] On whose votes are the united social democrats counting? Can they really snatch votes away from the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]?

[Kiraly] I honestly admit that I do not know. Those who rely on traditions and the past will perhaps choose the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP]. Obviously, there is an overlap here, and this could take votes away from the MSZP, including votes on which the MSZP are counting.

[Papp] Is the MSZP angry at the Social Democrats for all this?

[Janosi] We do not even consider being angry. We have always believed that a Social Democratic Party based on historical traditions has legitimacy in the Hungarian society. Overlapping can be imagined anyway, and competition has never harmed any party in history.

[Papp] Gyula Horn spoke about the possibility of a left-wing election bloc after the signing of the joint election coalition between the MSZP and the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ]. To what extent does the MSZDP count on the trade unions?

[Kiraly] Of course we count on them, because we have traditional contacts. We negotiated with the trade unions before our union and we also talked with the branch leaders of the MSZOSZ. Trade union leaders were present in the various parties before and also in the united party but, because the trade union movement is rather broad, everyone can sign agreements with any party, bloc, or confederation, according to one's own views. There is nothing disturbing in this, although I would very much disapprove of what the MSZP is doing now, namely that it is committing itself to one trade union bloc from the outset. I find this unfortunate both theoretically and practically. Of course, this is the internal affair of the MSZP.

[Janosi] Let me say that it takes two for such contacts. The MSZP has consistently stressed that it is open to every trade union confederation that is ready to cooperate. So far, only the MSZOSZ has displayed readiness for cooperation. I would also stress that we form an alliance with the socialist-social democratic platform of the MSZOSZ, and not with the MSZOSZ itself. If other platforms emerge, like the Christian-social platform, we regard it as the most natural thing if these platforms seek their chances and possibilities in other political contacts; the Christian social platform will probably also negotiate with the Christian Democratic People's Party.

[Papp] Is it possible that a left-wing bloc will emerge in the second round of the elections?

[Kiraly] Our position, and my own personal opinion, is that, particular regarding to recent years, this party's most honest position now would be to really wish to run alone, because it must transpire what the voters think about this renewed historical social democratic party. This is the starting point now.

[Janosi] I also think that running alone is important. Cooperation is not excluded at a later stage, obviously with bilateral conditions regarding the common denominator of our programs. Cooperation can also depend on the mutual acceptance of personnel conditions, so this question must be left open.

Editorial Views Yeltsin Letter on NATO

AU0410211493 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Oct 93 p 3

[Editorial by Tibor Kis: "Dance Order"]

[Text] As regards the letter allegedly sent by Yeltsin to the other superpowers, whether it actually exists is not the only exciting question. The other question is whether it could theoretically exist at all. Why did many experts take its existence for granted, even before they were able to learn about its contents?

Probably because many people had been expecting something like this for a long time. From a certain point of view, what was surprising was that the Kremlin showed remarkable moderation if not actual uncertainty in an issue that affects important Russian interests.

This high degree of moderation may of course have an explanation. According to some, Moscow has already adjusted to the democratic rules and has given up its traditional power politics. Others are more suspicious than this—or more realistic. Who could, for example, doubt that the Russians are nowadays busier with their own transformation than that of the world; this occupies all their energy and it will apparently remain so for a long time to come.

However, just because Moscow has less attention for the world, the country's need for external security has not decreased. On the contrary, under the confused domestic circumstances, Moscow even more desires a little external calm. However, for foreign observers, the Russian need for security has often seemed abnormally large ever since Peter the Great. For the time being, Moscow's ruling elite, which was raised on traditional (Soviet) Russian geopolitical teachings, is apparently considering security policy alternatives and it has not yet clarified certain new foreign and military policy priorities for itself.

However, it cannot be doubted that it is aware of Russia's short-term and long-term interests. It is not at all certain that they would share [Hungarian Prime Minister] Jozsef Antall's views that it might also be important for the Russian democrats that NATO is expanded with Eastern and Central European countries. For a very long time, in Russian political philosophy, this region has appeared as a natural Russian interest zone or a "buffer zone" at best. Therefore, it is small wonder that Moscow shows a noticeably meager enthusiasm for Hungarian, Polish, or Czech NATO membership. The Russians are more likely to hold the view that the country is about to be isolated again, that it is being left out of something, and that it can only take part in establishing the new European structures in an unbecoming way.

Regardless of whether the Yeltsin letter exists, now Moscow is showing its displeasure to the world and is announcing that it demands a place befitting its superpower status in the emerging European security system.

The NATO membership of Central European countries is one of the stakes—and not the most important one—in the superpower debate. From this point of view, the Yeltsin letter can even be seen as a particular combination of steps in the minuet of giants. The partners usually pay special attention to these signals—and the small states in question have even less chance of participating in the dance of the great ones. It is again very probably not they who will choose the next piece of music, in the same way as they have not been deciding on such matters for a very long time.

All they can hope for is that the next piece will be one that they can hum together with the others more wholeheartedly than they were able to previously.

Germany Pledges Funds To Support Agriculture

LD0610154293 Budapest MTI in English 1505 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Budapest, October 6 (MTI)—Germany has promised to support Hungary's agriculture with DM [German marks] 1 million this year, Agriculture Minister Janos Szabo told MTI at an international news conference in Kempinski Hotel, Budapest, on Wednesday.

The briefing was held on the occasion of a three-day visit to Hungary by German Agriculture Minister Jochen Borchert.

On his discussions with Borchert, Szabo said Germany was to help Hungary in new areas, such as preventing drought damage, setting up an environmentally sound agriculture, improving market work and renewing the quality control of Hungarian wines.

These schemes will probably begin next year.

Borchert said Hungary was the first country outside the European Community he had visited, given that relations were free from problem.

He showed interest in Hungary's privatization results as agricultural transformation in former East Germany was slower than planned.

Hungary's farm exports to Germany were DM 800 million last year, with imports approaching DM 200 million.

However, exports fell by 30 per cent this year, mainly due to a shortage of Hungarian commodity funds.

Police Chief Views New Police Bill, Efficiency

AU0710101393 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Oct 93 p 3

[Interview with Major General Sandor Pinter, chief of the national police, by Jozsef Dinoczki on 5 October in

Budapest: "The New Police Law Promises More Efficient Work—Secret Service Against Organized Crime"]

[Text] In the 111 years of the Hungarian police, this is the first attempt to regulate its operation by a law. Much debate has already preceded the police bill, but everyone agreed that it is needed. In the interval of the parliamentary general debate on the police bill, which began on 5 October, we interviewed Sandor Pinter.

[Dinoczki] Hungary is on the way to integration into Europe. To what extent will the new police law fulfill this requirement and to what extent will it be on a European level?

[Pinter] I believe that this is one of the assurances that Hungary will not only go toward Europe, but it will also get there.

[Dinoczki] New methods of crime have appeared. I am thinking, for example, of organized crime and economic crimes. Does the police bill deal with these?

[Pinter] Yes. For the fight against organized crime, we included secret service tools and methods in the draft law and we hope that Parliament will approve these. However, economic crimes are not such special acts that need separate measures.

[Dinoczki] What kind of secret service tools do you mean?

[Pinter] The police bill contains the secret service tools and methods section by section. We list many things here from observation to phone-tapping and many other methods that can be used against organized crime before and after the beginning of proceedings.

[Dinoczki] Is it possible for a policeman to infiltrate a crime syndicate in the interest of successful investigation?

[Pinter] In theory, it is possible, but various expert groups have different views on how useful and how dangerous this is. In my view, this will mainly be a professional issue, rather than a legal matter.

[Dinoczki] The police law will only come into force six months after it is passed. Is this not strange?

[Pinter] In the history of the police, this is the first time that its operation is to be regulated by law. The police is 111 years old, we will survive another six months.

[Dinoczki] Is this six months' wait necessary?

[Pinter] We need the police law, but the date of its coming into force is a political issue and it is not up to the police leadership to judge this.

[Dinoczki] To what extent will the law change the life of citizens, the civilians?

[Pinter] The police law mainly gives guidance to the citizens on how to behave during police actions, and what the police can do for them and against the criminals during the proceedings. The police law will not have spectacular changes from the point of view of law and order.

[Dinoczki] Does this mean that the current high crime rate will not change?

[Pinter] I do not agree with the high crime rate because, in his introductory speech, the interior minister said that only three European countries have better crime statistics than Hungary. I think that this will help a more efficient operation and the number of crimes committed will only be affected to a limited extent.

[Dinoczki] As far as I know, the organization of the police has already been prepared and it is only waiting for the law....

[Pinter] I believe this is true. The structure of the new police has already been established and the joining organizations will also be fully integrated in the police structure in January 1994.

[Dinoczki] Policemen often complain that they do not know what is allowed because of the unclear legal issues. When the law is enacted, will the policemen be perfectly clear about their rights?

[Pinter] Most certainly, they will.

'Secret Talks' To Determine Fate of Attaches

WS0710152793 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Report by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Will Attaches Return; Secret Talks Will Determine"]

[Text] Toward the end of last week, Colonel Vladimir Lomakin, Russian military attache in Warsaw, left for Moscow to hold consultations. Early this week, General Roman Harmoza, Polish attache in Moscow, arrived in Warsaw also to hold consultations.

According to the Wednesday [6 October] edition of GAZETA WYBORCZA, Poland expelled the Russian attache and the Russians retaliated by doing the same. According to our information, the matter has not yet been decided; things depend on the results of secret talks between both parties.

Colonel Vladimir Lomakin has been the Russian military attache in Warsaw for approximately a year. His office is in the Russian Embassy. Toward the end of last week, he left Warsaw suddenly.

"I did not know anything about that; I was sure he was at work as usual. Indeed, I have not seen him recently; however, I have seen his car," said Vladimir Voronkov, press attache of the Russian Embassy in Warsaw.

After some consultations, Voronkov stated that Lomakin "left for Moscow to hold talks at the Ministry of National Defense." He also told us that "there is no information that would confirm that the military attache has been recalled." "Lomakin has not yet returned; however, he may still come back," he said. "Perhaps he will be appointed minister of national defense," he said jokingly.

The press attache does not know what, if any, charges were leveled against Lomakin. "This is a question that you should ask Polish authorities," he says.

Silence in MON, MSZ, UOP

"As for the alleged expulsion, I have nothing to say," said Lieutenant Colonel Leszek Ziolo, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense [MON]. Has the Russian attache been expelled at all? "I can neither confirm nor deny that."

Grzegorz Dziemidowicz, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ]: "MSZ has not issued a statement on this issue."

Sylwester Garnet, acting spokesman for the Office of State Protection [UOP], when asked whether the Russian attache was expelled at UOP's request, said: "I can say nothing about that." In reply to all other questions, he answered: "I have nothing to say."

The military administration of the Russian Defense Ministry told us "the ministry does not have any information about the expulsion of General Harmoza." The ministry's press office did not have any information, either.

"Going Beyond One's Duties"

As we were told in military circles, there is an unwritten agreement among diplomatic services to tolerate, to a certain extent, the activities of military attaches that might "go beyond their official duties."

The expulsion of an attache is the most restrictive measure taken in the case of cooperation with special services or a blatant breach of regulations, related to state secrets, of the state in which the attache operates.

Such a case usually comes to light when relations between two countries are not very good. When they are good, both sides try to be discreet and resolve the problem by compromise. It is not clear what the situation was like in this case; whether one of the parties wanted the issue to go public. This depends on whether the information obtained by GAZETA WYBORCZA leaked accidentally, or if it was released on purpose.

First Such Conflict Between Poland and Russia

As we found out from military circles, whether this issue will blow over and the attaches will return to their posts depends on secret talks, which are usually held in such situations.

Coalition Experts Establish Joint Economic Platform

WS0710142793 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Report by J.B.L.: "Privatization Did Not Cause a Conflict"]

[Text] Experts from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and the Union of Labor [UP] completed their work yesterday on a joint economic platform. The experts are supposed to meet with party leaders on Friday [8 October]. It is possible that the coalition will formalized next week.

Beginning last Monday, several dozen experts from the three parties had been meeting to hold discussions. Six teams debated the problems of fiscal policy, privatization, agriculture, exports and protection of the domestic market, unemployment, and housing.

Only in the privatization team were there serious differences of opinion reported. It even seemed that the possibility of forming a coalition might be lost because UP insisted on substantial changes in this program. According to Wieslaw Kaczmarek (SLD), introducing those changes would mean abandoning the implementation of the program adopted by the previous Sejm.

Ryszard Bugaj (UP) insisted that the idea of National Investment Funds be abandoned (but he did not propose anything in their stead); he wanted to decrease the number of privatized companies from 600 to 150, and he stated that shares should only be granted to the aggrieved (among others, to the budget sector, senior citizens, disabled pensioners). It was possible to believe in further progress of the talks after the statement by Ryszard Bugaj that the coalition will not fall apart because of differences of opinion over privatization. He added that UP was willing to make a wise compromise.

Finally, the experts agreed to prepare a uniform programmatic document on Thursday; its introduction will contain an evaluation of the coalition's starting point.

Jozef Oleksy (SLD) said that the experts will present party leaders with a "document on the most fundamental economic decisions that the future coalition must make, concerning current activities, as well as activities scheduled for 1994 and the entire term of office."

The experts are supposed to ask the parties' leaders to hold a joint session of the political leadership and experts on Friday, during which it will be possible to "resolve certain problems politically."

Jozef Oleksy estimated that the Wednesday agreement is not equal to forming a coalition; however, it is a great step forward.

Michal Strak said that, following Ryszard Bugaj's statement, privatization—as it can be seen—no longer impedes the formation of a coalition.

Strak and Oleksy stated that PSL and SLD will make final decisions on 12 October, at sessions of their respective chief councils.

Coalition Talks Continue

WS0710140493 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Report by E.O., E.K., and E.Cz.: "The Government Still Not Here"]

[Text] The National Election Committee [KKW] of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] prepared on Wednesday, 6 October, the draft of a coalition agreement which it is going to submit on Thursday or Friday to leaders of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and Union of Labor [UP]. The first part of the agreement includes the parties' commitments concerning the implementation of an economic and social program, as well as commitments that result from the rules of foreign policy and the entire constitutional order in general. The second part contains the names of "the people who will put this joint concept into effect," that is, the members of the government. The full content of the agreement will be presented to the public as soon as it reaches the main addressees. SLD authorities, however, say that this depends on when the work of the programmatic teams ends.

This means that another, third deadline—the beginning of this week—for ending the coalition's talks on its program, for appointing and submitting a candidate for prime minister to the president, will not be met. SLD and PSL are consistently implementing their "programs" of prolonging the talks until the first session of the Sejm, which is supposed to test each other's intentions. Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, who spoke about the KKW SLD session (the session was not open to the press), said that, according to SLD, the course of the talks gives reason to believe that there are no serious programmatic differences between PSL and SLD, and that the talks may be successful. If it turns out that they are not, PSL and UP will be responsible for it.

Just Like at War

"We are acting in line with the best rules of the martial arts," commented Michal Strak of PSL on the president's statement concerning the lengthy talks. He also drew attention to the fact that the possible coalition members may continue their talks all the way up to the first Sejm session.

Wieslawa Ziolkowska of UP said bluntly in a Radio Zet interview that the president's attitude does not make the formation of the coalition any easier. "The president demands that three candidates for prime minister be submitted; however, this is not a three-card game," says UP Spokesman Tomasz Nalecz. According to him, the president deferred the convening of the parliament on purpose (he did it at the very last moment; the constitutional deadline is 19 October); it is contrary to political custom to demand a candidate for prime minister and the composition of the government before the Sejm has actually convened and before the present cabinet has resigned.

A Government With Three Unknowns

This does not change the fact that after the consultations, which have been going on for over two weeks, nothing is certain: Who will form the coalition, with what prime minister and with what program. On Tuesday, that is, only two days before parliament convenes, the chief bodies of SLD and PSL will make final decisions concerning the coalition. Most UP deputies believe that it would be better to remain in a parliamentary coalition, without entering into the government. There are many crucial differences between SLD and UP in their approach toward privatization. SLD insists that the present program be maintained; UP believes that it should be limited.

Nevertheless, experts from the three parties declare that forming a coalition depends on all the parties' willingness to reach a political compromise. However, SLD and PSL have not reached an agreement yet as to who should be the prime minister and who should be Sejm speaker. As Wieslawa Ziolkowska pointed out on Wednesday, the most important conflicts are not over programs, but over positions.

According to unofficial information, the Wednesday session of KKW SLD was held in the spirit of "our speaker, your prime minister," which was meant for the peasants. If PSL signs the agreement, it will mean that they agree that Waldemar Pawlak be prime minister and Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz be speaker of the Sejm. In such a case, they would give up the idea of appointing Jozef Zych to the latter position. If PSL does not officially submit the candidacy of Jozef Zych, but if it is submitted by a group of deputies at the session and supported by a majority, it will prove that the PSL leader is not able to make the club adhere to the conditions of the coalition agreement. If PSL does not sign the agreement, it will mean that there is no preliminary agreement concerning the division of the two most important positions and that all options are still possible in the formation of a government coalition.

'Dangers' Facing New Government Viewed

WS0710101493 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Oct 93 p 3

[Report by E.O. and E.Cz.: "Dangers for Future Government; Weakness of Majority"]

[Text] Immediately after the election results were released, Jan Olszewski, leader of the Movement for the Republic, stated that he intends to protest as well as organize demonstrations. Similar declarations were made by Maciej Jankowski, head of the Mazowsze Region "Solidarity." Despite the fact that neither of them yet knows who they will be protesting against (they do not know who will form the government and what the program of the future cabinet will be), they are ready.

Since the election results were announced, it has been obvious that the two largest parliamentary groups, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party, will have to try to form a government coalition. Both parties would like the Union of Labor [UP], a party of Solidarity origin, to join them. Even though they do not need UP to achieve a parliamentary majority, they think that it would protect them against being accused of trying to establish a post-communist government. However, no matter whether the government consists of two or three parties, the government will be exposed to many dangers, nonetheless.

The Most Noticeable...

...dangers can may be created by rightist groups, which have found themselves outside of parliament. They are already saying that they will organize demonstrations against the rule of the left; they are trying to frighten the people with the prospect of returning to the old political and economic system. They are greatly helped by President Walesa, who says that in the defense of reforms he is ready to resort to "Yeltsin's option." By saying this, he gives the people the impression that the reforms are in danger. The position of the president might become even sharper if it turns out that the opinions of several SLD politicians on limiting the president's constitutional rights are shared by the entire party.

We should also bear in mind the threats of trade unions. The chairperson of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement gave the future government three months to implement its demands. Also the Confederation for an Independent Poland, which intends to stay in the opposition, is going to watch SLD implementing its preelection promises. Because of all this, even though the coalition has not yet been formed, the atmosphere around it is rather unpleasant.

There is also no doubt that the people are expecting rapid and noticeable changes; that is, first of all they are expecting their material situation to improve. If this is not done, the future government must take into account the possibility that the people will feel increasingly disappointed in the near future.

According to Ryszard Bugaj,...

...another danger for the future government may be its desire to replace civil servants in the voivodships. For the last four years this cadre has been shaped by successive Solidarity authorities. Therefore, these civil servants may be unfavorably disposed to the new cabinet. The replacement of cadres may draw a lot of criticism; however, it would first of all distract the government's attention from current problems.

Finally, there is also the attitude of the West and the need for the government to take the opinions of international financial circles into account. If the future government wants to keep its preelection promises, it will be forced to increase the budget deficit—it is difficult to predict the reaction of the IMF and the World Bank. We also cannot say how an increased budget deficit might influence our negotiations on the reduction of Poland's foreign debt and securing new credits.

All these dangers may place the government in a very difficult situation and may impede its activities. Since the time when Jan Krzysztof Bielecki was prime minister, all subsequent cabinets have been for various reasons in a similar situation—they have all been unable to act in a stable manner.

Article Views Possible Splits in Leftist Alliance

AU0610181093 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 Sep 93 p 7

[Article by Igor Janke: "What Might Split the Left's Politicians?"]

[Text] The negotiations that are dragging on between the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], the PSL [Polish Peasant Party], and the UP [Union of Labor], that are—it would appear—close to each other in programmatic terms, prompt questions about how cohesive such a future government team would be.

The old, historic division on the left will probably cease to play a role, although, on the other hand, if the UP remains outside the cabinet, that might preserve the division between the post-"Solidarity" and post-communist left. Yet, if the UP and the SLD find themselves in the government together, there might be shifts within those groupings. It might be difficult to maintain the unity of the SLD club, if only because of its size (171 deputies).

For SLD activists who find it difficult to accept the views of such SLD liberals as Marek Borowski or Wieslaw Kaczmarek, and there is no shortage of such people in the SdRP itself, the UP may more convenient, because it has come out unequivocally in favor of a change in current economic policy. The PPS [Polish Socialist Party], which chose the SLD as its partner rather than the UP, may in day-to-day practice at the Sejm be closer to Zbigniew Bujak than to Jozef Oleksy.

It is difficult to imagine how the OPZZ [National Trade Union Confederation] will behave. Ewa Spychalska has on many occasions said that trade unionists do not want to join the government. Activists who are geared toward making wage demands will face serious dilemmas when they will have to accept or reject a budget prepared by "their" government.

Some SLD liberals have already said that the weakest have to be protected, but only inasmuch as the state does not suffer as a result, or that next year's budget should be prepared on the basis of the draft worked out by Suchocka's government.

The 61 OPZZ deputies, who will remain outside the government, might rebel and withdraw their support, counting on maintaining their position as an autonomous political entity. If the UP does not accept a policy of maintaining the present economic course and decided to take the same step, that would mean that the cabinet would be significantly weakened.

Of course, the reverse might also occur. An economic program realized in accordance with the PSL and UP model would be difficult for part of the SLD to accept. Today, this scenario seems less likely, because there are many indications that in a government headed by Pawlak, the economic ministries would fall into the hands of the SLD.

In each of these cases, there may be disputes over the policies of economic ministries.

The state administration might also be a subject of internal coalition conflicts. If Waldemar Pawlak really does become prime minister, then the administration will fall into the hands of the PSL. The Office of the Council of Ministers has been an object of desire for the PSL for a long time now. The grouping will undoubtedly seek to appoint its people to lower administrative posts. When the replacement of personnel at the lower level begins, the SLD may also start laying claim to specific posts.

Ideological questions will probably arouse much less controversy in a leftist government. It seems unlikely that the activities of the education, culture, and health ministries will be the subject of party disputes. The policies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may give rise to another kind of tension if people nominated by the president are appointed to them. Walesa might try to exploit the possibility of influencing the policies of these ministries during bargaining with government parties that want to curb the presidents' powers. The pursuit of an appropriate personnel policy might be an instrument that Walesa uses to apply pressure on the SLD and the PSL.

Polish Peasants Party Leader Profiled

PM0710134093 London THE EUROPEAN in English 7-10 Oct 93 p 11

[Article by Marcus Kuczinsky: "The Farmers' Hero Back in the Market"]

[Text] As good Catholics the Poles are accustomed to the concept of miracles, but even they have been surprised recently by the life-after-death quality of their country's political life.

First the Communists, in Social Democrats clothing, bounced back by defeating post-Solidarity parties in the general election. Now it looks as though the government will end up with a recycled prime minister.

Whether Waldemar Pawlak, the 34-year-old farmer's son who became leader of the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), will turn out to be the saviour Poland has been waiting for depends on his ability to strike a balance between his party's rural policies and the wider platform of the post-Communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the larger of the two coalition partners.

Pawlak's previous brush with power 16 months ago lasted just 33 days, leaving Pawlak sacrilegiously dubbed a poor man's Jesus Christ because both, at the same age, met their demise after bearing a heavy cross.

He is depicted in political cartoons as a hayseed kid. But despite his rural roots and provincial drawl, he reflects a cultured image for a farmers party coalition. With his short-cropped hair and smart suits he looks more like an upwardly mobile executive. At the Warsaw polytechnic where he studied mechanical engineering he was known as a sharp student.

He has solid backing from a wide cross-section of country people. With 40 percent of Poles living off the land this is a valuable support base.

Karol Szyndzielorz, political commentator for Nowa Europa financial newspaper, describes Pawlak as the success story of the elections—and not just with men on the land. He said: "Women represent half the rural population and the farm ladies are taken by his looks and

views, and by his ability to argue a case. He is the ideal successful farmer's son." Waldemar runs his family's 17-hectare farm near Plock in Poland's agricultural heartland between h is political duties. He is known to be a good farm manager. He is also a computer enthusiast, proud of having adapted a programme to help run the farm when he is away.

Friends describe him as peaceful, logical and intellectually reflective. His father was involved in local politics with the forerunner of the Peasants' Party before Waldemar was born. After marrying the girl next door, Pawlak went to live in the city. But when his father suffered a heart attack, the prodigal son dutifully returned to take over the farm.

Responsibility is not something Pawlak takes lightly. He has had a meteoric rise to the top in the Peasants' Party since joining only three years ago, and according to insiders he has no real challenger in the party ranks.

His prime ministerial ambitions are widely known, despite his failure to form a government last year when President Lech Walesa temporarily handed him the baton of power. Pawlak was Walesa's great hope as a compromise premier against the backdrop of squabbling parties that plagued the previous parliament. He emerged as the youthful leader who was politically clean, untainted by any Communist past.

On paper at least, he seemed the perfect candidate amid a stormy round of parliamentary debates over whether to release secret files allegedly identifying former Solidarity heroes—including Walesa—as Communist collaborators. When the ex-prime minister Jan Olszewski's five-month-old coalition government fell during a vote of no confidence, allegedly engineered from the sidelines by Walesa, Pawlak was ready to take the reins of power as the personal choice of the president.

Walesa's assessment of the new prime minister at the time was: "Pawlak has been to Jasna Gora (the Catholic church's most important Polish shrine) more times than I have, and prays more gracefully than I do."

Indeed, Pawlak is a devout Catholic and this makes him an acceptable leader for the church hierarchy, which is known to be quietly uneasy about the post Communists returning to power. The church in Poland has backed away from openly meddling in politics after criticism that it should stick to spiritual affairs. But the historical link between church and state is ingrained in the Polish way of life.

Political colleagues regard Pawlak as pragmatic and decisive. He is unlikely to allow the Democratic Left Alliance to try to pull his strings in the government coalition. He has already demanded that the Peasants Party should fill key ministerial portfolios and one of the deputy prime ministerial posts in return for supporting the SLD.

On key economic questions Pawlak believes in market reform and the much-lauded privatisation programme, but not at a breakneck pace despite the cost. "Privatisation should be a means to a more effective economy, not an aim in itself," he says. "Privatisation, in my view, should be slowed down considerably so that it fulfils the basic criteria. There is no lack of major state-run firms in the world operated by managers just like privately-owned ones, which are successful in the market."

On a broader plane a young leader is realistic about the challenges of shaping a newly democratic company.

Two years ago, while still relatively unknown, he said: "Democracy is now simply a matter of arithmetic. The birth of democracy always brings with it great uncertainty and irrational behaviour."

Poland's political flux in the four years since the fall of Communism bears testimony to his assessment. Szyndzielorz believes, however, that this time Pawlak would have a firmer base as prime minister. "For a start it will be a smaller coalition with only one or two other parties," he said. "Also the PSL is closer to the SLD that it was to the right-wing parties of the past," he added. The leadership styles of Pawlak and his predecessor Hanna Suchocka are likely to be quite different.

Mrs Suchocka was the archetypal Polish woman, good at holding the purse strings and running an efficient homenation. She was also ready to compromise. Pawlak, on the other hand, is less likely to bend once he has decided on a course of action. There are indications that if the PSL does not get its way in an SLD coalition it will consider breaking away and trying again to form a pact with the Democratic Union led by Suchocka.

Perhaps it is this determination that makes Pawlak so admired by the electorate. During his month in power last year he became one of the most popular politicians in the country and the most highly regarded crusader for farmers' rights in government. He is regarded as a moderate within his Communist-rooted party and good at addressing crowds. He also has a reputation for being a skilful political player, a valuable attribute in the tough environment of Polish politics.

Pawlak is likely to find much in common with the Democratic Left Alliance's leader, Aleksander Kwasniewski, who, at the age of 39, is also one of the new breed of successful young politicians. Pawlak will need to cultivate his power base on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum if he is to break the curse of Polish prime ministers—a desperately short political life.

In that regard he may find that farming and politics have a lot in common. Both need a fertile base to ensure a long life. But as one journalist described Pawlak recently: "He is a survivor who knows what he wants."

Ministry To Liquidate 1,304 State Farms

PM0710094593 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 2-3 Oct 93 p 11

[Unattributed report: "Eighty Percent of State Farms Gone"]

[Text] The voivodas and the agriculture minister have decided to liquidate 1,304 state farms [PGR]. This represents a cut of almost 80 percent. Assets remaining after the liquidation of state farms will be taken over and privatized by the State Treasury Agricultural Property Agency [AWRSP]. By August 31, local AWRSP branches had sold almost 36,000 hectares of land and rented more than 550,000 hectares to new users.

On a national scale, the new owners and tenants have taken over only 50 percent ("every other hectare") of the acreage put up for sale or rent by the agency.

To date, local AWRSP branches have organized more than 3,490 auctions at which they hoped to find purchasers or tenants for some 1,2 million hectares—that is, 40 percent—of the agricultural land they currently administer. By 30 August the agency had taken over 2.7 million hectares of post-PGR land and an additional 182,000 hectares from the State Land Fund.

Farmers predominate among the new purchasers of post-PGR property. Of the 9,871 land sale contracts signed at the local AWRSP branches, 8,866 involved individual buyers. The highest figures for land sold through 30 August were recorded at the following AWRSP branches: Poznan—just under 11,000 hectares; Lublin—almost 5,000 hectares; and Szczecin—nearly 4,500 hectares.

By the beginning of September, the agency had collected 324 billion zlotys [Z] in payment for the land sales and rental; at the same time, however, it took over the former PGR's debt liabilities to the value of Z12,2 trillion. Nationally, the average price of 1 hectare of agricultural land was Z9.1 million. The highest local average sale price was recorded at the Szczecin branch, where 1 hectare sold for Z13.9 million, while at at the other end of the scale the Lublin and Olsztyn branches averaged the lowest local price at Z4.4 million.

The agency will hand over all the land for which no buyers are found, as well as all property whose formal status is as yet unclear, to be managed provisionally by the State Treasury.

Iliescu Statement Before Leaving for Vienna Summit

AU0810121393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0908 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 8/10/1993—In a statement made on Friday, 8 October, at the Bucharest Otopeni airport on his departure to Vienna to attend the Council of Europe's summit conference, Romania's President Ion Iliescu stressed that "Romania will participate in the conference with a message of wide openness and under the firm decision to actively take part in the assertion of the Council of Europe as factor of stability in Europe and to extend cooperation among equals, that would mean a new philosophy of international relations based on equality and partnership, not on dependence of the weak on the powerful. We hope it to be a message in the spirit of our times," stated Romania's president.

Admittance to Council of Europe Viewed

UDMR Leader Interviewed

AU0710175193 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 2 Oct 93 p 3

[Interview with Bela Marko, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by Roxana Badralexi; place and date not given: "The Power To Hurt Us"]

[Text] [Badralexi] As expected, the favorable vote granted to Romania by the European Parliament provoked many commentaries and controversies in Hungary's legislative forum. The mass media in Budapest noted, among other things, the position of certain parliamentarians who would have liked Hungary not to abstain but rather vote against Romania's acceptance to the Council of Europe. The Hungarian press also carried a response for those parliamentarians by Mr. Andras Kelemen, secretary of state in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The Western world's point of view has changed as far as the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, in particular, and the national minorities in Eastern Europe in general are concerned."

Following Romania's acceptance to the Council of Europe, we asked Mr. Bela Marko, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], to grant us an interview.

[Badralexi] Mr. Marko, what do you think about Mr. Kelemen's statement?

[Marko] I have no information whatsoever that would prove that there was any change of mentality in the approach of the West regarding the issue of ethnic minorities. As a matter of fact, this attempt to settle the issue in Eastern Europe, as well as in all of Europe, is a process, and during the unfolding of this process, one might notice a temporary increase or decrease of interest toward these problems, especially since they are occuring in a very complicated political context. A certain conclusion was recently reached—namely that through their presence in the Council of Europe, the member countries of the European institutions will have a greater opportunity to exercise their positive influence on the state of affairs in a certain country. That is why this control mechanism has been set up, which has not been applied so far.

[Badralexi] Looking back, would you say that this dallying [tergiversarea] of Romania's acceptance to the Council of Europe was not good tactics?

[Marko] I would not call it dallying, but simply a relatively long procedure, indeed the longest so far. However, this is not the Council of Europe's fault, but rather the fault of the Romanian Government and those in power who have not taken the necessary steps to solve the problems.

[Badralexi] In your opinion, how far will this control or possible sanctions against Romania go?

[Marko] We also have to take several other elements into consideration. First of all, we should take into account the fact that this control mechanism of the Council of Europe is an unprecedented practice. Moreover, it seems that it will be carried out at the level of the Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe. Therefore, I believe that, at the level of the Council of Europe, a process of clarifying this procedure is currently under way in Romania, as well as in the other two countries where this procedure has also been instituted—Estonia and Slovakia. I hope that this control mechanism will be efficient. As far as consequences are concerned.... Certainly, it was in the interest of the Council of Europe to accept Romania. Of course, it was also in the interest of our country to be accepted to the Council of Europe. However, at the same time, it is in the Council's interest to keep its criteria and the specific character of this institution. Thus, if a member country does not intend to really integrate within those criteria, there is a risk that the character of the Council of Europe would change.

[Badralexi] Do you believe that we, as Romanian citizens, should feel hurt that we are the ones who, for the first time, are being granted this special status—namely to be controlled so strictly?

[Marko] Yes. We should be hurt, but rather by those factors in our country—the government respectively—which have made promise after promise and have not kept most of them. We have been hurt—if you choose to use this expression—by the power.

Melescanu Comments

AU0410183093 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 4 Oct 93

[Statement by Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu in Bucharest—recorded]

[Excerpt] Mr. Teodor Melescanu, minister of foreign affairs, made the following statement for our radio station in connection with Romania's admission to the Council of Europe.

[Melescanu] I think that to a great extent the vote cast today confirms the recommendations that have already been adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, that is the positive recommendations favoring our admission, and represents, if you will, an additional acknowledgment of the positive things that Romanian society as a whole has achieved on the road to political, economic, and social reform in our country.

Thus it is a vote that naturally gives us satisfaction, especially since it was unanimous, as you know. There was actually just one abstention, something that certainly marks a positive evolution compared with the Parliamentary Assembly, where there were, of course, votes against our admission, as well as abstentions.

Undoubtedly, this vote has a certain practical significance, because, as you know, it will permit Romania, as a member of the Council of Europe, to participate—at the highest level, President Iliescu's level, who is going to lead our country's delegation—in an extremely important meeting in Vienna this week; I am talking of the first summit meeting of the Council of Europe. This is a meeting whose goal is to examine the prospects of the future activity of the Council of Europe and the way this body may contribute to stability and security on our continent. [passage omitted]

Political Leaders Comment

AU0710185593 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 5 Oct 93 p 3

["The Situation in Russia as Seen by Romanian Politicians: Communism or Democracy?"]

[Text] With justified concern, we are following the escalation of events in Moscow. Resorting to force will hamper the democratization process in Russia and, in any case, cannot offer lasting solutions to political disputes. Only free democratic elections of the institutions of a state governed by law can ensure prospects for the country's stability and socioeconomic recovery. Being consistently on the side of the democratic forces in Russia, as its neighbor we are profoundly interested in a peaceful and political solution to the current conflict.

Corneliu Coposu, president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party: "As was to be expected, the particularly weighty radical conservatives did not surrender and the 1991 putsch was thus followed up with another attempt. The putsch has been stopped. The communist conservatives have capitulated due to the vigorous measures taken by Yeltsin. Certainly, in our country, those with nostalgic feelings for communism were inspired by hopes. I am convinced that this night (3 October) black lists have been revised."

Oliviu Gherman, Senate president: "I think that the events in Moscow represent an attempt to eschew democratic responsibilities in the process of building a state governed by law in Russia. The dispute between parliament and the other political forces does not benefit the organization of a normal life in this neighboring country. We believe that all necessary means must be employed to solve this situation and to permit free and democratic elections in order to establish democracy in Russia. The use of weapons in such disputes does not contribute to solving the social problems of that country. We hope for a speedy conclusion of the current tense situation."

Petre Roman, leader of the Democratic Party(National Salvation Front): "The violent events that are taking place at this time in Moscow prove that any democratic facade on behalf of the conservatives and supporters of the former Stalinist-type of regime has collapsed. They were the ones to call for violence, provoke it, and resort to force as a last method to acquire the positions they used to hold in the former regime. For us, this is a dangerous signal; it should be a means to realize again how precious the democratic achievements in Romania are, how important our freedom is, which we achieved during the December 1989 revolution, and how much we can serve the country, the Romanian nation, and the Romanian soil if democracy and freedom are threatened. We believe that what is happening in Russia today is a fight between democracy and the forces of the past and we are convinced that the forces of democracy represented by President Boris Yeltsin, who was democratically elected by the Russian people, will succeed in defeating the reactionary forces, the retrograde forces, and forces linked to the former regime so that stability will be achieved in that area in which, willy-nilly, Romania is located in the front line. We are convinced that the struggle for democracy and the struggle for freedom will triumph."

Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania: "Beyond any considerations of legitimacy and lawfulness, the essence of the conflict is that between the group around Yeltsin, which accepts the reform, and the group around Rutskoy and Khasbulatov, which aims to restore the communist and Soviet imperial structures.(...) There is proof that in situations of acute economic, political, social, and moral crisis, the main danger stems from nationalist communism represented by those who prove no responsibility for the fate of the millions of people whom they may implicate in bloody conflicts. They do not favor serious solutions, which, at times of crisis, may be painful, but are the only ones to ensure stability and the future on the road to genuine democracy and reform."

Csaba Takacs, executive president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania: "We are very concerned about the situation in Russia because of the escalation of the armed conflict, which has already claimed some victims. We are following the development of events with keen interest and believe that negotiations are the only solution to this conflict; it

would be very harmful for Russia and the whole of Europe if the democratic forces lost control over the situation and this conflict spread and turned into a civil war. It is in Romania's interest that the democratic forces in Russia are strengthened both from our country's point of view and that of the Republic of Moldova. We view the official position of those states, which support the reform forces, as a just position."

Dinu Patriciu, leader of the Liberal Party-93: "We have always said that Romania is located at the periphery of the democratic world with the chaos in the East stemming from the pulverization of an empire that belongs to Asia, a world without any democratic tradition, so that it will need decades to adjust to the present-day world. If Napoleon made a mistake with horses when he proceeded directly toward Moscow, Hitler made the same mistake with his tanks, while today the West repeats the same mistake by throwing its money into a black hole. The only intelligent policy would be the one of creating a barrier made up of democratic states between the Baltics and Black Sea. Maybe what is happening now will make our friends in the West realize that one should not repeat the mistake of World War II, when General Patton should have been permitted to reach Moscow with his 2,500 tanks, as he had requested.

"I think that Romania, 70 percent of whose foreign trade before 1989 took place with the former USSR, is still linked to this area of chaos by an umbilical cord. Our only solution is to build Romania's house of today with a fire wall toward the East and all windows and entrances toward the West."

PDSR Welcomes Admittance

AU0710105993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0958 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 7/10/1993—"The Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] is welcoming with full satisfaction the decision taken by the Committee of Ministers to approve a recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe regarding Romania's admittance as full member into this European body," shows a communique of Romania's ruling party.

"By this, Romania's achievements on the road of establishing a state of law and its attachment to the values of pluralistic democracy and respect of human rights were recognized after a long and undesirable absence from the family of European nations, for Romania has always been an European country which brought its valuable contribution along the centuries to defend and enrich the cultural and historic patrimony of the ancient European continent.

"Romania's admittance as full member in the Council of Europe accomplished during a period in which the Social Democracy Party has assumed responsibility for governing, is a result of the activity unfolded by Romanian democratic political forces, an expression of a national consensus for Romania's integration within European structures. That is why certain attempts are unjustified to transfer domestic political disputes on several foreign policy objectives of national interest through tendencies to give interpretations to several participations in the Strasbourg meeting and create false issues to one party's interest.

"The Social Democracy Party of Romania considers that Romania's Parliament must analyze the legal implications devolving from Romania's admittance into the Council of Europe, and the government must put into application the pledges our country has made on the occasion," reads the communique signed by the Social Democracy Party of Romania.

Military Accord With Russia Seen as 'Normal'

AU0710101593 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 4 Oct 93 p 3

[Article by Grigore Buciu: "Is the Romanian-Russian Military Accord a Document With a Technical Character or Regimentation?"]

[Text] Quite soon, the accord of cooperation between the Romanian Army and the Army of the Russian Federation will be signed in Bucharest. The press wrote about it immediately following the Moscow ceremony, during which the two armies' chiefs of staff initialed the document. There were opinions voiced in favor and against the document, and the argumentation was varied, starting with pertinent examination and ending with speculations outlined after the first impression. Certainly, in the absence of any direct source of information, the citizen may ask himself why would such a cooperation be necessary, since efforts are being made for our country's integration into the Western economic and security systems, including NATO? Is it maybe a change of tune and its effect is to get back into the Kremlin's orbit?

First of all, the draft accord should be examined with our geo-strategic position in mind. Romania is located between two spheres of influence. Neither the West nor the Slavic East succeeded in attracting us into preferential relations of cooperation.

After a lengthy Russian-Soviet experience, with painful effects for the Romanians, it is natural that any move closer to the Russian space is regarded with suspicion.

However, is it possible to ignore such relations in the current geo-strategic position of Romania and of its Army? Certainly not. The soldiers that get trained on those types of Russian combat technology that the Army currently possesses and that will stay here until sufficient resources are acquired to renew them, know very well that their operation depends on imports from Russia. The Airforce and the anti-aircraft units rely on the Russian Army's training grounds, the only ones where, for the time being, long range combat shooting can be carried out.

Given this situation, what can we do? To give up planes, radar, technological devices, and other equipment of Russian origin? This would mean simply to mutilate our national defense. Hungary for example has received and continues to procure military technology and weapons of Russian origin from the deposits of the former GDR [German Democratic Republic] Army but also from the Russian Federation. The accords concluded with the Russian Army and with the other CIS countries are regarded by Hungarians as something normal.

It was rumored that the chief of staff was summoned to report after the visit to the United States and reprimanded for the NATO bases issue. For the time being, nobody can read minds in order to affirm that this was really the intention of the Russian generals. On the other hand, it is not very likely that, after the revolution, after all that has been done in the area of foreign military relations and policy, the Army would accept such a position.

A certain level of trust is being established between the two armies through mutual openness. This makes a contribution to maintaining stability and security in the area. However, in the current climate of suspicion, it is difficult to explain and understand that the accord of military cooperation between the Ministries of Defense of Romania and Russian Federation is normal and necessary. However, we should overcome the stage of clinging to preconceived ideas.

The ministers of defense will sign the accord, which, from their viewpoint, will have a technical character.

The politicians in the Parliament have the duty to ratify or to reject it. We hope that the discussions will be elucidating for everybody. The decision that is going to be taken involve a great responsibility for the issue of our national defense.

Editorial Examines Aftermath of Yeltsin's Success

AU0710190793 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 5 Oct 93 p 1

[Editorial by Dumitru Tinu: "The Great October Socialist Rebellion"]

[Text] Blood had to be shed in the streets of Moscow for [Russian President] Yeltsin to decide that he should resort to force in order to eliminate the communist rebellion provoked by the residents of the so-called White House. In his speech delivered at the end of the nightmare on Sunday-Monday [2-3 October], Russia's elected president seemed ready to blame himself that he had not appealed earlier to the intervention of the Army. Realistically, he could not have resorted to a forced intervention earlier. He could have done it precisely when he did do it—that is, after the organizers of the rebellion exposed themselves in front of the whole Russia as being some irresponsible adventurers, ready to sacrifice the lives of other people for their own political ambitions. Boris Yeltsin knows that without the savage scenes of violence in front of parliament and the act of setting fire to the OSTANKINO Television Center, he would have risked that the Army—which in any event has had many reasons to be displeased for the humiliation of withdrawal from Europe and the decrease of its international role—would not answer his orders or would turn and side with those who still nurture imperial dreams. Through his reserved attitude and his tact and readiness for dialogue also displayed during the meeting with representatives of the church, the Russian president convinced people that it was not he who wished an armed confrontation and that, in practical terms, he exhausted all other possibilities to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, the population, otherwise indifferent, was moved by the heroic actions of the defenders of the White House who were ready to sacrifice themselves, and that seemed to have changed their attitude on that fatal night; they went out into the street and supported the government.

Boris Yeltsin's success also has an international dimension. Intensely publicized by the entire international mass media, the Moscow events have dispersed the last reserves of the Western democracies over the legitimate nature of the decision to dissolve the parliament, the way it was—that is, set up and not elected or partially appointed and not democratically elected. Those who played the role of people's deputies were nothing but fanatic rebels who still live in another time. Thus, it became clear that the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the organization of free elections is the only solution to appoint certain representatives of a power whose word still has weight in the international life.

What will happen is difficult to foresee. The defeat of the rebellion in Moscow does not mean the end of confrontation. The economic chaos and the galloping deterioration of social conditions of the majority of the population in no way will favor the reformers at the time of general elections. Unless a miracle happens, the Khasbulatovs will be those who, making use of all they learned in the school of communist diversion, will have the first chance to get the electorate on their side. After the legislative elections, Yeltsin might find himself facing a parliament that, this time freely elected, will be even more conservative than the previous one. In addition, the great unknown element will continue to be the army, the one that signed a blank check for the president in exchange for some promises that we can only guess, and the day of payment cannot be that far off.

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 8 October

WA0810165193

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

International mediators hint at new peace plan for former Yugoslavia ... Bosnian Croats accused of human rights violations against Muslim civilians ... Deputies continue to address Serbian Assembly during no-confidence debate.

DIPLOMATIC

MEDIATORS HINT AT NEW PEACE PLAN (TANJUG): Peace conference cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg suggest that "new global approach" that would include settlement of conflicts in Croatia and Kosovo should be taken in new Bosnian peace talks. TANJUG quotes Italian news agency ANSA as reporting that a "new option" has been "put into circulation" that would involve the exchange of western Bosnia, which would be included in a "confederal" Croatia, for Croatian-held territory in Bosnia. (LD0710185993, LD0710192693)

HUMANITARIAN

BOSNIAN CROATS ACCUSED OF RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Sarajevo Radio): UNHCR spokesman accuses Bosnian Croats of expelling 530 Muslims from the western, Croatian-held part of Mostar, while Bosnian Army officials announce discovery of mass grave containing remains of 500 civilians purportedly killed by Bosnian Croat forces. (AU0710124593, AU0710163393)

POLITICAL

DEBATE ON NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION CONTINUES (Belgrade TV): Serbian Assembly debate on no-confidence motion in Serbian Government continues, with over 100 deputies scheduled to address assembly today. (AU0710213293)

Delic Threatens Military Action in Western Bosnia

LD0710141293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1246 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Petrovac, 7 Oct (TANJUG)— Rasim Delic, commander of the main headquarters of the Muslim army loyal to Alija Izetbegovic, said in Bihac that he would—through UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]—request talks with representatives of the newly formed province of western Bosnia because "the acceptance of autonomy cannot even be discussed"—Muslim Radio Bihac [controlled by pro-Izetbegovic forces] has reported today.

"The secession must be condemned and prevented because a united, unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina is in our interest. If things cannot be settled in a peaceful way, we will have to do it by military means," Delic said. He heads Izetbegovic's delegation which, according to Radio Bihac, arrived in the Bihac-Cazin area last night.

Irfan Ljubijankic, who was proposed as a new member of the Muslim presidency in Sarajevo replacing Abdic, said that the proclamation of the autonomous province of western Bosnia was "an act of destroying and betraying the state at its most difficult moments."

Abdic yesterday again addressed the Muslim people in the region on Radio Velika Kladusa, stressing that a cease-fire agreed in the Cazin Krajina was observed, but that there were still some sporadic provocations.

Talking about the arrival of Izetbegovic's delegation, Abdic said: "We asked for a delegation headed by Alija Izetbegovic and including Ejup Ganic and other people who have led us to this situation." According to him, the delegation that arrived can only deal with military issues. "We need a stronger delegation comprising the people I have named to discuss political and other issues."

Muslim Radio Bihac has today reported that the command of the 5th Corps of the Muslim army loyal to Izetbegovic has sent a request to UNPROFOR's French battalion to act in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 836 and "disband all military and paramilitary formations that do not belong to the Bosnia-Herzegovina government."

Delic Visits Bihac

LD0710220793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] A state delegation headed by Rasim Delic, commander of the main headquarters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and Interior Minister Bahir Alispahic has been on a visit to the Bihac district since yesterday. Their task is to ensure the normalization of the situation there, especially in Velika Kladusa. We have received the following report:

[Reporter] The state delegation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Rasim Delic, commander of the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, is on a working visit to Bihac district. The objective of the visit is to surmount the present situation and to find ways to resolve the still extremely difficult and complex situation, especially in Velika Kladusa.

The members of the delegation last night took part in a radio-television talk show, which aroused great interest among the citizens of the district of Bihac. Commander Delic visited the 5th Corps' training and recruitment center, where he attended the final stage in the work of the twelfth class of officer cadets. He then visited the fighters on the front line.

The arrival of the state delegation has met with widespread approval in the district, as well as the return of [name indistinct], chairman of the district assembly, so a speedy solution to the present situation is being anticipated with good reason.

We should say that the present state of affairs is still complex, especially in Velika Kladusa. Sniper and occasional infantry weapons fire has been opened by Fikret Abdic's followers in Johovica since this morning. Pleas and appeals for the normalization of the present situation are still being sent by many citizens of Velika Kladusa.

An energetic protest was again lodged today with the Croatian Government, the [Croatian] Information Ministry, and Croatian television against their persistent spreading of falsehoods and a totally tendentious presentation of the events in the district of Bihac.

We should also say that, unfortunately, the war against the Serb aggressors is still not over in this area. Last night and this morning, the aggressor opened infantry and mortar fire in certain areas of the (Drvar-Srb) plateau as well as in the Bosanska Krupa and Buzim sectors of the front.

This is [name indistinct] reporting for Bosnia-Herzegovina radio and television.

Commander Reportedly Replaced

AU0710203093 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The situation is still extremely tense in the region of the autonomous province of western Bosnia. By the way, Alija Izetbegovic yesterday replaced Ramiz Drekovic, commander of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, with Mustafa Hajrulahovic, commander of the 1st Corps.

* Army Takes Over Bihac Pocket

94P50001A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 30 Sep 93 p 8

[Report by Jamil Rufa'il in Skopje and Eyup Stetkovic in Belgrade]

[Text] President Aliya Izetbegovic has announced "a state of emergency and direct military rule" in the area of Bihac in western Bosnia. He said in a communique broadcast by radio Sarajevo that it is up to the population and officials in the area "to counter the evil plot which aims at increasing the country's divisions and at splitting the unity of the Muslims." AL-HAYAH has also learned in a telephone call with Bihac that the Bosnian Army has given the leadership of the secession attempt until Thursday to retrace their steps or face preventive measures.

Four of the five Bihac area municipalities declared autonomy from Sarajevo day before yesterday. It guaranteed a movement toward secession by the Muslim pocket—led by controversial businessman and politician Fikret Abdic, known for his strong relations with the Croatian Serbs—from the rest of the Bosnian territories.

President Izetbegovic chose the Bosnian Army's V Corps commander, General Ramiz Drekovic, as military governor of the area. He said in a communique that the military governor "would determine civilian appointments in the area and place all information media under military supervision."

AL-HAYAH learned in a telephone call to Hassan Effendic, who works at the Bosnian Army's V Corps General Headquarters in the city of Cazin, that the V Corps commander held a meeting yesterday with the commanders of the military units in the area and excluded the director of the Cazin police, who is known to be sympathetic with the leader of the secessionists, Fikret Abdic.

The source added that the V Corps commander ordered that all radio and television staionns in Bihac, Cazin, Velika Kladusa, and Bosanska Krupa be placed under the Army's control, and stipulated that their sole source of information would be radio Sarajevo.

Effendic confirmed that there is resistence to the military orders, especially in the town of Velika Kladusa. However, no military clashes had occurred as of noon yesterday, Wednesday, and the deadline for complying with the military orders, their imposition by force, and crushing all resistence was given as noon Thursday (today).

He explained that the Bihac region is nearly five percent of the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina; i.e., half of the land now remaining in the hands of the Muslims. "For this reason, it is not possible to sacrifice it, especially since it did not suffer destruction during the war, remained united, and did not witness population migrations as happened in the other Bosnian territories."

AL-HAYAH called another center of the autonomy which Fikret Abdic declared and talked with Ismail Begic, who works in the Velika Kladusa province headquarters. He confirmed what he called "the military dictatorship that has been imposed on the region and which has caused a great wave of indignation and anger among the people."

Begovic stated that the head of the autonomous region, Fikret Abdic, sent a message to the deputies of the Bosnian parliament during their meeting in Sarajevo yesterday, Wednesday, in which he explained the reasons which led the population of the area to proclaim the autonomy. He called on them "to stand at the side of the victory of democracy and decency over the devastation, the destruction, and the lying promises."

Croats Reportedly Expel 530 Muslims From Mostar

AU0710124593

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1100 GMT on 7 October within its regular 19-minute newscast carries several reports on the situation in the Republic.

A report by the 3d Operation Group read by ar unnamed correspondent says that "provocations are continuing along most of the Kladanj front, and are particularly intensive in the Karaula zone in which artillery fire has been coming from (Dretelj) and our lines have simply been showered from antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft machine guns, ZIS guns, and 60-mm and 82-mm mortars."

A studio announcer says that "Roy Wilkinson, spokesman for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, informed journalists in Sarajevo today about a further drastic case of expulsion of the Muslim population from the western part of Mostar, which is under the control of the Croatian Defense Council.

"According to Wilkinson, on 29 September 530 civilians were thrown out of their homes in the western part of Mostar and gathered in a pharmacy. In that building, all the women were searched, and money and jewelry were taken away from them. This group of people was then forced to pass through no-man's land toward the part of Mostar controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The people crossed the Neretva in boats or over the old [word indistinct] bridge, Wilkinson said. Passing through no-man's land, they saw about 45 corpses, Wilkinson said. An elderly woman was then left behind and [words indistinct] unknown. According to some reports young girls were taken away from the group and taken to an unknown destination, Wilkinson added. According to him, this was the largest expulsion from Mostar in several months. Usually [words indistinct], 40-50 people would be expelled. These 530 expelled civilians are now being accommodated in the cellars of ruined buildings on the eastern bank of the Neretva."

Mass Grave With 500 Civilians Discovered

AU0710163393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] A mass grave has been discovered at the Partisans' Cemetery at Taskovcici. Over 500 civilians that were killed during the operation of ethnic devastation of the Stolac and Capljina commune are buried in the grave, reads the statement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center. The information was obtained with the help of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Military Security Service.

According to the latest information around 50 Bosniaks are buried in Harem on Balinovac in Mostar. Only some have been identified. They are Vedran Becirevic, (?Liba) and Ahmed Fajzal, Ilija (?Pelivan), and several members of the Mulahasanovic and Dugalic families. The perpetrators of these crimes against innocent civilians are members of the Croatian Defense Council 4th Battalion under the command of Mladen Misic. Also on Balinovac, immediately next to the Borik restaurant, there is a grave containing 15 bodies marked with numbers and initials [words indistinct]. [Words indistinct] in Harem Milkovici has been dug with bulldozers, but there is no precise information about the number of victims buried there.

UN Troops Exchange Fire With Serbian Sniper

AU0710164793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Three incidents that occurred yesterday were the topic of discussion at today's news conference in the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] Headquarters. UNPROFOR spokesman Van Biesenbroeck said that two vehicles belonging to humanitarian organizations had been hijacked yesterday in Vitez. Van Biesenbroeck said that it was believed that Croatian Defense Council troops were responsible for this incident. One of the vehicles, belonging to the Italian humanitarian organization Medica Internazionale, was hijacked yesterday morning, while the second vehicle, belonging to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, was hijacked in the afternoon. In both cases, UNPROFOR did not take any decisive steps, and the peace forces' representative surprised journalists with his statement that similar things happen in New York.

Yesterday in Sarajevo, an incident occurred in which UNPROFOR and the Serbian aggressor's army exchanged fire. A sniper fired from Serbian positions at a UNPROFOR vehicle as it was passing through a residential area in [the western suburb of] Alipasino Polje. UNPROFOR troops responded by firing in the direction of the unknown sniper. Following this, several other shots were fired from the aggressor's side. UNPROFOR responded with fierce fire from automatic weapons and a 20 mm gun, whereupon the shots ceased. UNPROFOR does not know whether the aggressor's side sustained any casualties.

Serbs Reportedly Shell Civilians in Maglaj

AU0810111693

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 8 October within its regular 14-minute newscast carries several reports on the situation in the Republic.

Hajrudin Sermic reports that "another horrible massacre has taken place in Maglaj. [Words indistinct] the entire day yesterday for a suitable moment to open artillery fire on civilians so that as many innocent people as possible could be killed. At the moment that NATO cargo planes dropped the much desired and needed food in an airdrop operation, chetniks launched a dozen mortar bombs and 30 Bofors shells from (Brusnicki) Potok on civilian defense workers in charge of private [word indistinct] and the hungry civilians who were looking forward to receiving packages. Two civilians were killed and 10 wounded."

A report by the Press Center of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina read by an unnamed correspondent says that "there was no peace in the zone covered by the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina yesterday. In the valley of the Lasva River, extremist fighters of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] opened sniper fire along the line of separation, particularly in the regions of Glavica and (Strane). On the [name indistinct]-Zavidovici front, the united enemy operated with infantry weapons and in the afternoon launched mortar bombs from the village of (Stog) on the villages of Mahoje, (Dugar), and Potok. During the night, the aggressor brought new forces and military hardware into this region.

"The extremist units of the HVO yesterday opened occasional infantry and mortar fire on the defense lines of Gornji Vakuf and its suburbs. In the afternoon, they used mortars to target the town center and the Voljice region. The extremist Croatian fighters' fiercest activity was registered in the Novi Travnik region where they used howitzers and recoilless guns. After this, pushing Muslim civilians in front of them as a human shield, they effected several infantry assaults, violently attacking Zabrdje and (Bogasi)."

A studio announcer says that "during the past 24 hours, the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor intensified infantry weapon, artillery, and tank activity over the broader Sarajevo front. The enemy operated from his strongholds in Mrkovici, [name indistinct], Blagovac, Dvor, and Lukavica. On the Igman front, the aggressor operated with infantry weapons in the region of (Bezinov Vis) where UNPROFOR forces were stationed who withdrew after [words indistinct]. Movements of vehicles [words indistinct] from (Celedovljani) toward Babin Dol and from Hresa toward Vogosca, as well as two columns of approximately 80 of the aggressor's vehicles from Rogovi toward Kijevo."

The studio announcer cites a report by the 4th Corps Command as saying that "the HVO concentration camp for Bosniaks in Dretelj has been vacated. However, the inmates have not been set free but moved to concentration camps in Gabela, a heliport near (Robnic), and penitentiaries in Stolac and Prozor. Nine hundred and seventy-seven captured Bosniaks were moved outside the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, to the territory of the Republic of Croatia. On 28 August, 450 Bosniaks were deported to Korcula, and on 23 August 527 prisoners were sent to the island of (Obuljan). Not a single one of these prisoners has been moved to the territory under the control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Press Center of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina reports."

The studio announcer cites Bihac Correspondent (?Mirza) Sadikovic as reporting that "the situation in the Bihac region is somewhat calmer, but still tense and uncertain. Fikret Abdic's supporters shot at Army personnel in the village of Johovica. It is somewhat calmer in Skokovi and many facts are pointing toward the possibility that the situation in the region will be solved through negotiations. [Words indistinct] negotiations began with talks about attempts to calm down and solve the situation that still threatens total anarchy, and a dramatic and chaotic situation."

Serbs Tie Peace Plan to Lifting of Sanctions

AU0810094693 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] The Bosnian Serbs will not sign any peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina if the plan does not contain a precisely formulated plan for lifting the UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is claimed by POLITIKA today, citing well-informed sources. The economic sanctions, which affect Serbia most, have been introduced because of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia cannot accept a peace solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina that does not contain a gradual lifting of the sanctions. This was stated for the paper by a top Serbian official who wanted to remain anonymous.

We could refuse to accept what Serbia accepts in the peace negotiations, but we will certainly reject what Serbia rejects, a Serbian leader from Pale told POLITIKA. He, too, wanted to remain anonymous.

All Prisoners Expected To Be Exchanged

AU0810090093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Report by Nada Al-Isa from Zagreb]

[Text] The exchange of prisoners between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] will start on 11 October. This was agreed today at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, Haris Silajdzic and Mate Granic respectively, with the representatives of the International Red Cross. Our Zagreb correspondent has the details:

[Al-Isa] The exchange will start in Konjic and Gabela. Release from other prisons and camps will then follow. For instance, this will be followed by the release of the prisoners from the prisons in Zenica and Mostar, who are held by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and from the camps of the HVO in Zabrdje, Purija, and the hospital in Mostar. The last prisoners should be released on 19 October, when the prisoners from the prison in Bugojno, which is run by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be released. The inmates of the camp run by the HVO in Ljubusko, the remaining prisoners in Brecelj, and Kiseljak will be released at the same time. According to the information of the International Red Cross, the HVO is still holding 4,670 prisoners and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina a several times fewer prisoners, about 850.

At today's meeting in Zagreb with the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian foreign ministers it was agreed that the representatives of the International Red Cross be present during all these exchanges and releases, and that they be in constant touch with the relevant organs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the HVO, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

So, let us repeat this, according to today's agreement in Zagreb, all prisoners in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be released between 11 and 19 October.

This is Nada Al-Isa reporting for Radio and Television Bosnia-Herzegovina from Zagreb.

RSK Says Resolution Aimed Against All Serbs

LD0710171893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1613 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Belgrade, Oct 7 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade association of Serbs from the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and the Republic of Croatia on Thursday [7 October] said that the U.N. Security Council yielded to the Croatian Government's threats by adopting Resolution 871 which is "aimed against RSK and the entire Serb nation."

"Instead of the expected peace and the resolution of the Serb question through political means under the protection of the U.N. forces, the Security Council decided to support the Croatian war option," the association said in a statement.

"What the Serbs can expect from the Croatian Army and authorities, was best demonstrated by the massacres and demolished Serb villages in Lika before the very eyes of the U.N. troops," the statement said.

According to UNPROFOR reports, the latest Croatian aggression on RSK killed close to 70 Serb soldiers and civilians and completely destroyed three Serb villages.

RSK was formed by the local Serbs in parts of the ex-Yugoslav republic of Croatia where they are in the majority and in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslav Federation.

Russian Envoy: Resolution Not Anti-Serb

LD0710181693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1612 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Zagreb, Oct 7 (TANJUG)—Russian Ambassador to Croatia Leonid Kerestedzhiyants assessed U.N. Resolution 871 on the extension of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate as neither pro-Croat nor anti-Serb, but said it was pitted against all those who obstruct the peace process.

Refuting the theses that the sanctions against Serbia would last until the Krajina problem is solved, the Russian ambassador told Zagreb weekly GLOBUS that the resolution's text does not mention the word "sanctions" but "responsibility" instead.

The sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were imposed due to that country's alleged involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their easing or lifting is conditioned by the termination of war in that former Yugoslav republic.

Ambassador Kerestedzhiyants emphasized that he has told Croatian President Franjo Tudjman that Resolution 871 was not pro-Croat because it states that appropriate measures will be taken against all who fail to comply with the resolution and attempt to hinder the peace process.

That point of the resolution refers to Croatia as well, warned the Russian ambassador.

Emphasizing the fact that Russia voted for the proposed resolution immediately after the parliament's pressure on the foreign policy in Moscow ended, Russian ambassador added that this does not mean that Russia will lead an anti-Serb policy.

UNPROFOR Reports Army Massacre of Serbs

LD0810103593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2248 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Belgrade, October 7 (TANJUG)—The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on Thursday [7 October] released a report stating that the extension of destruction and killing of Serb civilians in the Medak pocket in the south of the republic of Serb Krajina on September 9 showed that the Army of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia had practiced "a comprehensive scorched earth policy."

The well planned and systematic attack of the Croatian Army met little Serb resistance, said UNPROFOR spokeswoman Shannon Boyd, who forwarded the statement to TANJUG.

The report has been transmitted to the rapporteur of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the Commission of Experts for War Crimes.

After receiving the report on the Croatian massacre of Serb civilians in the RSK, Mazowiecki on Thursday protested with the Croatian Government and demanded that the perpetrators of the crimes be put on trial.

The report includes evidence of an intentional killing of Serb civilians who were unable to escape the attack, regardless of their age, sex or status.

Nearly every house in the territory upon which the Croatian Army made the incursion—a total of 500—was burned or leveled to the ground and U.N. peacekeepers recovered the bodies of 18 mutilated Serb civilians while 52 bodies were delivered by the Croatian Army, the report says adding that another 48 Serbs are missing.

Nearly all of the 18 bodies were riddled with multiple bullet wounds or incinerated. Seven victims were women and mostly over 60 years of age, the report says.

Most of the crimes were committed by special units armed with anti-tank mines and other explosives.

The report includes testimonies by survivors of the massacre, who spoke about the brutality of Croatian troops. An 84-year-old blind woman was sprayed with gunfire by at least 10 Croatian soldiers while on the front porch of her home and, in another incident, Croatian soldiers dragged two wounded Serbs from a car and threw them into a house which was set on fire, the report says. One 50-year-old woman described how soldiers

appeared outside the window of her home, lobbed in a grenade and then sprayed the room with gunfire, says the report.

During its latest aggression against the RSK in September, the Croatian Army razed 11 Serb villages and killed over 70 Serbs, mostly civilians, while in its previous aggression in January over 1,000 Serbs were killed, 800 of them civilians.

The republic of Serb Krajina was proclaimed in 1991 in the territories of Croatia predominantly populated by Serbs as their response to Croatia's violent secession from former Yugoslavia and its attempt to reduce the Serb people's status to that of a national minority.

After the secessionist war in which the Croatian troops killed 14,000 Serb civilians, the RSK was declared a United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) in the spring of last year, but this has not prevented Zagreb from launching three aggressions against the RSK.

Tudjman Receives Representatives of Muslim Parties

LD0710135893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman received in the Presidential Palace last night a joint delegation of the Croatian Muslim Democratic Party and the Muslim Democratic Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina which included chairmen of both parties Mirsad Baksic and Armin Pohara, and also Ismet Hadziosmanovic and (?Zulfo) Robovic, the president's office announced this morning.

They informed the president about the political program and work of the two Muslim democratic parties, and about their views on the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. They said that on 3 October Fikret Abdic, together with a large number of citizens of the recently proclaimed autonomous province of western Bosnia, had joined the Muslim Democratic Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

They expressed their support for the policy advocated by President Tudjman and the Croatian Democratic Union regarding the establishment of the union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the avoidance of clashes between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their cooperation in the defense against the common aggressor and efforts being made to reach a fair and permanent peace.

The talks were also attended by head of the Croatian president's office Jure Radic, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granic, and Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak.

Serbia

Assembly Discusses No-Confidence Motion

AU0710213293 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Report by Spomenka Jovic on Serbian Assembly session in Belgrade on 7 October—recorded]

[Text] [Jovic] Even though the first issue on the agenda at today's session was the initiative of the Serbian radicals to cast a vote of no confidence in the Serbian Government, this issue was debated only after the break this afternoon. This morning passed in establishing the agenda and voting on 31 initiatives put forward by the deputies to be urgently placed on the agenda.

Explaining the proposal of his party, Tomislav Nikolic, head of the deputies' group of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], said that the government had proven unable to take advantage of the time it had, and today's session was only the continuation of the session in June, when new measures had been conveyed.

[Nikolic] Now when it is completely clear that those measures have yielded no results, that the people of Serbia have become stratified to a large number of citizens who are struggling to survive, and a small number of those for which the hungry ones will soon work in the former state factories, now when it is completely obvious that this Serbian Government does not enjoy trust and cannot be allowed to lead Serbia, particularly during the long coming winter, now when all this is clear, the government should have come before the deputies and, thus, before the people.

The summer was long. The inflation had a jump not recorded in any other country in the world. Then came the measures that destroyed production and emptied the shops. Then came preparations for the second regular session, and the government was still quiet. Why did this government have to come before the Assembly with the analysis of its measures and the effects of these measures? Mostly because it is a minority government, which was elected in February thanks to the support of the SRS deputies, the strongest opposition party in Serbia.

I do not know whether there has ever been a case in the world that one government is elected thanks to the votes of the strongest opposition party. However, at that time, Serbia was crying out for parliamentary peace, and it was necessary to form a government, any government being better than no government. The possible coalition of the two strongest parties in the Assembly, the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the SRS, was out of the question because of the absolutely opposing political, economic, and social programs.

[Jovic] In his address that lasted for an hour and a half, the head of the deputies' group of the Serbian radicals put forward a series of accusations against the government, the socialists, and the Assembly. The Serbian Government cared little about Serbianhood, Nikolic said, and the first great defeat of the SPS was the rejection of the Vance-Owen plan with the then support of the Democratic Movement of Serbia and the Democratic Party. The socialists cannot be patriots, Nikolic said, if they are supported by people whom they label traitors.

Responding to the accusations, Zoran Andjelkovic, head of the deputies' group of socialists in the Serbian Assembly, said the following: They are accusing us of being bad patriots, but our patriotism is principled. We have done nothing to other nations, which we would not wish done to ours.

[Andjelkovic] In their initiative, Seselj's radicals are particularly concerned about the army and the police force. They are not concerned about the health service or the people in education, they do not care for production, supplies, or transportation for citizens. The radicals are against the extra-party concept of the army. They want to criticize the army and the police force and take advantage of that to create their own stronghold in the army and the police force in order to introduce dictatorship. However, the army and the police force belong to all the people and they cannot be subject to manipulation and means for the introduction of dictatorship.

They have to know that justified criticism of the state of the army exists, primarily in the army itself. The attempts by the radicals to establish their own influence and create a stronghold for themselves in the army is to be condemned. That was not a justified criticism of the state of the army. If we had been satisfied with the state of the army, we would not have committed ourselves to its transformation. The members of the army want to implement the transformation. We are all on the same side when it comes to the defense of the country. That is why we categorically oppose Seselj's attack on the army. The weaknesses and mistakes that existed and certainly still exist are not reason enough for that, apart from all those processes, which have smeared the reputation of the army members, who were performing their duties diligently. [sentence as heard] Seselj's radicals and their units of volunteers have not been defending the Serbian people in the Krajinas. The people's army—going through the nightmare of war, suffering the transformation, and sharing the poverty of the people—has shown a high professional and patriotic moral. That is what bothers the radicals. They do not want an extra-party army.

[Jovic] Prompted by the many criticisms and accusations by the Radicals, and before any more deputies spoke, Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic addressed the Assembly.

[Sainovic] What I have heard here today unfortunately surpasses my expectations as to how they can attack us. My expectations have been based on something that was published on 27 September this year. Here the head of

the deputies' group of the Radicals told us what happened on 28 September. 28 September came after 27 September. On 27 September, a political pamphlet was written, not a proposal for the overthrow of the government. The government is mentioned here in five lines. [Waves a leaflet at the deputies] Everything else is talk about the Socialists, the Socialist Party, foreign policy, the Vance-Owen plan, and so on and so forth.

The government does not lead the party, and the foreign policy of this country is led by Slobodan Milosevic. Therefore let us put our cards on the table and see what this is all about.

I have to say that, as I openly said no to [former Prime Minister Milan] Panic's government, I will not, gentlemen, withdraw in front of your attack, with the same responsibility and the same moral principles. [Applause] Therefore, as we have heard here in the address by the head of the deputies' group of the Radical Party the social issues mentioned as by-the-way arguments for the terms regime, authority, elections, that means that this is not an issue of overthrowing the government within the existing parliamentary structures. [sentence as heard] This is an issue for the introduction of a takeover of power in Serbia. Therefore, let us nicely address this issue, in the way it is written in this pamphlet, and the way it has been said here today.

I will cite only two theories from the text, the first and the last. It says here that this government has resulted from a party that, and so on; it says here is a patriotic party until the going gets tough. The last paragraph says that it should get out of the way and not allow itself to be remembered for long as it will only be remembered for evil. So the SPS will be remembered by the people [shouts are heard] please, next time write precisely what you mean. It says here what it says. Therefore, please, gentlemen, who are you saying this to? You want to tell us that, you want to tell the people that this is how the political movement that formed this republic disappears? You want to tell us [pauses] people are sitting here, to which I am honored to belong, who formed, were personally present in the unification of this republic, in the repression, the moving of the secessionist governments in Pristina. [sentence as heard] And now, please, another thing on the other side of the territory on which the Serbian people live. To say that these authorities want to sell the Serbs in Krajina down the river, I have been hearing that for a long time. I also have the personal, moral, and every other right, since I have been too long with them, right from the start, so I know what is really going on there. [sentence as heard]

Therefore, so that they will take power on that theory, to tell the Serbian people that Slobodan is selling the Serbs down the river, well, excuse me, gentlemen, that is what you are saying. [sentence as heard] We know who conducts foreign policy for this nation. Please, let me tell you nicely. The weakest point, the most fragile link in the defense front of the Serbian people is built on the theory that Serbs are selling Serbs down the river.

I was recently told something by a man from that region. There were those old stories about hanging Serbs on willow trees [play on words: Srbe na vrbe—graffiti that appeared in some republics before the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia]. But the Serbs have cut down the willows, and the only thing that can be done is to hang Serbs on Serbs [Srbe na Srbe]. We will not allow that to happen. Therefore, instead of the attack now, this kind of an attack and on these issues, without the basic evidence as to where we might have failed on the Serbian issue, where is the result, the negotiations have been going on for years, and, according to these negotiations, there is a Serbian state in the republic of Srpska, in the negotiations in which it is known who the leader is of the Serbian people. [sentence as heard] Eh, eh, Slobodan Milosevic. That state was formed in those negotiations. May our every betrayal result in the formation of a Serbian state on Serbian territory. We will be proud. We can then start discussing the vote of confidence in the government.

The government is working under conditions that I would not wish upon any government. Everyone knows what has unfortunately happened around us over the last three months. What happened three months ago, what happened two months ago, and what happened in September. I do not want to talk about it since I do not want to defend myself with that, and I do not want the enemies of this nation, who are doing it to us, to have a good time at our expense. I do not want to use that to defend myself in the Assembly.

Please, do not ask us how we will heat ourselves, how we will harvest; we have already organized these things three times: the harvest, the heating, and it is getting harder, conditions are getting harder, but we will organize these things again. Therefore, please gentlemen, let us be open and honest in front of this nation that sees everything, hears everything, and knows everything, that the point that it is time to overthrow the authorities before peace breaks out, as some say, let us drop that delusion in the interests of the nation, and let us talk about the practical questions of how to improve at a time like this the basic living conditions of this nation, for which we say how great the difficulties are, and so do not talk about how high the salaries are of this or that teacher or professor. [sentence as heard] Let us see how we can keep the country that has developed the entire social structure and everything else, when we had $2,800 per head, and now we have under $800 after all these sanctions. There are many more heads now to look after, and we are looking after them fairly.

I accept within this framework to hold an open discussion on everything. I am available, gentlemen.

[Jovic] Over 100 deputies have applied to address the Assembly tomorrow and that promises another dynamic day in the Serbian Assembly, which starts the session at 1000.

Assembly Debate Continues

AU0810082693 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] The Assembly of Serbia will continue its discussion on the no-confidence motion in the republican government proposed by the Serbian Radical Party. The proposal was explained by Tomislav Nikolic, head of the deputy caucus of that party, in a 90-minute speech yesterday.

The discussion on this proposal is expected to last a fairly long time as there are more than 100 deputies who want to take part in the discussion. A proposal supported by 24 deputies of different party affiliations asking for the dismissal of Agriculture Minister Jan Kisgeci due to poorly conducted policy, is also on the agenda.

Journalists Predict Survival

AU0810092293 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Report by Zoran Vaskovic from the Serbian Assembly]

[Excerpts] Judging by everything, the parliament of Serbia is facing a marathon debate, one that has never been longer. The Assembly will discuss whether the republic government should be voted out or not. [passage omitted]

Here in the Serbian assembly, journalists are discussing the statements by heads of deputy caucuses on how they intend to vote. According to journalists, the following votes against the government are expected: 73 Radicals, 11 deputies from the Democratic Party, and 20 deputies from the Democratic Party of Serbia.

In order for the government to be voted out, a no-confidence motion must be supported by at least 126 deputies.

The session is expected to start in about 10 minutes. This is all from the republic assembly hall.

Seselj Predicts Ouster

AU0710162993 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The Serbian Radical Party [SRS] is not surprised by the latest UN Security Council resolution, as it has been obvious that the world powers are anti-Serbian. This is what Vojislav Seselj said on the behalf of his party at the news conference. He said that such tendencies will remain in force until the international community breaks up Serbia, separating Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak from it. Jelena Hinic reports:

[Hinic] The Serbian people, according to Seselj, must oppose this intention. First the unification of the republic of Serbian Krajina and the republic of Srpska into western Serbia should be proclaimed, and then its unification with Yugoslavia. We still believe, Seselj said, that there can be no negotiations while the sanctions are in force, but our diplomacy keeps making the wrong moves. The Serbs in Krajina and the republic of Srpska, said the leader of the Serbian Radicals, have been sold down the river by the Socialist Party of Serbia and the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia.

Asked by the reporters how he saw the possible personnel changes in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Seselj said that he expected Goran Hadzic to be overthrown.

The Serbian Government has to fall, but not for ideological reasons but because it is incompetent. This is supported by the fact that the rationalized supplying of the population does not cover even half the citizens with the promised products.

The leader of the Serbian Radical Party has announced its demand for the removal of Borisav Tanaskovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, because—according to Seselj—as the former governor of the National Bank of Serbia, he was responsible for the financial manipulation in Dafiment, Jugoskandik, Inos Bank, and other financial organizations.

Seselj expressed satisfaction that the Serbian Assembly would urgently discuss the law on Radio Television Serbia. Our proposal is to abolish television subscriptions. Those who own the television should finance it, Seselj said.

Draskovic Seeks Talks With Milosevic

LD0710212793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1951 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Valjevo, Yugoslavia, Oct 7 (TANJUG)—Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic said on Thursday [7 October] that consultations between Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic and democratic opposition leaders about forming a government of national unity might pull that Yugoslav republic out of its present crisis.

"Such a government should be formed for a five-to-six-month term, it should link us with the world and prepare democratic elections," said Draskovic, who leads the Serbian Renewal Movement, the second strongest opposition party in the Serbian parliament, at a rally in Valjevo, central Serbia.

Earlier on Thursday, the Serbian parliament opened debate on confidence in the republican government. The motion was moved by the 72 deputies of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the strongest opposition party in parliament.

Draskovic reiterated that his party would not support the radicals in voting no confidence in the government.

He had previously said that his party, although considering the present government to be bad, would not vote against it, because such a vote would only give support to the "fascists," which was his term for the radicals of Vojislav Seselj.

Article Views SPS Attack on Seselj, Radicals

AU0710213593 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep 93 p 13

[Article by Gordana Logar: "The Dispensable"]

[Text] Even though many people already expected the tacit understanding—even an unofficial coalition—between the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party to break up, the [SPS's] statement against Seselj's party and against him personally still surprised many people, not only because of its severity and serious accusations, but also because of the style in which it was written—it lacked the ideological wording. It was perhaps this simple language (closer to a journalistic style) with certain stylistic turns ("such a thing is not possible anywhere else in the world and it is a good thing that it is not") that made this text understandable even "to the common people," which was obviously what the ruling party wanted to achieve at this delicate moment.

The question is, however, whether it should be interpreted from the moral and political point of view only as an attack on the Serbian Radical Party, or whether it can also be characterized as an admission of the Socialist Party of Serbia's [SPS] guilt for "its primitive chauvinism, the contribution to the isolation of Serbia from the world... for spoiling relations between the Serbian and other peoples, stirring up a warmongering atmosphere in Serbia, and creating hatred and conflicts between Serbs and citizens of non-Serbian origin."

Is Covering Up Not a Crime?

All this as well as "Seselj's participation in establishing paramilitary formations on the territory of the republic of Serbian Krajina and in the republic of Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the crimes that they have committed against Croatian, Muslim, and Serbian civilians" were obviously known to the SPS. The best proof that this was not only pure journalistic speculation is the sentence in the SPS statement that says that "the people will judge everything." This means that there is also evidence relating to the atrocities committed, but since it does not relate only to the present moment (paramilitary formations have been mentioned since the beginning of the wars in Bosnia and in Croatia in a series of documents about the Yugoslav crisis; the Croats from Hrtkovci moved out and those from Sid are still moving out, something that has also been known for a long time, as well as the fact that non-Serbs have been under constant attack), the ruling party wants to share the responsibility for all this with somebody else. If for no other reason, then in order to hide these facts from the people.

What is more, not all of the atrocities were mentioned in the statement issued by the SPS, although they have been known for a long time. They were not mentioned because they had not been condemned either by the constitutional state or by the SPS. This is proven not only by the statement itself, which says that Seselj "protects war profiteers, and accuses honest people who do their work conscientiously," but also by the existing "black lists" of people, which the leader of the Serbian Radical Party has read out at press conferences. There were absolutely no war profiteers on these lists, but only people who disagreed with Seselj's "ideology" and with the official Serbian policy, and so there was no condemnation. Need it even be mentioned that students and taxi drivers were threatened with pistols, that parliament was entered by armed men, that the requirements to check Seselj's immunity were never considered by parliament, as opposed to the requirements to check on people who committed much smaller crimes?

Who Will Replace the Radical Party?

For all these reasons, the key sentence in the SPS statement is the one in which it is stated that "Seselj is scared of peace because such people as he can become known only during wars and crises." This means that the atrocities committed by the Radical Party were not a problem during the war (it seems that they were welcome?!), but when there is the possibility to sign a peace treaty they are not only unnecessary, but also a good basis for accusations of war crimes. There is the question, however, whether Seselj and "his private subjects, who constitute one quarter of the members of parliament" are the only ones who deserve this. And even more than that—how is it possible that one quarter of the members of parliament are blackmailing Serbia? A quarter has never been a majority, and the small number of delegates from the opposition parties have never tipped the scale when decisions were made.

All this can be seen from another point of view (much closer to politicians than to analysts): Seselj's Radical Party members have played the final act—they were used as long as they were needed (during the war), but their time has passed now. It can be said better late than never, but is this really enough to calm all "non-Serbs" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to encourage those democratically oriented people who believe in the "development of democratic relations, national equity, social justice and the protection of human rights and the freedom of nations," as quoted from the SPS statement in connection with (the probably future) SPS policy?

Can it not be anticipated that the time will again come when the Radical or some other party will be necessary to play crime and punishment? Surely the way in which the SPS statement was first made public in the main news on Tuesday [28 September] proves that there is such a possibility: It was broadcast in the 17th minute and it was not read out by the announcer (usually a sign that the item itself was of lesser importance). What is more, it was stated in the end that "the president of Serbia does not have anything to do with this." The person quoted was SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic, but his words were heard neither on NTV Studio B nor on Radio B-92.

Judging from all this, we can say that the statement named the war criminals, but it was at the same time an attempt to amnesty all those who hid the crimes. Let us await the outcome.

No Heating in Belgrade Hospitals

LD0610141593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1236 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Belgrade, October 6 (TANJUG)—None of Belgrade's hospitals have oil supplies for heating in the autumn and winter months, and their patients are sure to freeze unless the U.N. sanctions committee allows the import of oil for humanitarian purposes.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) has 17 months been under an oil embargo and comprehensive economic sanctions introduced by the U.N. Security Council on account of the country's alleged involvement in the civil and religious war in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although the federal government requested the U.N. sanctions committee on several occasions to allow the import of oil derivatives and gas for heating of hospitals, nursery schools and schools, not a single tonne of oil for humanitarian purposes has reached the F.R.Y.

A large number of the ill, the elderly and children died last winter because of restrictions in heating.

The hospital for prematurely born children, where the constant temperature of 28 degrees centigrade is obligatory, has oil supplies for no more than ten days, said the hospital's deputy director Vidosav Jovanovic.

Surgeons in Belgrade's hospitals warned that they would have to suspend surgeries unless oil was urgently supplied.

Macedonia

Assembly Supports Frckovski by 'Tight Majority'

AU0710152893 Skopje MIC in English 7 Oct 93

[Unattributed report: "Frckovski Remains At His Function"]

[Text] With a very tight majority during the vote of confidence, the Macedonian Parliament at yesterday's session decided that the Minister of the Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski should remain in his post.

The VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] MP's were demanding his resignation due to, according to them, the violation of the Constitution by the police.

They reiterated the case when the police used force in the locations of Kiklis, Radovis, Radolista, Debar, Skopje (Gorce Petrov and Bitpazar), as well as the tapping of the official VMRO-DPMNE telephone.

The delegates of the Albanian parties PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and NDP [National Democratic Party] emphasized, in their words, "the double national measure" when the police repression is applied in Macedonia, as well as the discontent from the presence of Albanians in the Ministry of the Interior.

Minister Frckovski dismissed these accusations and said that the police managed to retain its objectivity.

Macedonia, according to Frckovski, is a country with the lowest criminal rate compared to the other socialist transit countries. He also stated it was ridiculous for the parties to blame the Ministry of the Interior for their internal problems.

Defense Minister Views Role of UN Peacekeepers

AU0710150193 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 2 Oct 93 p 14

[Interview With Defense Minister Vlado Popovski by Zoran Petrov; place and date not given: "Evolution of the Mandate of Peacekeeping Forces"]

[Text] In the conditions of the latest military and political developments in the Balkans, security in Macedonia will always be an issue on which opinions and positions differ and on the basis of which forecasts and assessments are made. Within this framework, of course, there are many issues associated with what is referred to as the internal organization of the republic for preventing, countering, and defending against any kind of aggression and imperilment of the constitutional order and independence. One of the best qualified people to talk on this subject is Vlado Popovski, Macedonian minister of defense, with whom we recently had a talk:

[Petrov] One year after coming to the position of defense minister, what is your assessment on the current political and security situation in Macedonia?

[Popovski] From the military and security criteria aspect, it can be said that there are no concentrations of foreign armies along our borders, and in this respect there are no threats at this moment, or any direct denials of our sovereignty and integrity. For these reasons, the political and security situation can be assessed as stable, and our expectations are that this trend will continue in the future. There will still be, and this is something we have repeatedly said, a potential danger from current hotbeds of crisis where at the moment the conflicts are in an early stage. This applies first of all to the Kosovo problem in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], because events that could develop in that region could represent a real cause for a change in the present security situation in Macedonia. For the time being, the situation in Kosovo is under control and it can be said there are no signs of direct and current destabilization in the political and security situation.

[Petrov] In your opinion, are the chances of an aggression from the north smaller or greater following the deployment of U.S. troops along the borders with the FRY?

[Popovski] Certainly smaller, because the peacekeeping forces came to the republic to protect the peace. The first contingent, the Nordic contingent, came with a precise task of observing and informing, while the second, the U.S. troops, came with a political mission, to stop the spreading of the conflict, in addition to the idea that the U.S. peacekeeping forces represent a warning to potential aggressors. It means that the preventive protection of peace has acquired a kind of a modified definition. Although small in number, symbolic, it indicates the clear interest of the international community and the United States in safeguarding peace in this region through the United Nations. Therefore I think that, despite a number of controversies regarding their arrival, with their presence, the more effective function of the U.S. troops for maintaining peace in the region has been highlighted.

[Petrov] Does that mean that their mandate has been changed and that they have greater authority?

[Popovski] Officially, not, although there has been speculation in the media. I believe that those elements of the definition of the role of the U.S troops to the effect that they have come to prevent the spread of the conflict and issue a warning, as a matter of fact, represent the precise meaning of "preventive protection of peace." In my opinion, this was not clearly defined with the mandate of the Nordic Battalion and its mission as an observer and informer, whereas the U.S. concept of preventive protection of peace acquires a concrete realization. This is, in any case, an evolution of the observing mandate into a protecting mandate, in conditions of peace. Therefore, along with the U.S. part of the peacekeeping contingent another part of the preventive protection of peace is added. On the other hand, only the UN Security Council can decide the concrete change of the mandate, which is lacking, for now.

[Petrov] What is the present position of the Macedonian Army in the realization of its constitutional role, alongside the presence of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and the more powerful and numerous Internal Ministry forces?

[Popovski] The role and the place of the Macedonian Army is the same as it was before the arrival of the UNPROFOR. This role is defined by the Constitution and there are no changes now that the UNPROFOR forces are present. That role is to maintain the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia; that is the priority task of the armed forces. UNPROFOR, in the overall situation, acts as an international component and an indication that Macedonia, as a sovereign state, is an international subject, which means that the peacekeeping forces will not assume the role and function of the MA.

In the second part of the question it is suggested that the Internal Ministry is larger and more powerful. That can only be the case in relation to itself, in relation to the previous period, but not in relation to the Macedonian Army. Next—these are not competitive structures, but compatible structures, with their own place and areas of responsibility, as well as specific functions, while at the same time there is the principle of cooperation between the two structures.

[Petrov] What about the Army apartments that members of the Internal Ministry have moved into?

[Popovski] A solution has almost been reached here, in the sense that the tension surrounding the apartments has eased between the two ministries. We have now almost completed clearing the last apartments of members of the Internal Ministry and handing them over to the Defense Ministry. We expect the last apartment to be handed over in 30 or 40 days' time. As you know, there were 352 apartments involved, which had been occupied, while at this moment there are no more than 60 apartments in which workers from the Internal Ministry live.

[Petrov] How true are the rumors that a number of army officers lack motivation and discipline, and what is your assessment on the morale of the higher army officers of the Macedonian Army?

[Popovski] It is not true. On the contrary, the motivation and morale of the officers is, according to a study made by competent sectors, at a high level, which can be seen from the level of their education, organization, and function in individual units, which obtain high evaluations in all our controls. I can also say that excesses have been minimized, and that the incidents that happened two to three months ago in Titov Veles and a few months before that in Kicevo have been dealt with. We have not had other greater excesses or violations of discipline until now.

[Petrov] What is your assessment of the morale of the population, considering the degree of response of reserve officers to calls for military exercises?

[Popovski] There are no problems here either, because the response of officers to the call for exercises is extremely high, in some cases up to 90 percent. From this point of view we can talk about our reserve officers having a high morale.

[Petrov] What is the response of the Albanians?

[Popovski] It is quite good at the moment, and it has shown tendency toward improvement in the last four to five months. At the beginning, the response of the Albanians was about 7.5 percent, and today we already have 26.5 percent. This means that the response of the Albanians in the Macedonian Army has been competely normalized. We hope such an attitude regarding the Macedonian Army will become constant, that is to say regarding their civil duties.

[Petrov] Recently the question was raised in the Serbian Assembly for a reexamination of the borders with Macedonia. Is this border today completely marked according to all regulations, or which parts are a problem, disputable, or unsolved?

[Popovski] The border is not marked according to all regulations, because mutual recognition of the two states is necessary for that. As you know, the FRY has not recognized Macedonia de jure. On the other hand, such a marking of borders is done by an international commission, and then international evidence is presented on that. That has not been done between the two states, and we have submitted a request for such a commission to be created. Therefore the answer to the question why we have not yet marked the border lies with the other side, not with us. There are not any official denials of the border by the FRY, although the Serbian press writes about the denial of two points on the present border. One, according to them, is near the Dva Groba region, near Kumanovo, and the second is near the village of Tanusevci. The essential thing is that on our side there are disputable points regarding the inter-republic border that existed in former Yugoslavia. Macedonia possesses adequate documentation from the land registry records and from other official maps.

[Petrov] More than three months ago you stated that Macedonia will soon submit an official request for admission to NATO. Where does this initiative stand now?

[Popovski] The procedure has started and has been made official by a request from a party to the Macedonian Parliament. The procedure has been also initiated with the government, and to this there is added its own and the initiative of the Parliamentary group of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement for Macedonian National Unity]. An official request of the Republic for membership in NATO has been submitted to Parliament, which, according to the Constitution, is the only authority competent to make a decision on membership in international organizations.

[Petrov] Why has no strategy for the defense of the Republic of Macedonia been adopted yet?

[Popovski] First of all, I must say that there has been great mystification in the media regarding the strategy and doctrine. Of course they are important documents for the defense, but they cannot be prepared and worked out in a short period, and these documents do not have the character of a legal act adopted in a specifically defined procedure. There are countries that have been independent for longer than we have, and they still do not have, as it were, a doctrine. The Republic of Macedonia has, however, got its concept for defense and a plan for defense. Those documents have been adopted and are availabel the Macedonian Army. Therefore, it has to be stated publicly that the Army and the Ministry, or the Republic of Macedonia in general, has its plan for defense.

Montenegro

Republic Government Not Expected To Fall

AU0810120893 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] The Montenegrin Assembly has continued its autumn session in Podgorica. The deputies are discussing a confidence motion in the Montenegrin Government, initiated by the People's Party. The (?session) unexpectedly continued today, after an interruption early this morning. The session started with a delay and is characterized by fierce verbal exchanges between the deputies of the People's Party, on one side, and the government ministers and the deputies of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, on the other. The Democratic Party of Socialists has a majority of 46 in the assembly. There are 85 of them in all. A confidence vote will therefore not affect the future of Djukanovic's Government.

The agenda also includes several draft bills concerning social protection and a proposal to set up a parliamentary commission for establishing the facts surrounding the abduction of passengers in Strbci station on the Belgrade-Bar rail line.

Kosovo

Rugova Endorses UN Resolution on Yugoslavia

AU0710174493 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] In an exclusive statement to the Prishtina newspaper BUJKU, Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosovo, stressed that in its latest resolution the UN Security Council, defining the mandate of all UN forces in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia, confirmed thereby that the Bosnian problem is not the only one in former Yugoslavia, as Serbian propaganda would have it. There are a number of problems of equal importance: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosova, and others.

The UN Security Council sanctions have from the very beginning stipulated a number of conditions that must be fulfilled by Serbia, if it wants to avoid international political isolation and economic sanctions. The latest UN Security Council resolution, which refers to Croatia, shows the seriousness of the crisis in this region. We therefore welcome this resolution and consider it a positive step on the part of international diplomacy to resolve the existing problems in former Yugoslavia.

The 12 members of the European Community's belief that the crisis in former Yugoslavia requires a complete solution, not a partial one, was also viewed by President Rugova as a positive step. I believe that the latest position of the 12 members of the European Community, Rugova stated, is a result of more analytical examination of the situation and problems in former Yugoslavia. I believe, he went on to say, that only a complete solution and an agreement covering all problems can be useful, otherwise confrontations will continue and new crisis centers will be created.